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Abstract: This article argues that mirror neurons originate in sensorimotor associative learning and therefore a new approach is needed to
investigate their functions. Mirror neurons were discovered about 20 years ago in the monkey brain, and there is now evidence that they
are also present in the human brain. The intriguing feature of many mirror neurons is that they ﬁre not only when the animal is
performing an action, such as grasping an object using a power grip, but also when the animal passively observes a similar action
performed by another agent. It is widely believed that mirror neurons are a genetic adaptation for action understanding; that they
were designed by evolution to fulﬁll a speciﬁc socio-cognitive function. In contrast, we argue that mirror neurons are forged by
domain-general processes of associative learning in the course of individual development, and, although they may have psychological
functions, they do not necessarily have a speciﬁc evolutionary purpose or adaptive function. The evidence supporting this view shows
that (1) mirror neurons do not consistently encode action “goals”; (2) the contingency- and context-sensitive nature of associative
learning explains the full range of mirror neuron properties; (3) human infants receive enough sensorimotor experience to support
associative learning of mirror neurons (“wealth of the stimulus”); and (4) mirror neurons can be changed in radical ways by
sensorimotor training. The associative account implies that reliable information about the function of mirror neurons can be obtained
only by research based on developmental history, system-level theory, and careful experimentation.
Keywords: action understanding; associative learning; contextual modulation; contingency; genetic adaptation; imitation; mirror neuron;
poverty of the stimulus; sensorimotor experience.
1. Introduction
Mirror neurons (MNs) were discovered serendipitously in
1992 and given their brilliant name four years later (di Pel-
legrino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996). The striking feature
of many MNs is that they ﬁre not only when a monkey is
performing an action, such as grasping an object using a
power grip, but also when the monkey passively observes
a similar action performed by another. Neurons with this
capacity to match observed and executed actions, to code
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both “my action” and “your action,” were originally found in
area F5 of the ventral premotor cortex (PMC) (di Pelle-
grino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996) and the inferior par-
ietal lobule (IPL) (Bonini et al. 2010; Fogassi et al. 2005) of
the monkey brain. There is now a substantial body of evi-
dence suggesting that MNs are also present in the human
brain (Molenberghs et al. 2012).
MNs have received a great deal of attention from special-
ists and in the scientiﬁc and public media. Hailed as “cells
that read minds” (Blakesee 2006), “the neurons that shaped
civilization” (Ramachandran 2009), and a “revolution” in
understanding social behavior (Iacoboni 2008), MNs have
been ascribed a wide variety of functions. The primary can-
didates relate to action understanding (Gallese & Sinigaglia
2011; Rizzolatti et al. 1996), imitation (Iacoboni et al.
1999), and language processing (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998).
However, signifying the way in which MNs have captured
the attention and imagination of neuroscientists, psycholo-
gists, and philosophers, they have also been implicated in:
embodied simulation (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006b), empathy
(Avenanti et al. 2005), emotion recognition (Enticott
et al. 2008), intention-reading (Iacoboni et al. 2005),
language acquisition (Theoret & Pascual-Leone 2002),
language evolution (Arbib 2005), manual communication
(Rizzolatti et al. 1996), sign language processing (Corina
& Knapp 2006), speech perception (Glenberg et al.
2008), speech production (Kuhn & Brass 2008), music pro-
cessing (Gridley & Hoff 2006), sexual orientation (Ponseti
et al. 2006), and aesthetic experience (Cinzia & Gallese
2009). In addition, it has been suggested that MN dysfunc-
tion contributes to a number of disorders, including autism
(Dapretto et al. 2006; Nishitani et al. 2004; J. H. Williams
et al. 2001), schizophrenia (Arbib & Mundhenk 2005),
Down’s syndrome (Virji-Babul et al. 2008), multiple scler-
osis (Rocca et al. 2008), cigarette addiction (Pineda &
Oberman 2006), and obesity (Cohen 2008).
Thus, much of the ﬁrst 20 years of MN research has been
devoted to theorizing and speculation about their func-
tions. In contrast, the primary focus of this article is the
origin of MNs. Our principal questions are not “What do
MNs do?” or “What are they for?”, but “What is the
process that gives MNs their ‘mirrorness’; their fascinating,
cardinal capacity to match observed with executed
actions?”
The standard view of MNs, which we will call the
“genetic account,” alloys a claim about the origin of MNs
with a claim about their function. It suggests that the mir-
rorness of MNs is due primarily to heritable genetic factors,
and that the genetic predisposition to developMNs evolved
because MNs facilitate action understanding. In the sense
of “an adaptation” developed by G. C. Williams, and used
in Evolutionary Psychology, the genetic account casts
MNs as an adaptation for action understanding. In contrast,
we argue in this article that the balance of evidence cur-
rently favors an “associative account” of MNs, which separ-
ates questions about their origin and function. It suggests
that MNs acquire their capacity to match observed with
executed actions through domain-general processes of sen-
sorimotor associative learning, and that the role of MNs in
action understanding, or any other social cognitive func-
tion, is an open empirical question. The associative
account is functionally permissive; it allows, but does not
assume, that MNs make a positive contribution to social
cognition. Thus, there are three critical differences
between the genetic and associative accounts: (1) The
former combines, and the latter dissociates, questions
about origin and function. (2) The genetic account sug-
gests that natural selection has acted directly on MNs,
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whereas the associative account suggests that natural selec-
tion has played a background role; for example, acting on
domain-general mechanisms of associative learning. (3)
The genetic account assigns a relatively minor, facilitative
role to sensory and/or motor experience in the develop-
ment of MNs, whereas the associative account suggests
that sensorimotor experience plays a major, instructive
role in their development.
We begin, in section 2, with some basic information
about the ways in which MNs have been deﬁned and inves-
tigated in both monkeys and humans.1 In the third section
we present the genetic and associative accounts, and intro-
duce four kinds of evidence that have the potential to favor
one of these hypotheses over the other. Sections 4–7
discuss each of these types of evidence in turn. In section
8 we survey recent theories that are, or appear to be,
alternatives to the genetic and associative accounts, and
suggest that the associative account is stronger. Finally, in
section 9 we argue that the associative account has major
methodological implications for research investigating the
functions of MNs. Unlike the genetic account, the associat-
ive account doesn’t claim to tell us what MNs do or what
they are for, but it does tell us how we can ﬁnd out.
2. Mirror neuron basics
2.1. Locations and deﬁnitions
MNs have been found in the monkey brain (Macaca nemis-
trina and Macaca mulatta), not only in “classical” areas –
ventral PMC and IPL – but also in “non-classical” areas,
including primary motor cortex (Dushanova & Donoghue
2010; Tkach et al. 2007) and dorsal PMC (Tkach et al.
2007). There is also evidence of single neurons, or
circumscribed populations of neurons, with sensorimotor
matching properties in classical areas of the human
brain, including posterior regions of the inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG; considered the human homologue of the
monkey F5) (Kilner et al. 2009) and inferior parietal
cortex (Chong et al. 2008), and non-classical areas of the
human brain, including dorsal PMC, superior parietal
lobule, and cerebellum (Molenberghs et al. 2012), supple-
mentary motor area, and medial temporal lobe (Mukamel
et al. 2010).
Some researchers apply the term “mirror neuron” only to
neurons found in classical areas (Brown & Brune 2012;
Molenberghs et al. 2012), whereas others, like us, use the
term to refer to neurons in both classical and non-classical
areas (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011; Keysers & Gazzola 2010).
In addition to this variation in anatomical speciﬁcity, some
researchers reserve the term “mirror neuron” for units that
discharge during the observation and execution of precisely
(Dinstein et al. 2008b; Keysers 2009) or broadly similar
actions (Kilner et al. 2009), whereas others use the term,
at least on occasions, to refer to any neuron that is respon-
sive to both the observation and execution of action,
regardless of whether the observed and executed actions
are even broadly similar to one another (Gallese et al.
1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). In accord with the
majority of researchers in the ﬁeld, and the meaning of
the word “mirror,” we take it to be a cardinal feature of
MNs that they are responsive to observation and execution
of similar actions. However, following common usage, we
also refer to “logically related” MNs (see sect. 2.2), which
ﬁre during observation and execution of dissimilar
actions, as “mirror neurons.”
2.2. Monkeys
Early studies of the ﬁeld properties of monkey MNs – the
sensory and motoric conditions in which they ﬁre –
revealed three basic types: “Strictly congruent” MNs dis-
charge during observation and execution of the same
action, for example, precision grip. “Broadly congruent”
MNs are typically active during the execution of one
action (e.g., precision grip) and during the observation of
one or more similar, but not identical, actions (e.g.,
power grip alone, or precision grip, power grip, and grasp-
ing with the mouth). “Logically related” MNs respond to
different actions in observe and execute conditions. For
example, they ﬁre during the observation of an exper-
imenter placing food in front of the monkey, and when
the monkey grasps the food in order to eat it. MNs do
not respond to the presentation of objects alone (di Pelle-
grino et al. 1992). However, “canonical neurons,” which
are active during object observation and performance of
an action that is commonly performed on that object,
are co-located with MNs both in area F5 (Murata et al.
1997) and in the anterior intraparietal sulcus (Murata
et al. 2000).
To date, monkey MNs have been found that are respon-
sive to the observation and execution of hand and mouth
actions. The hand actions include grasping, placing, manip-
ulating with the ﬁngers, and holding (di Pellegrino et al.
1992; Gallese et al. 1996). The mouth actions include inges-
tive behaviors such as breaking food items, chewing and
sucking, and communicative gestures such as lip-smacking,
lip-protrusion, and tongue-protrusion (Ferrari et al. 2003).
2.3. Humans
Only one study purports to offer direct evidence – from
single cell recording – of MNs in the human brain
(Mukamel et al. 2010). However, there is a considerable
body of indirect evidence – from neuroimaging, transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and behavioral studies –
suggesting that human brains contain MNs or comparable
“mirror mechanisms”; circumscribed cortical areas
involved in both action production and observation (Glen-
berg 2011).
2.3.1. Neuroimaging. Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) has identiﬁed regions of PMC (both
classic BA6 and BA44) and inferior parietal areas that are
active during both action observation and execution
(Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006a; Buccino et al. 2004; Carr et al.
2003; Grèzes et al. 2003; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Leslie
et al. 2004; Tanaka & Inui 2002; Vogt et al. 2007). Overlap-
ping responses to action observation and execution have
been found in single-subject analyses of unsmoothed data
(Gazzola & Keysers 2009), conﬁrming that the foregoing
reports are not artifacts of group averaging. Most recently,
repetition suppression protocols have been used to provide
evidence of mirror populations encoding visual and motor
representations of the same action. These paradigms
exploit the logic that repeated stimulus presentation or
action execution causes a decrease in neural responses
(Grill-Spector et al. 2006). “Cross-modal” repetition
Cook et al.: Mirror neurons: From origin to function
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suppression effects have been reported, whereby action
observation followed by execution of the same action, or
vice versa, elicits repetition suppression in inferior parietal
regions (Chong et al. 2008; Lingnau et al. 2009) and in
PMC (Kilner et al. 2009; Lingnau et al. 2009).
2.3.2. Mirror pattern of MEPs. A human mirror mechanism
is further suggested by “mirror” motor evoked potentials
(MEPs) elicited during action observation (Fadiga et al.
1995). When TMS is applied to M1 during passive
action observation, the amplitude of the MEPs recorded
from the muscles required to execute that action is
greater than the amplitude of the MEPs recorded when
observing a different action. For example, observing
index and little ﬁnger abduction movements selectively
facilitates the amplitude of MEPs recorded from the ﬁrst
dorsal interosseus and abductor digiti minimi muscles,
responsible for index and little ﬁnger movements, res-
pectively (Catmur et al. 2011). That action observation
selectively increases corticospinal excitability to action
relevant muscles is suggestive of “mirror” sensorimotor
connectivity.
2.3.3. Automatic imitation. Automatic imitation is said to
occur when observation of an action involuntarily facilitates
performance of a topographically similar action (body parts
make the same movements relative, not to external frames
of reference, but to one another) and/or interferes with
performance of a topographically dissimilar action (Brass
et al. 2001; Stürmer et al. 2000). Humans show robust auto-
matic imitation when they observe hand, arm, foot, and
mouth movements (Heyes 2011). This is regarded by
many researchers as evidence of a human mirror mechan-
ism (Blakemore & Frith 2005; Ferrari et al. 2009a; Iaco-
boni 2009; Kilner et al. 2003; Longo et al. 2008; van
Schie et al. 2008). Supporting this view, several studies
have shown that application of disruptive TMS to the
IFG – a classical mirror area – interferes with automatic
imitation (Catmur et al. 2009; Newman-Norlund et al.
2010).
3. The mirrorness of mirror neurons: Genetic or
associative?
This section presents the standard, genetic account of the
origin of MNs and the alternative associative account.
3.1. Genes for mirroring?
The genetic account assumes: (1) Among common ances-
tors of extant monkeys and humans, some individuals had
a stronger genetic predisposition to develop MNs, and
(2) these individuals were more reproductively successful
than those with a weaker genetic predisposition because
the development of MNs enhanced their capacity to under-
stand the actions of other agents. Consequently, (3) a
genetic predisposition to develop MNs became universal,
or nearly universal, in monkeys and humans. (4) Motor
experience (the performance of actions) and/or sensory
experience (the observation of actions) plays a facilitative
(Gottlieb 1976) or permissive (Gilbert 2003) role in the
development of MNs, but their matching properties are
primarily due to this genetic predisposition.
The term “action understanding” was introduced by Riz-
zolatti and colleagues to characterize the function of MNs
(Rizzolatti & Fadiga 1998; Rizzolatti et al. 1996). As far as
we are aware, it had not previously been used in research
on animal or human cognition. The term plays a key role
in the genetic account; it describes the adaptive function
of MNs, the effects that made them a target of positive
selection pressure. However, there is still no consensus
about exactly what is meant by “action understanding,” or
how it differs from cognate functions such as “action per-
ception,” “action recognition,” and “action selection”
(Gallese et al. 2011). Attempts to clarify have emphasized
that, in comparison with purely visual processing of
action, MN activity relates to the “meaning” of an action
and yields a “richer understanding,” “real understanding,”
or “understanding from within” (Gallese et al. 2011; Rizzo-
latti & Sinigaglia 2010). As we discuss further in section 8,
these descriptions do not provide an operational deﬁnition
of action understanding, that is, a deﬁnition that would
allow behavior based on (this kind of) action understanding
to be distinguished empirically from behavior based on
other processes.
Until recently, the genetic account was largely implicit in
discussions of the “evolution” of MNs (Gallese & Goldman
1998; Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004;
M. J. Rochat et al. 2010). For example, it has been
suggested that “the mirror neuron mechanism is a mechan-
ism of great evolutionary importance through which pri-
mates understand actions done by their conspeciﬁcs”
(Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004, p. 172) and that “in their
basic properties, MNs constitute a relatively simple
action-perception mechanism that could have been
exploited several times in the course of animal evolution”
(Bonini & Ferrari 2011, p. 172). A number of discussions
have also expressed the view that MNs are present at
birth (Ferrari et al. 2009; Gallese et al. 2009; Lepage &
Theoret 2007; Rizzolatti & Fadiga 1998), a feature com-
monly associated with traits for which there is strong
genetic predisposition (Mameli & Bateson 2006). For
example, Casile and colleagues have suggested that “both
face processing and the mirror neuron system, or at least
the part involved in facial movements, rely on a brain
network that is present already at birth and whose elements
are probably genetically predetermined” (Casile et al. 2011,
p. 531).
In its starkest form, the genetic hypothesis would suggest
that gene-based natural selection has provided each indi-
vidual –monkey and human –with MNs that code the
mapping between a ﬁxed set of observed and executed
actions, and that experience plays a minimal role in the
development of the observation-execution matching prop-
erties of these neurons. However, the genetic hypothesis
does not necessarily assume that experience plays a
minimal role. For example, in a recent explicit statement
of the genetic account, Gallese et al. (2009) suggested
that links form during gestation between motor regions
and “to-become-visual” regions that will subsequently
mediate sensorimotor matching abilities in young infants.
They implied that these projections are genetically predis-
posed to target certain visual areas, and therefore that the
matching properties of MNs are produced by information
encoded in the genome. However, they also suggested
that motor experience plays a part in preparing motor
regions to send projections to visual areas, and that visual
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experience may also facilitate the maturation of fully func-
tioning MNs.
3.2. A product of associative learning
The associative hypothesis assumes that gene-based natural
selection has played a signiﬁcant background role with
respect to the development of MNs; for example, in
shaping the anatomy of visual and motor cortex for visual
guidance of action, and in producing the capacity for associ-
ative learning in neural tissue. However, it suggests that the
cardinal matching properties of MNs are a product, not of a
speciﬁc genetic predisposition, but of domain-general pro-
cesses of associative learning – the same kind of learning
that produces Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning
phenomena (Catmur et al. 2009; Heyes 2010; Ray &
Heyes 2011). Associative learning is found in a wide
range of vertebrate and invertebrate species, indicating
that it is an evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved
adaptation for tracking predictive relationships between
events (Heyes 2012b; Schultz & Dickinson 2000).
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of howMNs could
acquire their matching properties through sensorimotor
associative learning. Before associative learning, sensory
neurons in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), responsive
to different high-level visual properties of observed action
(Oram & Perrett 1994; 1996), are weakly connected,
directly or indirectly, to motor neurons in PMC (Rizzolatti
et al. 1988) and parietal cortex (Gallese et al. 2002). Some
of these connections may be stronger than others, but the
links between sensory and motor neurons coding similar
actions are not consistently stronger than other, non-
matching links. The kind of learning that produces MNs
occurs when there is correlated (i.e., contiguous and con-
tingent) excitation of sensory neurons and motor neurons
that code similar actions. For example, when an adult imi-
tates an infant’s facial movements, there might be corre-
lated excitation of neurons that are responsive to the
observation and execution of lip protrusion. Correlated
excitation of the sensory and motor neurons increases the
strength of the connection between them, so that sub-
sequent excitation of the sensory neuron propagates to
the motor neuron. Thereafter, the motor neuron ﬁres,
not only during execution of lip protrusion, but also, via
its connection with the sensory neuron, during observation
of lip protrusion; what was originally a motor neuron has
become a lip protrusion MN. Correlated excitation of
sensory and motor neurons encoding the same property
of action occurs not only when humans are imitated, but
also when we observe our own actions (directly or using
an optical mirror); observe others during the kind of syn-
chronous activities involved in sports and dance training;
and as a consequence of “acquired equivalence” experi-
ence, for example, when the same sound (a word, or a
sound produced by an action) is paired sometimes with
observation of an action and sometimes with its execution
(Catmur et al. 2009; Ray & Heyes 2011).
There are several important things to note about the
associative hypothesis:
1. Strong experience-dependence – It suggests that
correlated sensorimotor experience plays an inductive
Figure 1. Mirror neurons from associative learning. (a) Before learning, sensory neurons in STS, encoding visual descriptions of
observed action, are not systematically connected to motor neurons in premotor and parietal areas involved in the production of
similar actions. (b) Through social interaction and self-observation in the course of typical development, agents receive correlated
sensorimotor experience; they see and do the same action at about the same time (contiguity), with one event predicting the other
(contingency). This experience produces correlated activation of sensory and motor neurons coding similar actions, and, through
associative learning, (c) strengthens connections between these neurons. Due to these connections, neurons that were once involved
only in the execution of action will also discharge during observation of a similar action; motor neurons become MNs (see sect. 3.2).
Because the visual system and motor system are organised hierarchically, some types of sensorimotor experience produce correlated
activation of sensory and motor neurons coding relatively low-level features of action (e.g., left or right hand, power or precision
grip), and thereby generate strictly congruent, hand- and direction-sensitive MNs. Other types produce correlated activation of
neurons coding relatively high-level features (e.g., grasping) and generate broadly congruent MNs (see sect. 5.1).
Cook et al.: Mirror neurons: From origin to function
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(Gottlieb 1976) or instructive (Gilbert 2003) role; without
this kind of experience, MNs would not develop at all.
2. Social construction – It proposes that much of the
sensorimotor experience required for MN development
comes from being imitated, synchronous action, and
exposure to action words (Ray & Heyes 2011), and there-
fore that MNs are to a very large extent built through
social interaction.
3. Contingency – Following contemporary learning
theory, the associative account speciﬁes that MN develop-
ment requires, not just that sensory and motor neurons
“ﬁre together” in a Hebbian way (contiguity), but that the
event provoking ﬁring of one predicts the event provoking
ﬁring of the other (contingency; Cook et al. 2010).
4. Testability – The associative account makes novel
predictions about the development and mature properties
of MNs, many of which have already been tested and
supported by experiments using a variety of methods (see
sect. 7).
Thus, the associative hypothesis implies that the cha-
racteristic, matching properties of MNs result from a
genetically evolved process, associative learning, but this
process was not “designed” by genetic evolution to
produce MNs. Rather, it just happens to produce MNs
when the developing system receives correlated experience
of observing and executing similar actions. When the
system receives correlated experience of observing
objects and executing actions, the same associative
process produces canonical neurons. When the system
receives correlated experience of observing one action
and executing a different action, the same associative
process produces logically related MNs.
3.3. Not nature versus nurture
The contrast between the genetic and associative hypoth-
eses does not represent a dichotomous nature–nurture
debate. It has been recognized for decades that the devel-
opment of all phenotypic characteristics depends on the
interaction of nature and nurture, genes and the environ-
ment, evolution and learning (Elman et al. 1996; Oyama
1985). Rather, the two accounts differ in the speciﬁc
roles they assign to genetic evolution and to learning, and
in the types of experience they take to be important, in pro-
ducing the characteristic matching properties of MNs. The
genetic hypothesis says that genetic evolution has played a
speciﬁc and decisive role, and learning – based on sensory
and/or motor experience – plays a merely facilitative role,
in the development of MNs. In contrast, the associative
hypothesis says that genetic evolution has played a non-
speciﬁc background role, and that the characteristic match-
ing properties of MNs are forged by sensorimotor learning.
Regarding the function of MNs, the genetic account
assumes that they play a fundamental role in action under-
standing, and that this is why a speciﬁc genetic predisposi-
tion to develop MNs was favored by natural selection. In
other words, it proposes that action understanding is the
“adaptive function” of MNs, or that MNs are “an adap-
tation” for action understanding. In this way, the genetic
account offers a hypothesis about the function of MNs as
an explanation for their origins. In contrast, the associative
account separates questions about the origin and function
of MNs. It suggests that MNs develop through associative
learning, and that further research is needed to ﬁnd out
how they contribute to social cognition (see sect. 9). If
this research reveals that MNs make positive contributions
to social cognition, these would be “psychological uses” or
“psychological functions,” but not necessarily “adaptive
functions”; they may not have enhanced reproductive
ﬁtness, nor resulted in the evolution of mechanisms speciﬁ-
cally designed to foster the development of MNs (see sect.
8). Rather, it is possible that MNs are constructed by
domain-general processes of associative learning, and are
recruited in the course of development to contribute
to one or more psychological functions, without either
the construction or the recruitment processes having
become a speciﬁc target of gene-based selection (Elman
et al. 1996).
In this respect, MNs may be like beak morphology in
Neotropical woodcreepers, which has been selected for
foraging and food manipulation (a non-social function, ana-
logous to visuomotor capability) but also has effects on song
production (a social function, analogous to action under-
standing; Derryberry et al. 2012). Another more closely
related example comes from honeybees, which are able
to use associative learning to discriminate among human
faces (Dyer et al. 2005). Given the taxonomic- and
domain-generality of associative learning, and the fact
that human faces were not part of the environment in
which honeybee nervous systems evolved, we can be sure
that associative learning is not an adaptation for face dis-
crimination in honeybees. However, when they are put in
an environment where faces are important, honeybees
can use associative learning about faces to optimize their
foraging behavior. Another example, which may be
closely related in a different way, is the area of the
human occipito-temporal cortex known as the “visual
word form area” (VWFA; Petersen et al. 1990). This area
plays an important role in reading, but, given the recent
emergence of literacy in human history, the VWFA is
very unlikely to be a genetic adaptation for reading.
Rather, the reading-related properties of the VWFA are
forged in the course of development, by literacy training,
from a system adapted for generic object recognition.
3.4. Four kinds of evidence
Four evidence-based arguments are crucial in deciding
between the genetic and associative accounts. The ﬁrst pro-
vided the inspiration and foundation for the genetic
hypothesis. It suggests that the ﬁeld properties of MNs
indicate that they were designed for action understanding.
The terms “design” and “purpose” are used here as they
were by G. C. Williams in his seminal work on Adaptation
and Natural Selection (Williams 1966). Williams described
adaptations as designed by natural selection to fulﬁll a par-
ticular purpose, and emphasized that the mark of an adap-
tation is that it has features making it peculiarly apt to
achieve a speciﬁc end in a highly efﬁcient way. For
example, “An examination of the legs and feet of the fox
forces the conclusion that they are designed for running
and walking, not for the packing or removal of snow” (p.
13). In a similar way, supporters of the genetic hypothesis
argue that examination of the ﬁeld properties of MNs –
and, in particular, their “goal” coding – forces the con-
clusion that MNs are designed for action understanding.
In section 3 we examine the ﬁeld properties of MNs and
suggest that this argument is not compelling.
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The second argument is complementary to the ﬁrst; it
has a similar form but advocates the associative hypothesis.
It suggests that research using conditioning procedures
shows associative learning to be the right kind of learning
to produce MNs. Speciﬁcally, as we discuss in section 5,
the ways in which associative learning tracks contingent
relationships, and enables contextual modulation of these
connections, makes it apt to produceMNs (and non-match-
ing visuomotor neurons) in typical developmental
environments.
The second pair of arguments draws on research examin-
ing the development of MNs and their modiﬁcation
through sensorimotor experience. Section 6 discusses
research with infants and adults that has been used to
support a “poverty of the stimulus” argument (Chomsky
1975); to suggest that MNs emerge too early in develop-
ment or, more generally, after too little sensorimotor
experience, to have been forged by associative learning.
In contrast, we offer a “wealth of the stimulus” argument.
Finally, section 7 focuses on evidence that, even in adult-
hood, the properties of MNs can be changed in radical ways
by relatively brief periods of sensorimotor experience. We
argue, against various objections, that this evidence is
sound and therefore supports the associative hypothesis
by showing that it has produced novel, testable predictions
which have been conﬁrmed by experiment.
4. Designed for action understanding
Supporters of the genetic hypothesis argue that examin-
ation of the ﬁeld properties of MNs shows that they
encode “goals,” and this characteristic indicates that they
were designed by genetic evolution to mediate action
understanding (Bonini & Ferrari 2011; Rizzolatti & Craigh-
ero 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). We therefore begin
our survey of the evidence by considering how well the
neurophysiological data accord with this view. The term
“goal” affords numerous interpretations (Hickok 2009).
We will consider two deﬁnitions commonly adopted,
assuming that MNs encode “goals” if they encode object-
directed actions (sect. 4.1) or high-level action intentions
(sect. 4.2).
4.1. Goals as object-directed actions
Early descriptions of MN ﬁeld properties reported that
pantomimed actions (e.g., miming a precision grip in the
absence of an object) and intransitive actions (e.g.,
tongue-protrusion) did not elicit MN responses (di Pelle-
grino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996). In contrast, robust
responses were reported when monkeys observed object-
directed actions. This pattern raised the possibility that
MNs encode “goals” in the sense that they are responsive
only to object-directed actions (di Pellegrino et al. 1992;
Gallese et al. 1996).
However, a close reading of the single-cell data suggests
that only a small subset of MNs appeared to have been
“designed for” encoding action goals in these terms. A
subset of the MNs described in the early reports continued
to respond, albeit less strongly, to pantomimed or intransi-
tive actions (di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996,
Figure 5b), and subsequent studies conﬁrmed that sizable
proportions, perhaps the majority, of MNs exhibit robust
responses to the observation of object-free body move-
ment. Kraskov et al. (2009) reported that 73% of MN
responses modulated by observation of object-directed
grasping showed similar modulation during observation of
pantomimed grasping. Also, substantial proportions of
MNs respond to intransitive mouth movements such as
lip-smacking, lip-protrusion, and tongue-protrusion
(Ferrari et al. 2003).
Single-unit data also show that, even when they are
responding to object-directed actions, MNs have ﬁeld
properties suggesting that they were not tuned to do this
by genetic evolution. For example, after training in which
tools were used to pass food items to monkeys, MNs
were discovered that respond to the observation of
actions such as grasping with pliers (Ferrari et al. 2005).
Similarly, “audiovisual” MNs respond to unnatural sounds
associated with actions; for example, the sound of metal
striking metal, plastic crumpling, and paper tearing
(Keysers et al. 2003; Kohler et al. 2002). Importantly,
large numbers of tool-use and audiovisual MNs respond
more to the sight of tool-actions and to action sounds
than to the sight of gripping or tearing executed with the
hands. The fact that these MNs respond maximally to unna-
tural stimuli – that is, stimuli to which the evolutionary
ancestors of contemporary monkeys could not possibly
have been exposed – is hard to reconcile with the genetic
hypothesis (Cook 2012; see sect. 7).
4.2. Goals as high-level intentions
The term “goal” has also been used to refer to what, at a
high level of generality, the actor intends to achieve
through their behavior – for example, “grasp in order to
eat” (Fogassi et al. 2005) or “taking possession of an
object” (M. J. Rochat et al. 2010). Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
(2010, p. 269) state: “only those [neurons] that can encode
the goal of the motor behavior of another individual with
the greatest degree of generality can be considered to be
crucial for action understanding.” The suggestion that
MNs encode high-level action intentions is made plausible
by reports that MN responses to grasping can be modu-
lated by the ﬁnal outcome of the motor sequence (Bonini
et al. 2010; Fogassi et al. 2005). It is also consistent with
reports that some broadly congruent MNs respond to the
observation of multiple actions; for example, any “grasping”
action executed with the hand or mouth (Gallese et al.
1996).
However, the single-cell data again suggest that relatively
few MNs have the ﬁeld properties one would expect of a
system designed by genetic evolution to represent high-
level action intentions. For example, Gallese et al. (1996)
reported that during action observation 37.5% of MNs
responded differently depending on whether the action
was executed with the left or right hand, and 64%
showed direction sensitivity, preferring either left-to-right
or right-to-left grasping actions. Similarly, many MNs
(53%) respond selectively to the observation of actions exe-
cuted within (“peripersonal”MNs) or beyond (“extraperso-
nal” MNs), not the actor’s, but the observing monkey’s
reach (Caggiano et al. 2009). The majority (74%) of MNs
also exhibit view-dependent responses; some MNs are
tuned to egocentric (ﬁrst-person) presentation, while
others respond maximally to allocentric (third-person) per-
spectives (Caggiano et al. 2011). Each of these classes of
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MN is sensitive to features of action that fall well below
the “greatest degree of generality” of intentions such as
“grasping in order to eat” or “taking possession of an
object.”
The ﬁeld properties of logically related MNs are perhaps
the hardest to reconcile with the idea that MNs were
designed by genetic evolution to mediate action under-
standing by activating in the observer the same “goal”
that is guiding the actor’s behavior. Logically related
MNs ﬁre when a monkey observes an action with one
goal (e.g., placing food items on a table, with the intention
of giving food to the monkey) and when the monkey exe-
cutes an action with a different goal (e.g., grasping the
food with a precision-grip and bringing it to the mouth,
with the intention of eating). Thus, these MNs respond
to different object-directed actions, with different inten-
tions, in observe and execute conditions.
5. The right kind of learning
The previous section argued that many MNs have ﬁeld
properties incompatible with the hypothesis that they
were designed by genetic evolution to mediate action
understanding via goal coding. In complementary fashion,
this section argues that research on the roles of contingency
and contextual modulation in associative learning enables
the associative hypothesis to provide a uniﬁed account of
all the MN ﬁeld properties reported to date.
5.1. Predictive relationships
It has long been recognized that associative learning
depends, not only on contiguity – events occurring close
together in time – but also on contingency – the degree to
which one event reliably predicts the other. Where the pre-
dictive relationship between two events is weak – that is,
where one event is equally likely to occur in the presence
and absence of the other event – contiguous pairings
produce little or no learning (Elsner & Hommel 2004;
Rescorla 1968; Schultz & Dickinson 2000). The associative
account therefore predicts that MNs will acquire sensori-
motor matching properties only when an individual experi-
ences contingencies between sensory events and
performed actions (Cooper et al. 2013b). This feature of
associative learning ensures that the matching properties
of MNs reﬂect, not just chance co-occurrences, but sensor-
imotor relationships that occur reliably in the individual’s
environment. Evidence that the human mirror mechanism
is modiﬁed by contingent but not by non-contingent sen-
sorimotor experience has been reported by Cook et al.
(2010).
Contingency sensitivity explains the mix of strictly con-
gruent MNs, sensitive to the low-level features of observed
actions (type of grip, effector used, direction of movement,
viewpoint, proximity to the observer), and broadly congru-
ent MNs, responsive to multiple related actions irrespec-
tive of the manner of their execution. Both visual and
motor systems are known to be organized hierarchically
(Felleman & Van Essen 1991; Giese & Poggio 2003; Jean-
nerod 1994; Perrett et al. 1989), comprising different popu-
lations encoding relatively low-level representations (e.g.,
descriptions of particular “precision” or “power” grips)
and more abstract representations (e.g., descriptions of
“grasping”). Therefore, contingencies can be experienced
between both low- and high-level sensory and motor rep-
resentations. When a monkey observes itself performing
a precision grip, the excitation of sensory and motor popu-
lations encoding a speciﬁc grip are correlated. However,
during group feeding, a monkey might observe and
perform a range of grasping actions, thereby causing corre-
lated excitation of higher-level visual and motoric descrip-
tions of grasping. Contingency sensitivity therefore
explains the existence of both strictly congruent MNs,
tuned to a particular sensory representation (e.g., a right-
to-left precision grip executed with the right hand viewed
egocentrically), and broadly congruent MNs, responsive
to the observation of a number of related actions.
Contingency sensitivity also explains the existence of
logically related, audiovisual, and tool-use MNs. According
to the associative hypothesis, MNs acquire sensorimotor
properties whenever individuals experience a contingency
between “seeing” and “doing.” There is no requirement
that contingencies are between action performance and
the observation of the same action, or indeed of natural
action-related stimuli, such as the sight of animate motion
or sounds that could have been heard by ancestors of con-
temporary monkeys. Both monkeys and humans frequently
experience non-matching sensorimotor contingencies,
where the observation of one action predicts the execution
of another; for example, you release and I grasp (Newman-
Norlund et al. 2007; Tiedens & Fragale 2003). The associ-
ative account therefore explains in a very straightforward
way why logically related MNs respond to different
actions in observe and execute conditions. Equally, the
associative account explains in a simple way why “tool-
use” MNs (Ferrari et al. 2005) develop when action per-
formance is reliably predicted by the sight of actions
performed with tools (e.g., food items being gripped with
pliers), and why “audiovisual” MNs (Keysers et al. 2003;
Kohler et al. 2002) develop when action performance pre-
dicts characteristic action sounds (e.g., paper tearing or
plastic crumpling; Cook 2012).
5.2. Contextual modulation
Studies of conditioning indicate that learned responses are
often subject to contextual control; if a stimulus is associ-
ated with two responses, each in a different context, then
the context determines which response is cued by the
stimulus (Bouton 1993; 1994; Peck & Bouton 1990). For
example, Peck and Bouton (1990) initially placed rats in a
conditioning chamber with a distinctive scent (e.g.,
coconut) where they learned to expect electric shock fol-
lowing a tone. The rats were then transferred to a second
chamber with a different scent (e.g., aniseed) where the
same tone predicted the delivery of food. The rats
quickly learned the new contingency and conditioned fora-
ging responses replaced conditioned freezing. However,
learning in the second phase was context dependent.
When the rats were returned to the ﬁrst chamber, or trans-
ferred to a third chamber with a novel scent, the tone once
again elicited freezing. By drawing on the components of
associative learning theory that explain this kind of effect,
the associative account of MNs can explain contextual
modulation of MN ﬁring (Cook et al. 2012a).
Many, possibly all, of the ﬁndings cited as evidence that
monkey MNs code action goals can also be interpreted
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within an associative framework as evidence that MNs are
subject to contextual control. For example, some MNs
show stronger visual responses to object-directed grasping
than to pantomimed grasping in object-absent contexts
(Gallese et al. 1996), and in some cases, the modulating
inﬂuence of the object-context can be seen even when
the target object is occluded prior to contact with the
hand (Umiltà et al. 2001). Similarly, MN responses
during the observation of grasping may be modulated by
the type of object being grasped (Caggiano et al. 2012),
with some MNs responding more strongly in the presence
of high-value (food, or non-food objects predictive of
reward), and some in the presence of low-value (non-
food objects not associated with reward) stimuli. In the
clearest example, the same motor act, grasping with a pre-
cision grip, elicits different MN responses dependent on
whether the action is observed in the presence (“grasp to
place”) or absence (“grasp to eat”) of a plastic cup
(Bonini et al. 2010; Fogassi et al. 2005). Rather than the
plastic cup providing a cue to the actor’s intention, it may
act as a contextual cue modulating the operation of two
associations. In the same way that the sound of the tone eli-
cited different behaviors when presented in the coconut
and aniseed contexts (Peck & Bouton 1990), observing a
precision grip may excite different MNs in the cup-
present and cup-absent contexts.
Thus, many of the ﬁeld properties cited as evidence of
goal (intention) coding by MNs can also be explained by
contextual modulation within an associative framework.
Under the “goal” interpretation, these ﬁeld properties con-
stitute direct evidence that MNs mediate action under-
standing. Under the associative interpretation, they are
very interesting but not decisive. The ﬂexibility apparent
in the ﬁeld properties of MNs gives them the potential to
make a useful contribution to social behavior. However,
further research, examining the behavior of whole organ-
isms, not only of neurons, is needed to ﬁnd out how this
potential is realized (see sect. 9).
6. Wealth and poverty of the stimulus
Research involving infants (sect. 6.1) and adults (sect. 6.2)
has been used to support a poverty argument suggesting
that MNs emerge too early in development or, more gen-
erally, after too little sensorimotor experience, to have
been forged by associative learning.
6.1. Mirroring in infancy
It has been argued that: (1) imitation is mediated by MNs
(or a mirror mechanism); (2) both human and monkey
infants are able to imitate observed actions when they
have had minimal opportunity for visuomotor learning;
and (3) therefore, the associative account of the origin of
MNs must be wrong (Gallese et al. 2011). The structure
of this argument is valid, but the evidence supporting the
second assumption (e.g., Heimann et al. 1989; Meltzoff
& Moore 1977; Nagy et al. 2005) has been challenged in
two respects. Building on previous analyses (e.g., Anisfeld
1996), a recent review found evidence that human neo-
nates copy only one action – tongue-protrusion – and that
this copying does not show the speciﬁcity characteristic of
imitation or of MNs (Ray & Heyes 2011). Figure 2
illustrates the ﬁrst of these points. For each of the action
types tested in young infants, it shows the number of pub-
lished studies reporting positive evidence of imitation and
the number reporting negative evidence. This is a highly
conservative measure of how often young infants have
failed imitation tests, because it is much harder to publish
negative than positive results (Fanelli 2012). Nonetheless,
Figure 2 shows that the number of positive reports subs-
tantially exceeds the number of negative reports only
for tongue-protrusion. Evidence that even the tongue-
protrusion effect lacks the speciﬁcity characteristic of imita-
tion and MNs – that it is an exploratory response, rather
than an effect in which action observation is met with per-
formance only of a similar action – comes from research
showing that tongue-protrusion can be elicited by a range
of arousing stimuli, including ﬂashing lights and lively
music (Jones 1996; 2006), and that it is greater when
infants observe a mechanical “tongue” or disembodied
mouth (Soussignan et al. 2011).2 More broadly, evidence
that the development of imitation is crucially dependent
on learning is provided by a study of 2-year-old twins
showing that individual differences in imitation were a
result predominantly of environmental rather than genetic
factors (McEwen et al. 2007), and by a recent study of
infants indicating that individual differences in associative
learning ability at 1-month predicted imitative performance
eight months later (Reeb-Sutherland et al. 2012).
Turning from human to monkey infants, Ferrari et al.
(2006) reported immediate imitation of tongue-protrusion
and lip-smacking in 3-days-old monkeys. However, the
effects were not present on days 1, 7, and 14 postpartum,
and it is not clear whether they were replicated in a sub-
sequent study using a similar procedure (Paukner et al.
2011). The later study did report imitation of lip-smacking
in monkeys less than one week old, but this effect seems to
have been due to a low frequency of lip-smacking in the
control condition, when infants were observing a static
neutral face, rather than to an elevated frequency of lip-
smacking when the infants were observing lip-smacking.
Therefore, in common with the data from human infants,
studies of imitation in newborn monkeys do not currently
support a poverty argument.
Figure 2. Summary of experiments seeking evidence of gesture
imitation in human infants (adapted from Ray & Heyes 2011).
“Gesture type” refers to the target or modelled movement.
Positive frequencies (lighter bars) indicate the number of
published experiments reporting positive cross-target comparisons
(i.e., infants performed the target action more often after
observing the target action than after observing an alternative
action). Negative frequencies (darker bars) indicate the number
of experiments reporting failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in
cross-target comparison.
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A similar poverty argument suggests that the associative
account must be wrong because (1) suppression of alpha
band (∼6–13 Hz) oscillations over central scalp locations
during action observation (and execution) reﬂects the oper-
ation of MNs or a mirror mechanism, and (2) electroence-
phalographic (EEG) studies indicate that both human and
monkey infants show alpha suppression when they have
had minimal opportunity for sensorimotor learning
(Gallese et al. 2011; Nyström et al. 2011). In this case,
both of the assumptions are questionable. First, the func-
tional signiﬁcance of alpha band oscillatory activity is
poorly understood even in human adults, and is yet more
difﬁcult to interpret in human and monkey infants where,
for example, less information is available about the source
(Marshall & Meltzoff 2011). Second, human adult studies
have traced the likely source of central alpha suppression
during action execution to the somatosensory cortex (Hari
& Salmelin 1997), suggesting that it may not index motor
processing at all.3 Third, even if alpha suppression does
index motor processing, it does not show that the motor
activation matches or mirrors the actions observed (Mar-
shall & Meltzoff 2011; Pfurtscheller et al. 2000). For
example, alpha suppression during observation of lip-
smacking, which has been reported in neonatal monkeys
(Ferrari et al. 2012), may reﬂect a generalized readiness
to act, or arousal-related motor activation of tongue-protru-
sion, rather than motor activation of lip-smacking, and
thereby the occurrence of MN or mirror mechanism
activity. Furthermore, studies of human infants, which
provide superior source information, have not shown that
central alpha suppression occurs when infants have had
insufﬁcient correlated sensorimotor experience to build a
mirror mechanism through associative learning. Indeed,
studies of human infants suggest an age-related trend con-
sistent with the associative hypothesis (see Marshall et al.
[2011] for a review).
Sound evidence of MN activity in newborns –which,
we suggest, has not been provided by research to date on
imitation and alpha suppression –would be inconsistent
with the associative model. However, it is important to
note that the associative account is predicated on a
“wealth of the stimulus” argument and therefore antici-
pates MN activity in young infants (Ray & Heyes 2011).
This wealth argument points out that human developmen-
tal environments typically contain multiple sources of the
kind of correlated sensorimotor experience necessary to
build MNs; each of these sources is rich; and the mechan-
isms of associative learning can make swift and efﬁcient use
of these sources. The range of sources available to young
human infants includes self-observation, being imitated
by adults, being rewarded by adults for imitation, and the
kind of experience in which, for example, lip movements
make the same smacking or popping sound when observed
and executed. Evidence of the richness of these sources
comes from studies showing that infants spend a high pro-
portion of their waking hours observing their own hands in
motion (P. Rochat 1998; White et al. 1964); in face-to-face
interaction with a caregiver, they are imitated on average
once every minute (Jones 2009; Pawlby 1977; Uzgiris
et al. 1989); and “noisy actions,” which provide an early
source of acquired equivalence experience, are among
the ﬁrst that infants imitate (Jones 2009). A common mis-
conception about associative learning is that it always
occurs slowly. Directly relevant evidence that this is not
the case comes from studies showing that, when the contin-
gency is high, infants can learn action-effect associations in
just a few trials (Paulus et al. 2012; Verschoor et al. 2010).
6.2. Motor training in adulthood
It has been claimed that the associative account “cannot
explain why motor experience obtained without visual feed-
back can affect perception of human biological motion
related to that experience” (Gallese et al. 2011, p. 383).
This claim assumes that the perception of human biological
motion is mediated by MNs or a mirror mechanism, and
appeals to a subtle poverty argument; it suggests that the
fundamental properties of MNs – the way in which they
map observed with executed actions – can be changed by
motor experience alone, that is, in the absence of correlated
sensorimotor experience.
Two types of evidence, from studies that were not
designed to investigate MNs, have been cited in support
of this subtle poverty argument (Gallese et al. 2011).
First, when observing point-light displays of whole body
movements such as walking, from a third party perspective,
people are better able to recognize themselves than to
recognize their friends (Beardsworth & Buckner 1981;
Loula et al. 2005). Second, practice in executing actions
can improve visual discrimination of those actions, even
when actors are prevented from observing their move-
ments during execution (Casile & Giese 2006; Hecht
et al. 2001). These motor training effects, and the self-
recognition advantage, are interesting and important
phenomena in their own right. If they were mediated by
a mirror mechanism – that is, a mechanism in which there
is a direct, unmediated connection between visual and
motor representations of action – they would also support
a poverty argument. However, a recent study provides evi-
dence that these effects depend on an indirect mechanism
representing temporal cues. It shows, using avatar facial
motion stimuli, that the self-recognition advantage is main-
tained despite gross distortion of the kind of spatial cues
that characterize biological motion, but is abolished by
even relatively minor disturbance of domain-general tem-
poral cues (Cook et al. 2012b). In the absence of appropri-
ate visual experience, actors appear to be able to use their
considerable knowledge of the rhythmic characteristics of
their own actions to recognize and better represent allo-
centric movement displays. Thus, motor training effects
and the self-recognition advantage are of independent
interest, but they do not support a poverty argument
because current evidence suggests that they do not
depend on a mirror mechanism.
7. Sensorimotor learning changes mirror neurons
7.1. Testing the predictions of the associative account
The associative account has been explicitly tested in exper-
iments examining the effects of laboratory-based sensori-
motor training on mirror mechanisms in human adults.
Building on the results of more naturalistic studies (Calvo-
Merino et al. 2005; 2006; Cross et al. 2006; Ferrari et al.
2005; Haslinger et al. 2005; Jackson et al. 2006; Keysers
et al. 2003; Kohler et al. 2002; Margulis et al. 2009; Vogt
et al. 2007), these experiments have isolated the effects of
sensorimotor experience from those of purely visual and
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purely motor experience. Using all of the measures of
mirror mechanism activity commonly applied to humans
(sect. 2.3), they have shown that relatively brief periods of
sensorimotor experience can enhance (Press et al. 2007;
Wiggett et al. 2012), abolish (Cook et al. 2010; 2012a; Gill-
meister et al. 2008; Heyes et al. 2005; Wiggett et al. 2011),
reverse (Catmur et al. 2007; 2008; 2011), and induce (Land-
mann et al. 2011; Petroni et al. 2010; Press et al. 2012a)
mirror mechanism activity. Each of these ﬁndings conﬁrms
a novel prediction of the associative account: it reveals ﬂexi-
bility of exactly the kind one would expect if MNs/mechan-
isms are forged by sensorimotor associative learning. In
contrast, this kind of ﬂexibility does not provide any
support for the genetic hypothesis. Indeed, if MNs were a
genetic adaptation, some evolutionary frameworks would
predict that the development of MNs would be protected
or “buffered” against environmental perturbations that
could interfere with their adaptive function (Cosmides &
Tooby 1994; Pinker 1997). In the case of a genetic adap-
tation for action understanding, this would include pertur-
bations with the potential to divert MNs from coding
properties of action, rather than of inanimate stimuli, and
from coding similar, rather than dissimilar, observed and
executed actions.
Evidence that MNs/mechanisms are not resistant to
coding inanimate stimuli comes from studies showing
that arbitrary sound, color, and shape stimuli can induce
mirror MEP (D’Ausilio et al. 2006; Petroni et al. 2010),
fMRI (Cross et al. 2009; Landmann et al. 2011; Press
et al. 2012a) and behavioral effects (Press et al. 2007) fol-
lowing sensorimotor training (Press 2011). For example,
Press and colleagues gave participants approximately 50
minutes of sensorimotor training in which they repeatedly
opened their hand when seeing a robotic pincer open,
and closed their hand when seeing the robotic pincer
close (Press et al. 2007). Prior to this training, the pincer
movement elicited less automatic imitation (see sect. 2.3)
than human hand movement, but 24 hours after training,
the automatic imitation effect was as strong for the pincer
movement as for the human hand.
Evidence that MNs/mechanisms are not resistant to
coding dissimilar actions comes from studies showing that
non-matching (or “counter-mirror”) sensorimotor training
abolishes automatic imitation (Cook et al. 2010; 2012a;
Gillmeister et al. 2008; Heyes et al. 2005; Wiggett et al.
2011), and reverses both fMRI (Catmur et al. 2008) and
MEP mirror responses (Catmur et al. 2007). For
example, Catmur and colleagues gave participants approxi-
mately 90 minutes of non-matching sensorimotor training
in which they repeatedly made an index ﬁnger movement
while observing a little ﬁnger movement, and vice versa
(Catmur et al. 2007). Before this training the participants
showed mirror MEP responses, for example, observation
of index ﬁnger movement elicited more activity in an
index ﬁnger muscle than observation of little ﬁnger move-
ment, and vice versa for the little ﬁnger muscle. After train-
ing, this pattern was reversed, for example, observation of
index ﬁnger movement elicited more activity in the little
ﬁnger muscle than observation of little ﬁnger movement.
7.2. Objections to sensorimotor training evidence
Objections to this evidence suggest, in various ways, that it
does not show that sensorimotor experience can change
MNs/mechanisms. For example, it has been suggested
that the evidence comes only from studies of object-free
actions and yet MNs code only object-directed actions (Riz-
zolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). However, a study of pianists has
shown that experience modulates mirror responses to
object-directed actions (Haslinger et al. 2005) and, as dis-
cussed in sect. 4.1, monkey studies of communicative ges-
tures (Ferrari et al. 2003) and pantomimed reaching
movements (Kraskov et al. 2009) have identiﬁed MNs
that code object-free actions.
A related concern is that, because they use indirect
measures (fMRI, MEPs, and automatic imitation), rather
than single-cell recording, sensorimotor learning exper-
iments may not be measuring MN responses. Section 2.3
reviewed the evidence for human MNs from a range of
experimental techniques. These include conjunction of
neural responses during action observation and perform-
ance (Gazzola & Keysers 2009; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Vogt
et al. 2007), suppression of neural responses to cross-
modally (perceptual-motor or motor-perceptual) repeated
actions (Kilner et al. 2009; Press et al. 2012b), muscle-
speciﬁc MEPs (Catmur et al. 2011; Fadiga et al. 1995),
and automatic imitation (Brass et al. 2001; Stürmer et al.
2000). In isolation, each of these measures is imperfect
(Caggiano et al. 2013), but together they provide strong
converging evidence for human MNs. Sensorimotor learn-
ing effects have been demonstrated for all these measures
of mirror responses: fMRI conjunction (Catmur et al. 2008;
Landmann et al. 2011); repetition suppression (Press et al.
2012a); MEPs (Catmur et al. 2007; 2011; D’Ausilio et al.
2006; Petroni et al. 2010); and automatic imitation (Cook
et al. 2010; 2012a; Gillmeister et al. 2008; Heyes et al.
2005; Press et al. 2007; Wiggett et al. 2011). Thus, conver-
ging evidence using multiple techniques strongly suggests
that sensorimotor learning experiments are measuring –
and changing –MN responses. Furthermore, although
experiments speciﬁcally testing sensorimotor learning (in
which sensory, motor, and sensorimotor experience are
compared and/or controlled) have not been performed
using single-unit recording, this conclusion is supported
by single-unit data showing that experience with tools
creates MN responses to observed tool use (Ferrari et al.
2005; M. J. Rochat et al. 2010; see sect. 4).
Considerations regarding anatomical speciﬁcity raise
another possible objection to the sensorimotor training evi-
dence: Sensorimotor experience may only affect neurons in
non-classical mirror areas (e.g., dorsal PMC). However,
while recordings of monkey MNs have mostly been con-
ﬁned to ventral PMC and IPL, measurements in humans
using single-unit recording and fMRI conjunction suggest
that MNs are more widespread (e.g., Arnstein et al. 2011;
Gazzola & Keysers 2009; Landmann et al. 2011; Mukamel
et al. 2010; Vogt et al. 2007). Furthermore, paired-pulse
TMS indicates that functional connections from dorsal (as
well as ventral) PMC to primary motor cortex enhance
muscle-speciﬁc MEP responses to action observation
(Catmur et al. 2011). Thus, several sources of evidence
suggest that MNs are not restricted to classical mirror
areas. Therefore, even if sensorimotor experience were
altering neuronal responses only outside ventral PMC and
inferior parietal cortex, it could still be affecting MNs.
However, there is also evidence that sensorimotor learning
affects classical mirror areas. Many studies have demon-
strated effects of sensorimotor experience on classical
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mirror areas (Cross et al. 2009; Haslinger et al. 2005; Land-
mann et al. 2011; Margulis et al. 2009; Vogt et al. 2007);
counter-mirror sensorimotor learning reverses ventral
PMC and inferior parietal cortex responses to observed
actions (Catmur et al. 2008); and such learning is supported
by ventral PMC-M1 connections (Catmur et al. 2011). Fur-
thermore, localizing the effects of sensorimotor learning to
speciﬁc neural populations using repetition suppression
suggested that sensorimotor experience affects MNs in clas-
sical mirror areas (Press et al. 2012a). Therefore, it appears
that MNs are not restricted to classical mirror areas and that
sensorimotor experience has effects both on classical mirror
areas and elsewhere.
A ﬁnal possibility is that counter-mirror training changes
relatively late neural responses to action observation,
leaving earlier responses, mediated by MNs, intact (Barch-
iesi & Cattaneo 2013). Such a ﬁnding might indicate that
counter-mirror responses result from a more indirect
route (e.g., via prefrontal areas for rule retrieval) than
mirror responses. Barchiesi and Cattaneo (2013) tested
this hypothesis using a task that is likely to have provoked
coding of domain-general spatial cues, rather than action-
speciﬁc topographic cues, and therefore to have failed to
index mirror responses at any time-point. A more recent
study, using a more speciﬁc test of mirror responses,
found effects of counter-mirror training on MEPs from
200 msec, the earliest time-point at which mirror responses
have been observed in monkeys and humans (Cavallo et al.
2013; see also Catmur et al. 2011).4 Thus, effects of
counter-mirror training occur at the time when complex
information about the observed action has just reached
PMC, making it improbable that mirror and counter-
mirror effects occur at different times. It is likely that a pre-
frontal route is involved during the training session, when
participants retrieve a rule in order to implement task
instructions (e.g., “if index, do little”). However, the
ﬁnding that after counter-mirror training, effects of training
are present in MEPs from 200 msec suggests that such
rule-based responding merely initiates associative learning:
after learning, action observation activates counter-mirror
responses as quickly as the original mirror responses.
In summary: Although there are currently no studies sys-
tematically testing the effects of sensorimotor learning on
MN responses in monkeys, a substantial body of evidence
from studies of training and expertise in humans has con-
ﬁrmed the predictions of the associative account, showing
that mirror responses can be changed in radical ways by sen-
sorimotor learning. Furthermore, these studies have pro-
vided no evidence that MNs/mechanisms are buffered or
protected against sensorimotor experience of a kind that
makes them code inanimate stimuli and dissimilar actions.
8. Other models: Canalization and exaptation
This article focuses on the genetic and associative accounts
of the origins of MNs because these were the ﬁrst models
to be proposed, and the associative hypothesis is the
most fully developed alternative to the standard, genetic
view. For example, unlike other alternatives, it has been
used to generate and test novel empirical predictions.
However, two other alternatives, which have been motiv-
ated in part by the data generated in these tests (see
sect. 7) should be considered. One raises the possibility
that the development of MNs is “canalized,” and the other
that it represents an “exaptation” for action understanding.
These are interesting possibilities but, we argue, they are
not supported by the evidence reviewed in sections 4–7.
8.1. Canalization
It has been suggested that MNs are acquired through
“Hebbian learning” (Keysers & Perrett 2004) and that
their development is supported or “canalized” by geneti-
cally predisposed features of the perceptual-motor
system, including the tendency of infants to look at their
own hands in motion (Del Giudice et al. 2009). On one
reading, this canalization hypothesis is identical in sub-
stance to the associative hypothesis; it is helpful in provid-
ing a more detailed neuronal model of how sensorimotor
experience makes MNs out of motor neurons, and, in con-
trast with the associative hypothesis, it emphasizes self-
observation over social interaction as a source of relevant
sensorimotor experience in development, but otherwise
the canalization hypothesis is identical to the associative
account. On this reading, the term “Hebbian learning” is
understood to be a synonym for “associative learning,”
and the canalization hypothesis suggests that if the
infants’ tendency to look at their own hands in motion is
an adaptation (Clifton et al. 1994; Meer et al. 1996) – if
this attentional bias evolved “for” anything – it was to
promote the development of precise visuomotor control,
rather than MNs and action understanding.
On another reading, which we think is less likely to rep-
resent the authors’ intentions, “Hebbian learning” differs
from “associative learning” in depending on contiguity
alone, rather than both contiguity and contingency (see
sect. 3.2), and the infant preference for manual self-obser-
vation evolved speciﬁcally to promote the development of
MNs and action understanding. If this reading is correct,
the canalization hypothesis is a hybrid of the associative and
genetic accounts; it claims that MNs develop through
(Hebbian) sensorimotor learning and constitute a genetic
adaptation for action understanding. However, this hybrid
model would not be supported by current evidence for
three reasons. First, there is no evidence that the tendency
of infants to look at their own hands evolved to promote
the development of MNs or action understanding rather
than visuomotor control (Del Giudice et al. 2009). Second,
experimental data and modeling work have indicated that
the sensorimotor learning which changes MNs depends on
contingency as well as on contiguity (Cook et al. 2010;
Cooper et al. 2013b). Third, if MNs are forged by contin-
gency-based sensorimotor learning, there is no problem for
evolution (or scientists) to solve through canalization for
MN development. If it was based on contiguity alone, there
is a risk that sensorimotor learning would produce lots of
“junk associations” – visuomotor neurons mapping observed
and executed actions that happen to have co-occurred by
chance. However, contingency-based (i.e., associative) learn-
ing could produce the observed distribution of strictly congru-
ent, broadly congruent, and non-matching MNs all by itself,
without MN-speciﬁc canalization (see sect. 5.1).
8.2. Exaptation
Another interesting hybrid of the genetic and associative
hypotheses has been developed by Arbib and colleagues
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(e.g., Arbib 2005; Oztop et al. 2006). They propose that
MNs are produced, not by domain-general mechanisms
of Hebbian or associative sensorimotor learning, but by
a special kind of sensorimotor learning which receives
input from self-observation of hand motion. This special
kind of learning is an “exaptation” for action understand-
ing: It evolved from more domain-general mechanisms,
such as those producing canonical neurons, speciﬁcally
to promote action understanding through the production
of MNs. This exaptation hypothesis does not specify, in
psychological or neurological terms, exactly what is dis-
tinctive about the kind of sensorimotor learning that pro-
duces MNs. However, it suggests that “some extra
structure is required, both to constrain the variables rel-
evant for the system, and to track trajectories of those
relevant variables,” and that the function of this extra
structure is to ensure coding of goals or “hand-object
relationships” (Oztop et al. 2006, p. 269). Bonini and
Ferrari (2011) recently advanced a similar exaptation
hypothesis, also motivated by the need to explain why
MNs consistently encode goals. However, as we have
argued in section 4, the evidence from single-unit record-
ing in monkeys suggests that MNs do not consistently
encode goals. Therefore, the primary motivation for
invoking exaptation is not compelling. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that the sensorimotor learning
involved in MN development is modiﬁed or constrained
relative to the associative learning that occurs in standard
conditioning experiments. On the contrary, there is
experimental evidence that it is sensitive to contingency,
subject to contextual modulation, and open to the encod-
ing of both animate and inanimate stimuli in exactly the
same way as standard associative learning (see sects. 5
and 7).
A recent article (Casile et al. 2011) adds another element
to the hybrid model advanced by Arbib and colleagues. It
suggests that a special, exapted form of sensorimotor learn-
ing underwrites the development of hand-relatedMNs, but
the development of facial MNs is minimally dependent on
experience. This suggestion is designed to accommodate
evidence from studies of imitation and EEG suppression
in newborns, which some authors have interpreted as
showing that facial MNs are present at or shortly after
birth. As we reported in section 6, this evidence has been
challenged on a number of counts. Independent motivation
and support for the idea that hand and faceMNs have differ-
ent origins would be provided by evidence that faceMNs are
less susceptible than hand MNs to modiﬁcation by sensori-
motor experience. However, as far as we are aware, this
novel prediction of the hand/face hybrid model has not
been tested, and a recent study of improvement in facial imi-
tation suggests that face MNs are as susceptible to modiﬁ-
cation by sensorimotor experience as hand MNs (Cook
et al. 2013). Thus, until it is used to generate and test
novel predictions, the hand/face hybrid model stands as an
intriguing but essentially ad hoc hypothesis.
Hybrid modelling is a promising direction for future
research. However, to preserve predictive power, it is
essential to check not only that hybrid models are consist-
ent with existing data, but also that they have indepen-
dent support. We have argued that both of these
conditions are met by the associative account, and that
neither is currently fulﬁlled by canalization and exaptation
models.
9. A new approach to the function of mirror
neurons
We have argued that, at present, there is no positive evi-
dence that MNs are a genetic adaptation or exaptation, or
that their development has been canalized, for action
understanding. However, the associative hypothesis is func-
tionally permissive; it does not deny that MNs make a posi-
tive – possibly even an adaptive – contribution to social
cognition. Rather, the associative hypothesis implies that
a new approach is required to ﬁnd out what MNs contrib-
ute to social behavior.
9.1. From reﬂection to theory-based experimentation
In the 20 years since MNs were discovered, theories relat-
ing to their function have been inspired by a method which
(if you like a pun) could be called “reﬂection.” This method
focuses on the ﬁeld properties of the MNs found in a
sample of laboratory monkeys with unreported develop-
mental histories. It asks, usually without reference to pre-
existing computational or psychological theory, what
neurons with these ﬁeld properties would be “good for”;
that is, what they might enable the animal to do. For
example, early reports that MNs discharged when
monkeys saw and produced object-directed actions
inspired the theory that MNs mediate “action understand-
ing” via “motor resonance,” when neither of these was an
established category of psychological functioning. Even
now, opposition to the idea that MNs mediate action
understanding tends to be answered by stressing their
ﬁeld properties (Gallese et al. 2011). The associative
account suggests that the reﬂection method needs to be
changed and extended in three principal ways.
9.1.1. Developmental history. If MNs were a genetic
adaptation, it is likely that their properties would be rela-
tively invariant across developmental environments. There-
fore, it would be possible to make valid inferences about
species-typical properties of MNs based on a relatively
small and developmentally atypical sample of individuals.
If MNs are instead a product of associative learning, this
kind of inference is not valid. Whether or not an individual
has MNs, which actions are encoded by their MNs, and at
what level of abstraction, will all depend on the types of
sensorimotor experience received by the individual in the
course of their development. Therefore, the associative
account implies that it is crucial for studies of laboratory
monkeys to report, and ideally to control, the animals’
developmental history; that is, the kinds of sensorimotor
experience to which they have been exposed. It also
suggests that, if we want to know the species-typical prop-
erties of monkey MNs, it will be necessary to test monkeys
that have received all and only the types of sensorimotor
experience typically available to them under free-living
conditions. A corollary of this is that we cannot assume
that the mirror mechanisms found in the members of one
human culture are representative of the whole human
species. With its emphasis on the role of social practices –
such as the imitation of infants by adults, sports and dance
training, and mirror self-observation – in driving the devel-
opment of MNs, the associative account provides speciﬁc,
theory-driven motivation for cross-cultural studies of
mirroring.
Cook et al.: Mirror neurons: From origin to function
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2014) 37:2 189
9.1.2. System-level theory. If MNs were a genetic adap-
tation, one could argue that new categories of psychological
functioning – such as “action understanding” and “motor
resonance” – are necessary to characterize what they do.
It could be argued that, since they were “specially
created” by evolution, MNs are likely to have a highly dis-
tinctive, largely independent, and previously unrecognized
psychological function. In contrast, by showing that estab-
lished psychological theory – associative learning theory –
can cast light on the origin of MNs, the associative
account underlines the value of embedding research on
MN function within system-level psychological and compu-
tational theories of how the brain produces behavior (Giese
& Poggio 2003; Kilner 2011; Kilner et al. 2007a). This
implies that hypotheses about MN function should
specify a part in a process – a process that goes all the
way from peripheral sensory input to overt motor output –
that MNs are thought to fulﬁll. The name assigned to this
part is not important in itself. What is important is that the
hypothetical function of MNs is distinguished clearly from
other components of the same overall process. For
example, in this kind of system-level, theory-guided
approach, “action understanding” would be distinguished
from components that are likely to be more purely percep-
tual (which might be called “action perception” or “action
recognition”), more purely motoric (e.g., “action
execution”), or to constitute a higher level of “understand-
ing” (e.g., “mentalizing”). This approach would also make it
clear whether the hypothetical function is thought to be
optional or obligatory; whether it can be, or must be,
done by MNs. The kind of system-level theoretical
approach required in research on the functions of MNs is
exempliﬁed by studies of their role in speech perception
(Lotto et al. 2009; Scott et al. 2009).
A system-level theoretical approach would also over-
come a problem that has haunted discussions of the
“action understanding” hypothesis since MNs were discov-
ered: Is this hypothesis claiming that MN activity causes or
constitutes “action understanding”? The former is an
empirically testable hypothesis suggesting that there is a
distinctive behavioral competence (the nature of which
has not yet been speciﬁed, see sect. 3.1), called “action
understanding,” to which the activity of MNs contributes.
The latter implies that the ﬁring of MNs during action
observation is, in itself, a form of “action understanding”;
it does not need to have further consequences in order to
qualify as “action understanding.” This claim is not
subject to empirical evaluation; it is true, or otherwise, by
virtue of the meanings of words.
9.1.3. Experimentation. Empirical (rather than constitu-
tive) claims about the function of MNs need to be tested
by experiments looking for, at minimum, covariation
between MN activity and behavioral competence, and,
ideally, testing for effects on behavioral competence of
interventions that change MN activity. A brief survey of
recent research of this kind – using fMRI, TMS, and the
effects of focal brain lesions in human participants – is pro-
vided in the next section. At present, this research faces two
major challenges. First, because the hypothetical functions
of MNs typically are not deﬁned in the context of a system-
level theory, it is difﬁcult to design appropriate control
tasks. For example, if an experiment is testing the hypoth-
esis that MNs play a causal role in action understanding,
should it control for the possibility that they instead play
some role in action perception? If so, what kind of behav-
ioral competence is indicative of action perception rather
than action understanding?5 To date, only a small
number of studies (e.g., Pobric & Hamilton 2006)
include control conditions designed to address this issue.
The second major challenge is that, with rare exceptions
(Mukamel et al. 2010), MN activity cannot be localized pre-
cisely within the human brain. Consequently, many studies
assume that activity in the ventral PMC and IPL – areas
homologous to those in which MNs have been found in
monkeys – is MN activity, and that behavioral changes
brought about through interference with the functioning
of these areas are due to interference with MNs. The
results of such studies are of interest regardless of
whether they relate to MNs. However, it is unsatisfactory
to assume that they relate to MNs, because, in monkeys,
it is likely that fewer than 20% of the neurons in these clas-
sical mirror areas are actually MNs, and because there is
evidence of MNs in non-classical areas in both monkeys
and humans (see sect. 2.1). Techniques such as fMRI rep-
etition suppression and TMS adaptation (Cattaneo et al.
2011; Silvanto et al. 2007) hold some promise as means
of overcoming the localization problem with human partici-
pants, by isolating behavioral effects to speciﬁc populations
of neurons. Guided by system-level theory, future studies
could use these techniques with a range of tasks to isolate
processes in which MNs are involved.
Alongside the development of techniques such as fMRI
repetition suppression and TMS adaptation for use with
human participants, it would be valuable to conduct
animal studies that, not only document the ﬁeld properties
of MNs, but also examine how those properties relate to
behavioral competence. For example, are animals with
MNs for actions X and Y better than other animals of the
same species at behavioral discrimination of X and Y, or
at imitating X and Y? Studies of this kind have been dis-
missed as impractical on the assumption that they would
have to involve monkeys, which are demanding and expens-
ive laboratory animals, and that between-group variation in
MN activity would have to be induced via lesions or disrup-
tive TMS. However, the associative account suggests that,
in the long term, it may be possible to overcome these pro-
blems by establishing a rodent model and using sensorimo-
tor training to induce between-group variation in the
number and type of MNs present in rodent brains. If
the associative account is correct, rodents are likely to have
the potential to develop MNs because they are capable of
associative learning. Whether or not they receive in the
course of typical development the sensorimotor experience
necessary to realize this potential, it could be provided by
various regimes of laboratory-based sensorimotor training.
9.2. Early signs
Given the theoretical limitations and methodological chal-
lenges faced by research to date on the functions of
MNs, it is very difﬁcult indeed to form a consistent and
potentially reliable picture of where their ﬁndings are
pointing. Nonetheless, for completeness, we offer the fol-
lowing brief overview of research relating to the two most
commonly investigated hypotheses –MN activity contrib-
utes to action understanding and to imitation. We ﬁrst sum-
marize the results of meta-analyses of functional imaging
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data, which, by identifying commonalities across multiple
studies, highlight candidate brain areas involved in these
hypothesized MN functions. Building on the fMRI
studies, patient data and studies using disruptive TMS
applied to classical mirror areas have the potential to ident-
ify causal, rather than purely correlational, relationships
between MN activity and behavioral competence.
9.2.1. Action understanding. As discussed in section 3.1,
consensus regarding the term “action understanding” has
yet to be reached. In terms of the involvement of mirror
areas in perceiving others’ actions, a recent meta-analysis
of fMRI data on action observation revealed that obser-
vation of hand movements produces responses in both pre-
motor and parietal cortex, while face and body movements
recruit premotor and parietal cortex, respectively (Grosbras
et al. 2012). If, however, “action understanding” is opera-
tionalized in terms of understanding others’ intentions,
then the role of mirror areas is less clear: A meta-analysis
of studies using mentalizing tasks concluded that classical
mirror areas are not recruited unless the tasks involve
action stimuli (Van Overwalle & Baetens 2009). Even
when action stimuli are presented, intention understanding
does not necessarily recruit mirror areas (e.g., Brass et al.
2007; de Lange et al. 2008), implying that the recruitment
of mirror areas during mentalizing tasks that involve action
stimuli is likely to be due to the action observation com-
ponent of these tasks. Patient data indicate that com-
ponents of action perception – including action detection,
discrimination between observed actions, action recog-
nition (e.g., naming observed actions), and object-action
matching –may require classical MN areas (Buxbaum
et al. 2005; Fontana et al. 2011; Kalenine et al. 2010;
Moro et al. 2008; Pazzaglia et al. 2008; Saygin 2007;
Saygin et al. 2004; Serino et al. 2010).
However, not all patients with impairments in action pro-
duction are also impaired in action recognition, suggesting
that motor ability may not always predict this aspect of
“action understanding” (Calder et al. 2000; Negri et al.
2007), or at least that these abilities can dissociate, either
prior to brain damage or via subsequent compensatory
processes. Several TMS studies have demonstrated that
PMC stimulation disrupts components of action percep-
tion including detection or discrimination of actions
(Candidi et al. 2008; Urgesi et al. 2007b; van Kemenade
et al. 2012), conﬁgural processing of bodies (Urgesi et al.
2007a), judgment of body aesthetics (Calvo-Merino et al.
2010), and motor-to-visual adaptation for observed actions
(Cattaneo et al. 2011). It also impairs the ability to use infor-
mation from perceived actions to judge the weight of
grasped objects (Pobric & Hamilton 2006) and to initiate
online predictions about ongoing actions (Stadler et al.
2012). It appears therefore that PMC may be necessary
for some components of action perception, and this is an
important result. However, given the current uncertainty
about what is meant by “action understanding,” it is not
clear whether these results consistently demonstrate a role
for mirror areas in “action understanding” as opposed to a
more perceptual process (see sects. 3.1 and 9.1).
9.2.2. Imitation. A recent meta-analysis of functional
imaging studies found consistent responses during imitation
tasks in classical MN areas, suggesting a possible functional
involvement of MNs in imitation (Caspers et al. 2010; but
see Molenberghs et al. [2009] for inconsistent results in
ventral PMC). Research investigating the effects of
damage to parietal cortex supports a role for this area in
imitation: for example, of mimed tool use (Halsband
et al. 2001), of meaningless and object-related gestures
(Buxbaum et al. 2005; Goldenberg & Karnath 2006;
Tessari et al. 2007), and of phonetic detail in speech
(Kappes et al. 2010). Additionally, damage to inferior
frontal cortex results in impairments in imitation of
ﬁnger movements (Goldenberg & Karnath 2006). Patient
studies have used intentional imitation tasks that make
many demands on the information processing system, in
addition to the core imitation requirement to match
sensory with motor representations of action (Leighton
et al. 2008). Therefore, it is important that TMS studies
have demonstrated that stimulation of classical mirror
areas can disrupt both intentional and automatic imitation
of simple ﬁnger and hand actions (Catmur et al. 2009;
Heiser et al. 2003; Mengotti et al. 2013; Newman-
Norlund et al. 2010).
Thus, the localization problemnotwithstanding, insofar as
current experimental data provide even early signs, they
suggest that MN activity may make some contribution to
action perception and imitation. However, the picture for
action understanding is obscured by the fundamental
problem of deﬁning exactly what is meant by “action under-
standing” and how it differs from action perception. There is
thus a pressing need for system-level theory to guide the
design of control tasks in studies of action understanding.
The picture is somewhat clearer in the case of imitation.
The idea that MNs contribute to imitation was originally
rejected on the grounds that monkeys do not imitate.
However, guided by a leaner and more precise deﬁnition
of imitation, based on system-level theory, subsequent
studies have conﬁrmed, not only that monkeys can imitate
(Voelkl & Huber 2000; 2007), but also, as the associative
account predicts, that distantly related species, such as bud-
gerigars (Richards et al. 2009) and dogs (Range et al. 2011),
are capable of imitation. Consistent with this, there is con-
vergent evidence from meta-analyses, lesion studies, and
TMS techniques implicating MN activity in a core com-
ponent process that translates sensory input from body
movement into a matching motor plan.
9.3. Conclusion
Like many other people, we ﬁnd MNs intriguing. In
Google Scholar “mirror neuron” scores some 11,000 hits,
whereas “visuomotor neuron” scores 50. Some of this exci-
tement may be ill-founded (Heyes 2010), but that is not the
point of this target article. The associative account of the
origin of MNs acknowledges that they were a fascinating
scientiﬁc discovery, and this account is open to the possi-
bility that MNs play one or more important roles in the
control of social interaction. It differs from the received
view in suggesting that (1) sensorimotor learning plays a
crucial, inductive role in the development of MNs, and,
because of this, (2) we will get reliable information about
the function of MNs only by applying an approach based
on developmental history, system-level theory, and rigor-
ous experimentation. The ﬁrst of these methodological
implications underlines the fact that, relative to the
genetic hypothesis, the associative account shifts the
balance of explanatory power from MNs themselves to
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the environments in which they develop. In some ways this
is inconvenient because developmental environments are
much harder to study in the laboratory, but there are sig-
niﬁcant potential payoffs. As a rich source of testable pre-
dictions about when, where, and how MNs develop,
associative learning theory can provide ﬁrm guidance for
future research on the taxonomic distribution, typical prop-
erties, and functional roles of MNs.
NOTES
1. The present article concerns what might be described as
“motor”MNs – that is, MNs that are responsive during the obser-
vation and performance of actions. There may be neurons with
analogous properties involved in empathetic emotional and soma-
tosensory responses. This interesting possibility is beyond the
scope of the present article, but for discussion of how an associat-
ive framework may be applied to the origins of empathic mirror-
ing, see Heyes and Bird (2007).
2. Infant research suggesting that tongue-protrusion “imita-
tion” improves over trials, in the absence of visual feedback, has
been taken as evidence against the view that this “imitation”
effect is really a nonspeciﬁc exploratory response (Soussignan
et al. 2011). However, a recent experiment showing that even
adults cannot improve their imitative performance in the absence
of visual feedback suggests that the trends observed in the infant
data may not have been signs of improvement (Cook et al. 2013).
3. Central alpha suppression is often seen alongside attenu-
ation of beta band (∼15–30 Hz) oscillations, and beta effects are
thought to reﬂect motor processing. The sum of the two effects
is deﬁned as “mu suppression” (Hari & Salmelin 1997), but this
term is often used more liberally in the MN literature, to refer
to effects observed solely in the alpha band.
4. Monkey studies reporting this information suggest that MN
responses start around 250 msec after observed movement onset
(di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Kraskov et al. 2009; Umiltà et al. 2001).
In humans, EEG and MEG data indicate that complex visual
stimuli, including actions, reach PMC and motor areas in
around 300 msec (Nishitani & Hari 2000; 2002; Proverbio et al.
2009; Sitnikova et al. 2003); while muscle-speciﬁc patterns of
MEP facilitation are present from 200 msec after observed
action onset (Cavallo et al. 2013).
5. Theneed to control for “action perception” is suggested byRiz-
zolatti and Sinigaglia’s deﬁnition of “action understanding” as under-
standing “‘from the inside’ as amotor possibility, rather than ‘from the
outside’ as a mere visual description” (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010,
p. 265). However, the potential circularity of deﬁning perception as
“merely visual” underlines the need for system-level theory.
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Abstract: I argue that Cook et al.’s attack of the genetic hypothesis of
mirror neurons misses its target because the authors miss the point that
genetics may specify how neurons may learn, not what they learn.
Paying more attention to recent work linking mirror neurons to
language acquisition and evolution would strengthen Cook et al.’s
arguments against a rigid genetic hypothesis.
In the target article, Cook et al. claim that the genetic account of
mirror neurons (MNs) is problematic and they propose an associa-
tivist alternative, arguing that “sensorimotor learning plays a
crucial, inductive role in the development of MNs” (sect. 9.3).
However, several models of sensorimotor learning for MNs
have addressed neurophysiological ﬁndings (e.g., Bonaiuto &
Arbib 2010; Bonaiuto et al. 2007; Keysers & Perrett 2004;
Oztop & Arbib 2002; Oztop et al. 2013), so it seems the article
is directed only to those who take MNs metaphorically and/or
are unfamiliar with the primary literature.
It is true that any account proposing a rigid genetic ﬁxation of
MNs is incompatible with available evidence. Yet, Cook et al.
fail to provide evidence that proponents of the genetic hypothesis
are committed to such problematic accounts and some of their cri-
ticism seems to attack implausible “straw men” instead of existing
accounts. For example, they claim that the “fact that these MNs
respond maximally to unnatural stimuli – stimuli to which the
evolutionary ancestors of contemporary monkeys could not poss-
ibly have been exposed – is hard to reconcile with the genetic
hypothesis” (sect. 4.1, para. 3). The fact that “audiovisual” MNs
are responding to “unnatural sounds” such as metal striking
metal, plastic crumpling, or paper tearing associated with
actions is allegedly problematic for the genetic hypothesis
because no such sound/action connections existed for our
distant ancestors and evolution could not have “acted on them.”
The real issue is: “What would genetics specify?” Given that
natural selection can only act on present conditions and pass cur-
rently beneﬁcial traits on to the offspring, there can be a time lag
between what an organism encounters in its environment and
what it has been “genetically equipped” to deal with. So if our
distant ancestors encountered any novel sound-action combi-
nation, a rigid mechanism that encodes only correlations as
speciﬁc as those mentioned by Cook et al. would be of no use.
One should reasonably expect then, that it is the ability to
acquire MNs adapted to changing circumstances that is geneti-
cally speciﬁed, not what MNs code.
Cook et al. conclude that we can “get reliable information about
the function of MNs only by applying an approach based on devel-
opmental history, system-level theory, and rigorous experimen-
tation” (sect. 9.3). Given this reasonable conclusion, it is
surprising that Cook et al. failed to pay adequate attention to
recent work linking MNs to language acquisition and evolution
(e.g., Arbib 2005; 2010; 2011; Arbib et al. 2008; Corballis 2010;
Corina & Knapp 2008; Gentilucci & Corballis 2006; Ramachan-
dran 2000; for a skeptical view, see Bickerton 2007). Language
acquisition seems to offer an excellent opportunity to gather evi-
dence against a rigid genetic hypothesis (e.g., language acquisition
accounts defended by: Chomsky 1981; 1995; 2012; Legate & Yang
2002; Lightfoot 1999; McGilvray 2006; Pietroski & Crain 2005;
Pinker 1994). According to this framework, all humans possess
“some innate mental state common to the species that provides
the basis for acquisition of knowledge of grammar” (Chomsky
1981, p. 224). The interesting question is how the intricate
details of linguistic knowledge might be genetically encoded. A
healthy infant can acquire any human language. Therefore, she
needs to be able to imitate both sounds that are the same as,
and very different from, those her ancestors have acquired.
Further, the English acquired by an infant born in 2013 differs
greatly from that of an infant born in the year 848. The differences
between those sounds are arguably as great as the difference
between the sound of branches breaking (natural) and plastic
crumbling (artiﬁcial) discussed above. It is indeed implausible
that any genetically ﬁxated mechanism could underwrite such
highly ﬂexible imitation. Such considerations lead to the abandon-
ment of the proposal that the “innate endowment consists of a
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system of principles, each with certain possibilities of parametric
variation” (Chomsky 1981, p. 224). The minimalist program
(Chomsky 1995), that replaced the Principles and Parameters
account, focuses on “powerful third factor effects” (Chomsky
2012, p. 46), allegedly constraining language acquisition. But
neither of these frameworks seems to provide a satisfactory
account for language acquisition (Behme 2014).
For this reason, alternatives have been suggested (e.g., Elman
et al. 1996; MacWhinney 2004; Sampson 2002; Tomasello
2003). Relevant here is one proposal (Arbib 2005; 2010) that
involves mirror neurons. It assumes that Broca’s area evolved
atop an already existing mirror system for grasping with its
capacity to generate and recognize a set of actions. Possibly, in
language acquisition “mirror neurons for words encode recog-
nition of the articulatory form … but must be linked to other
neural networks for the encoding of meaning” (Arbib 2010,
p. 18). It is of course implausible that genetically pre-programmed
MNs could be implicated in the highly ﬂexible imitation required
by language acquisition. Instead, the evidence suggests that there
are quasi-mirror neurons ready to become mirror neurons for
novel actions demonstrated by others but which, prior to imita-
tion, do not have this capacity.
Regarding the adaptive value of the language related MN-
system, it has been suggested that language evolution was a
gradual process that provided us step by step with brain mechan-
isms supporting (i) the ability to recognize performance as a set of
familiar movements, (ii) complex action recognition, and (iii)
mechanisms for complex imitation (Oztop et al. 2013, p. 52).
There is no a priori reason to question that such improvements
in cognitive abilities could have been selected for. For an ade-
quate evaluation of the function of MNs we need to keep in
mind that they did not evolve in isolation but as part of an
embodied cognitive system. The “[a]ctivity seen in [human]
mirror systems involves not only mirror neurons but other cell
types as well… and [s]uch activity may reﬂect widespread inﬂu-
ence of prefrontal cortex and ventral pathways as well as the
classic STS→IPL→IFG pathway” (Arbib 2010, p. 14). Under a
more holistic analysis Cook et al.’s claim that “there is no positive
evidence that MNs are a genetic adaptation or exaptation, or that
their development has been canalized, for action understanding”
(sect. 9, my emphasis) seems too strong, again missing the
point that genetics may specify how neurons may learn, not
what they learn.
The insufﬁciency of associative learning for
explaining development: Three challenges to
the associative account
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Abstract: Three challenges to the sufﬁciency of the associative account for
explaining the development of mirror mechanisms are discussed: Genetic
predispositions interact with associative learning, infants show
predispositions to imitate human as opposed to nonhuman actions, and
early and later learning involve different mechanisms. Legitimate
objections to an extreme nativist account are raised, but the proposed
solution is equally problematic.
As a developmental scientist, I greatly appreciate this target article
drawing attention to the importance of clarifying the origins of
mirror neurons (MNs). This is no easy feat and I believe that
this article is testament to the complexity of the problem.
According to the authors, Cook et al., the standard view of MNs
is that they represent an adaptation by the organism, and are
thus genetically predetermined. By contrast, Cook et al. assert
that mirror mechanisms are not predetermined or even probabil-
istically determined, but instead develop as a function of sensori-
motor associative learning. My objection to this position is that
associative learning may be necessary, but it is not sufﬁcient for
the development of MNs. In the remainder of this commentary,
I will present three lines of evidence that question the sufﬁciency
of associative learning for explaining the development of mirror
mechanisms: (1) Genetic predispositions interact with associative
learning; (2) infants show predispositions to imitate human as
opposed to nonhuman actions, and (3) there are differences in
learning during early and later development.
The ﬁrst reason to question a strict associative account is
because it cannot explain why some behaviors are learned more
easily than others. Cook et al. claim that the observation–
execution matching properties of mirror mechanisms are not a
speciﬁc genetic predisposition, but rather a domain-general
process of associative learning found in a wide range of vertebrate
and invertebrate species. This position implies that all correlated
sensory-motor experiences should be learned equally well by
the organism, but this claim is not supported by the data. Begin-
ning with the pioneering research of Garcia (e.g., Garcia et al.
1955), it was shown that rats could not associate visual and audi-
tory cues with food that made them ill, but could learn to associate
olfactory cues with such foods (see Gould & Marler [1987] for
other examples). These ﬁndings are not surprising from an adap-
tive standpoint (though I suspect eschewed by Cook et al.)
because rats are biologically prepared to learn some things more
readily than others. In the natural world, odor is a more reliable
cue than color for rats because they are primarily nocturnal, so
odor is better associated with dangerous foods than is color. The
conclusion from these sorts of studies is that animals are biased
to learn some associations more easily than others even though
the contingencies are the same. Thus, it appears that there are
genetic predispositions that interact with the success of associative
learning.
The second reason to question the associative account derives
from evidence showing that infants are biased to imitate human
as opposed to nonhuman actions. In the target article, imitation
is considered a behavioral index of the presence of mirror mech-
anisms. If all sensorimotor associative learning is sufﬁcient to
explain imitation, then infants should be as likely to imitate mech-
anical as opposed to human actions. However, the critical evi-
dence is at best mixed. For example, Meltzoff (1995)
demonstrated that 18-month-old infants could imitate the
actions of an adult pulling apart a barbell but not the actions of
a mechanical pincer designed to match the movement, as well
as the effect, produced by the adult.
Similarly, Longo and Bertenthal (2006) tested 9-month-old
infants in an observational version of the Piagetian A-not-B
search task, and showed that infants still committed the search
error on the B test trial because they covertly imitated the
search behavior of the experimenter during the A trials. By con-
trast, Boyer et al. (2011) substituted a pair of mechanical claws
for the human experimenter, and 9-month-old infants failed to
commit the search error suggesting that they were less likely to
covertly imitate the goal-directed behavior of the claws. It thus
appears that infants, like the rats described above, are predisposed
to learn some sensorimotor associations more readily than others.
These ﬁndings are thus consistent with the human and nonhuman
research literature suggesting that MNs are more likely to become
activated to the observation of human actions than to mechanical
devices or tools (Liepelt & Brass 2010; Longo & Bertenthal 2009;
Woodward 1998). If associative learning was sufﬁcient for the
development of mirror mechanisms, the response to human gen-
erated actions should not be privileged.
The last challenge concerns whether sensorimotor training
studies with adults, considered an important source of support
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for the associative account, are necessarily relevant to the develop-
ment of mirror mechanisms. This evidence is questionable
because the training studies involve behavioral assessments
which are inferred to reﬂect mirror mechanisms, but there is no
direct evidence that the underlying mirror mechanisms are modi-
ﬁed nor is there evidence that these observed short-term changes
can translate into more permanent long-term effects. Also, at the
neural level, there are two types of experiential learning (Green-
ough et al. 1987). One type is limited to sensitive periods during
early development and is characterized by an overproduction of
new synapses in anticipation of speciﬁc experiences that will con-
tribute to the development of species typical behaviors, such as
locomotion and language development (Bertenthal & Campos
1987). By contrast, experience-dependent processes are associ-
ated with the formation of new synapses that develop in response
to unique experiences of the individual organism throughout
development. If Cook et al. are correct that mirror mechanisms
are exclusively a function of an inductive process involving sensor-
imotor learning, their development would correspond to an
experience-dependent process. Currently, this claim is not defen-
sible given that it is just as likely that the early behaviors associated
with mirror mechanisms, such as imitation, are species-typical
behaviors, and thus just as likely to be mediated by an experi-
ence-expectant process which predisposes infants to develop
mirror mechanisms.
In conclusion, the target article raises legitimate reasons to
question an extreme nativist position regarding the development
of mirror mechanisms, but errs in the opposite direction by claim-
ing a strong empiricist position. If a more probabilistic than pre-
determined view of epigenesis is considered (Gottlieb 2007), it
is difﬁcult to imagine how a genetic predisposition could not con-
tribute to the development of mirror mechanisms.
Associative learning is necessary but not
sufﬁcient for mirror neuron development
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Abstract: Existing computational models of the mirror system
demonstrate the additional circuitry needed for mirror neurons to
display the range of properties that they exhibit. Such models emphasize
the need for existing connectivity to form visuomotor associations,
processing to reduce the space of possible inputs, and demonstrate the
role neurons with mirror properties might play in monitoring one’s own
actions.
The primary hypothesis set forth by Cook et al. is that mirror
neurons (MNs) are the result of generic associative learning pro-
cesses, rather than the result of evolutionary selection for action
understanding. They claim that the standard view of mirror
neurons, what they call the “genetic account,” suggests that the
predisposition to develop MNs is heritable and was selected for
on the basis of their role in action understanding. However, in
their characterization of the genetic account, Cook et al. do
allow for the role of experience in shaping MNs. Computational
models that simulate the development of MNs through experi-
ence show that this is possible through associative learning mech-
anisms, but that the connectivity to form these associations must
already be in place and that this connectivity must be somewhat
specialized for control of hand actions.
Cook et al. describe the “exaptation hypothesis” as claiming that
MNs require a special kind of sensorimotor learning. However, a
closer look at several of the computational models developed
under this hypothesis, such as the Mirror Neuron System
(MNS) model (Oztop & Arbib 2002), reveals that they do in
fact use standard learning algorithms completely compatible
with the associative learning account. What makes these models
work is the structure of their input representations and their con-
nectivity. The pure associative learning account seems to assume
that every neuron is either directly or indirectly connected with
every other neuron in the brain. Such architecture would
require signiﬁcantly more trials of action and observation in
order to correctly associate visual stimuli with the relevant
motor representations.
The simplest version of the genetic account would predict that
MNs would be found in different areas of the brain, depending on
the unique history of each individual. This is not the case, at least
in monkeys, and this seems to be due to a genetic inﬂuence on the
patterns of connectivity expressed by each brain region. Indeed, as
Cook et al. claim, there is a “wealth of the stimulus” – so much that
the space of possible hand–object interaction representations in
the visual and motor domains makes the associative learning
account computationally intractable. What makes the “exaptation
hypothesis”models able to handle such a space is the fact that the
inputs are constrained to represent the hand–object relationships
appropriate for performing manual actions. This is thought to
occur throughout motor development as the infant learns to
extract the relevant features from visual stimuli for controlling
the hand relative to the object (Oztop et al. 2004). Once the
inputs are restricted to those necessary to control transitive
actions, “domain-general learning processes” can proceed to
associate the visual representation with the motor program at
various levels of abstraction.
Although the learning algorithm in the MNSmodel was compa-
tible with the associative learning account, the network required
extensive pre-processing of its input. Mirror neurons respond to
observation of dynamic hand actions and therefore must process
trajectories in the space of hand–object relationships. Mirror
neurons will often respond to observation of a grasp before the
hand contacts the object. In order to predict the outcome of a
grasp before its completion, the MNS model transformed a tem-
poral sequence of hand–object relations into a spatial pattern of
neural activity for input to the network. A subsequent version of
the MNS model, MNS2, discarded this preprocessing step by
using a recurrent neural network and a modiﬁed learning algor-
ithm to handle raw input sequences (Bonaiuto et al. 2007).
These models show that although MNs may acquire their proper-
ties through associative-style learning processes, extra circuitry is
required to perform the computations necessary for processing
dynamic visual input from objected-directed hand actions.
The MNS2 model additionally proposed that audiovisual MNs
develop their auditory properties through simple associative learn-
ing. However, in this model, extra mechanisms such as working
memory and dynamic remapping were required to handle the
case where MNs correctly predict the outcome of a grasp when
the ﬁnal portion was obscured. It is not clear how these functions
could be developed through pure associative learning.
Giese and Poggio (2003) present a model of visual tuning in the
mirror system that is the most compatible with the associative
learning account. This model currently does not include a learning
mechanism, but it does address the existence of view-dependent
and -independent mirror neurons and does not require recon-
struction of the arm and hand shape. However, it still requires
extensive processing to transform visual input into a reduced
space such that it can be associated with motor signals.
The Augmented Competitive Queuing (ACQ) model embeds a
network such as those in the MNS and MNS2 models in a larger
network that learns self-actions (Bonaiuto & Arbib 2010). In this
model, MN activity signals recognition of successful completion of
one’s own actions. Their output is used as an eligibility trace in
reinforcement learning algorithms that modify the recognized
action’s desirability – how likely an action is to lead to a reward;
and executability – how likely an action can be successfully
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performed in the current context regardless of reward. This model
shows how mirror systems can have evolved for the purposes of
monitoring one’s own actions and ﬁt within a reinforcement learn-
ing framework for action selection.
A mechanistic model of MNs with random or full connectivity
and pure associative learning has never been developed. Current
computational models suggest that appropriate coarse-grained
connectivity and input representations are required to make the
space of possible hand–object relation trajectories tractable.
While the associative learning account is compatible with these
models at a ﬁrst approximation, it does not offer any detailed
explanations as to how networks of MNs acquire their properties
in development and operate in the adult. Conceptual models such
as the associative learning theory of mirror neuron origins which
do not provide a proof of concept in the form of a computational
model, are unconvincing.
More than associations: An ideomotor
perspective on mirror neurons
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Abstract: In this commentary, we propose an extension of the associative
approach of mirror neurons, namely, ideomotor theory. Ideomotor theory
assumes that actions are controlled by anticipatory representations of their
sensory consequences. As we outline below, this extension is necessary to
clarify a number of empirical observations that are difﬁcult to explain from
a purely associative perspective.
How often the battles of psychology have to be fought over again
each time with heavier armies and bigger trains…
— William James (1890, Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 523,
footnote)
AlthoughWilliam James wrote this sentence more than a hundred
years ago in his ingenious paragraph on ideomotor action, it could
have also have been coined in the discussion about the origin and
functional role of mirror neurons (MNs). One important contri-
bution of the associative learning account outlined in the target
article by Cook et al. has been to situate the ﬁnding of MNs in
the historical context of psychological theorizing on the relation-
ship of perception and action. Moreover, associative learning pro-
vides a powerful approach to explaining the ontogenesis of MNs
based on general learning principles. However, a purely associat-
ive account of mirror neurons falls short in explaining a number of
important ﬁndings regarding the modulation and control of the
mirror system. In this comment, we therefore outline an extension
of associative learning, namely, ideomotor theory that addresses
several of these problems.
While the origins of ideomotor theory can be traced back to
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most prominent
proponent of ideomotor theory was William James (1890). In
its modern form (Greenwald 1970), ideomotor theory assumes,
just like associative learning, that learning promotes the associ-
ation of sensory and motor codes. However, ideomotor theory
states that in the course of learning, additional ideomotor rep-
resentations are formed that resemble anticipations of the to-
be-produced sensory consequences of an action (see our
Fig. 1, a–c, for a model of how ideomotor representations are
formed).
According to ideomotor theory, these representations primarily
serve a motor control function. We control our actions by antici-
pating their sensory consequences. Moreover, ideomotor theory
predicts a speciﬁc form of sensorimotor compatibility, namely,
ideomotor compatibility. A stimulus that resembles the antici-
pation of a sensory action-effect activates the corresponding ideo-
motor representation (see Fig. 1d). For example, the image of
another person opening their hand strongly overlaps with the rep-
resentation that is used to control the hand-opening movement.
Consequently, ideomotor-compatible stimuli can to some
degree bypass response selection by directly activating motor pro-
grams (Brass et al. 2001).
As ideomotor representations are conceived as neither uniquely
sensory nor motor, they should be localized in dedicated motor
control structures that are distinct from primary sensory or
motor areas. Such representations can be activated without
necessarily leading to overt behavior and are thus likely used for
motor planning and prediction (see also the commentary by
Keysers, Perrett, and Gazzola for the idea of mirror neurons
being involved in predictive coding). This property of ideomotor
theory is consistent with human brain imaging studies showing
an overlap of brain areas involved in action planning, movement
observation, and motor imagery (Grezes & Decety 2001).
Another important consequence of ideomotor compatibility
is that it can lead to self–other confusion. Because ideomotor-
compatible stimuli directly activate representations that are used
for motor control, confusion can arise between externally and
intentionally triggered motor representations. Accordingly, con-
trolling imitative behavior has been related to brain areas that
are involved in the sense of agency and self–other distinction,
and dissociated from brain areas involved in controlling interfer-
ence from overlearned stimulus–response associations (Brass
et al. 2003; 2005).
One crucial difference between ideomotor representations and
simple stimulus–response associations relates to the underlying
learning mechanisms. Ideomotor representations evolve from
learning the relationship between responses and subsequent
sensory effects (R-E learning). In contrast, classical associative
learning theories, although concerned with action-outcome con-
tingencies, primarily focus on learning the relationship of
responses to those stimuli that precede them (S-R learning).
Importantly, most experiments demonstrating that imitative
response tendencies can be easily reversed use S-R learning para-
digms rather than R-E learning paradigms (e.g., Catmur et al.
2007). From an ideomotor theory perspective, these ﬁndings
may reﬂect that rapid learning strengthens the corresponding
S-R associations to such a degree that they temporarily overrule
existing ideomotor representations, leading to an advantage
of ideomotor-incompatible over compatible mappings (Catmur
et al. 2007).
Another difference between associative learning and ideomotor
theory lies in their capacity to deal with speciﬁc forms of contex-
tual modulation. Cook et al. outline how associative learning can
explain the inﬂuence of contextual information on MN responses.
In human studies, however, it has been demonstrated that the
response of the mirror system is not only sensitive to contextual
cues but also to high-level beliefs about the intentionality of the
Figure 1 (Brass & Muhle-Karbe). Acquisition of an ideomotor
representation (adapted from Greenwald 1970). (a) A stimulus
(S) triggers a speciﬁc response (R) that leads to a sensory effect
(E). (b) After learning, the stimulus will activate an anticipation
(e) of the effect that precedes the response. (c) This anticipation
(e) becomes conditioned to the response and allows for control
of the response. (d) Priming by action observation: a stimulus
that resembles the effect of the action (Se) primes the
ideomotor representation (e) which activates the response.
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observed action (Liepelt et al. 2008b). Ideomotor compatibility
can account for such ﬁndings, as it is based on the representational
overlap between the observed event and the ideomotor represen-
tation. Therefore, stimuli that are not perceived as resulting from
an intentional action will activate the ideomotor representation to
a smaller degree. To our knowledge, a similarly convincing
interpretation of such effects from an associative learning per-
spective is still lacking.
Directly testing for dissociations between associative learning
and ideomotor theory proves to be very difﬁcult, as ideomotor
theory and associative learning share a common learning phase.
In order to demonstrate that ideomotor theory differs from associ-
ative learning, one must reveal the anticipatory nature of ideomo-
tor representations. Most tests of ideomotor theory, however,
merely show that perceiving learned action effects activate a cor-
responding motor representation in the observer. This prediction
is shared by both approaches. A notable exception to this is a para-
digm developed by Kunde (2001). He showed that when actions
are consistently followed by incompatible effects (pressing a
right key that is followed by a left stimulus), participants react
slower than when actions are consistently followed by compatible
effects (pressing a right key that is followed by a right stimulus). In
contrast to classical S-R compatibility phenomena, this effect
unequivocally originates from the conﬂict between the previously
acquired anticipatory representation of the action and the antici-
pation of the actual sensory consequence.
To conclude, the associative learning account by Cook and col-
leagues certainly provides a powerful account of the functions and
origins of the mirror system. However, we propose that ideomotor
theory provides an important extension of associative learning that
is necessary to account for a number of phenomena that are difﬁ-
cult to explain from a purely associative perspective.
Reward in the mirror neuron system, social
context, and the implications on
psychopathology
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Abstract: Positive and negative reinforcers guide our behaviors as we
interact with others in our social environment. Here, we present
evidence that highlights a central role for reward in the general
functioning of the mirror neuron system (MNS). We also discuss the
relevance of reward-related modulation on other previous ﬁndings
revealing certain properties of the MNS, and on social context and
psychopathology.
The target article by Cook et al. proposes that the mirror neuron
system (MNS) becomes functionally specialized through sensori-
motor experience during development, and is founded upon
domain-general processes similar to that of Pavlovian and instru-
mental conditioning. The authors acknowledge that a difference
in mirror neuron (MN) responses can be inﬂuenced by the subjec-
tive value of an observed action; however, they put little emphasis
on the possible role of reward in MN activity. This associative
learning account particularly lends itself to the suggestion that
the perceived subjective value associated with both executed
and observed actions may potentially hinder or facilitate the devel-
opment of the MNS and its general functioning. The differences
in the subjective value associated with others’ actions, just as the
processing of reward is dependent on the context in which the
reward is presented (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2005), may also deter-
mine the degree to which MN areas are activated, and, conse-
quently, may temper action perception.
The neural correlates of “social rewards” are beginning to be
revealed, as studies are conﬁrming the involvement of reward-
related areas in certain social scenarios (Behrens et al. 2008; Rush-
worth et al. 2013). It is known that the neural coding of reward is
crucially involved in action selection and is therefore also intrinsic
to goal-directed behavior (Schultz 2000). As the activity in the
MNS has been shown to be speciﬁc only to observed actions
that are goal-directed (Rizzolatti et al. 1996), it follows that
reward and punishment are likely to have reciprocal effects on
the neural activity associated with action observation.
Several studies have shown that the presence or absence of
reward can inﬂuence the excitability of the motor cortices
during both action execution and action observation, which has
also been linked to motor learning (Hosp et al. 2011; Wickens
et al. 2003). Reward can change the size of motor evoked poten-
tials (MEP) as a result of inhibition of primary motor cortex
(Kapogiannis et al. 2008; Thabit et al. 2011), and motor skill learn-
ing can be improved if rewarding feedback is given (Sugawara
et al. 2012). Spontaneous mimicry of facial expressions can also
be enhanced when the emotional face being mimicked has been
associated with a high reward (Sims et al. 2012). We have also
recently demonstrated that rewarding actions produced the great-
est suppression in the EEG mu rhythm, an index of MNS activity
in motor areas (Brown et al. 2013). These studies resonate with
early work on social leaning by Bandura (1965) and others such
as Liebert and Fernandez (1970a; 1970b), in which vicarious
reward and punishment inﬂuenced the degree to which children
tended to imitate the observed actions of adults.
There is much evidence showing that activity in the motor-
related areas of the MNS can be affected by the context and
“meaning” of the observed action, and here we propose that
some of these ﬁndings could be accounted for by underlying
differences in the subjective value associated with the seen
actions. Studies demonstrating modulation of the mu suppression
in the observation of painful versus non-painful action-related
stimuli (Cheng et al. 2008; Perry et al. 2010) provide one clue
to the inﬂuence of reward on the MNS, as pain and reward-pro-
cessing are closely linked (Leknes & Tracey 2008). In terms of
differences in social context, actions performed in a social inter-
action produce greater mu rhythm suppression than actions per-
formed outside of an interaction (Perry et al. 2011). The mu
rhythm can also be modulated by the social relevance of the
observed action (Kilner et al. 2006; Oberman et al. 2007). Fur-
thermore, the interpersonal liking between individuals can modu-
late MNS areas, as differences in premotor cortex activation were
found when observing in-group versus out-group members’
actions (Sobhani et al. 2012). Some have suggested that being in
a social interaction, in itself, can be rewarding (Krach et al.
2010). If this is the case, then it would be plausible to argue
that differences in motor activity seen in studies comparing
social and non-social settings or stimuli may be confounded by
differences in reward-processing.
The role of reward in vicarious motor cortex activity may also
relate to previous studies investigating MNS function in psycho-
pathologies that exhibit both deﬁcits in social cognition and
abnormalities in reward-processing (Gold et al. 2008; Penn et al.
2008). It has been proposed that a dysfunction in the MNS may
help to explain deﬁcits in social cognition in schizophrenia and
autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) (Arbib & Mundhenk 2005;
Williams et al. 2001). Some studies have found abnormal mu
rhythm suppression in people with ASDs when observing
actions (Bernier et al. 2007; Oberman et al. 2005; 2008),
whereas others have not (Fan et al. 2010; Raymaekers et al.
2009). The ﬁndings in schizophrenia are also mixed, as one
study from McCormick and colleagues (McCormick et al. 2012)
found greater mu suppression in psychotic patients, whereas
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another found lower mu suppression (Singh et al. 2011), with both
ﬁnding some relationship between mu suppression and psychotic
symptoms. We suggest that these inconsistent results may have
resulted from a more elementary pathological deﬁcit in reward-
processing. As reward has a substantial inﬂuence on vicarious
motor activity and motor learning, then it is likely that abnormal-
ities in the processing of reward could also have a detrimental
impact on the development of the MNS, consequently leading
to the apparent impairments in social cognition seen in autism
and schizophrenia. This proposal is further supported by emer-
ging evidence suggesting that problems in social functioning
seen in ASDs may be founded upon an impaired response to
social rewards (Dichter & Adolphs 2012).
To sum up, it does appear that reward has an inﬂuence on the
motor-related areas of the MNS, which may also partially account
for some of the previous ﬁndings demonstrating context-related
modulation of motor cortex and MNS activity, and may help to
explain some of the inconsistencies found in studies investigating
MNS function in pathological groups. This proposal is well in line
with the associative learning account of the MNS. Future studies
looking at MNS activity may beneﬁt from taking the potential
interaction effects of reward into account.
Motor-visual neurons and action recognition in
social interactions
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Abstract: Cook et al. suggest that motor-visual neurons originate from
associative learning. This suggestion has interesting implications for the
processing of socially relevant visual information in social interactions.
Here, we discuss two aspects of the associative learning account that
seem to have particular relevance for visual recognition of social
information in social interactions – namely, context-speciﬁc and
contingency based learning.
The proposal that motor-visual neurons are formed through
associative learning is an elegant way to explain a multitude of
ﬁndings about motor-visual couplings that are otherwise more dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile. Cook et al. argue that motor-visual neurons
originate from associative learning and suggest the dissociation
of function from origin of motor-visual neurons. We would like
to stress that this view on motor-visual associations does not
dispute the involvement and the importance of motor-visual coup-
lings in social functioning, which has been demonstrated in
numerous studies (e.g., Aglioti et al. 2008; Casile & Giese 2006;
Kilner et al. 2009). Rather, Cook et al. encourage us to review
the function of motor-visual couplings for social functioning in
past and future studies. Here, we will argue that the perspective
of motor-visual couplings being a result of associative learning is
able to explain some ﬁndings of social functioning in physical
social interactions (e.g., handshake) that are more difﬁcult to
explain with a genetic perspective of motor-visual associations.
Speciﬁcally, we will discuss two aspects of this proposal that we
deem particularly important for processing of information rel-
evant for social cognition in physical social interactions.
The associative learning hypothesis accounts for context-
speciﬁc learning of motor-visual associations. Although Cook
et al. mainly discussed context speciﬁcity in terms of the emer-
gence of motor-visual linkages, we would like to point to
implications of context-sensitive motor-visual associations for pro-
cessing socially relevant information in social interactions. Speciﬁ-
cally, empirical evidence indicates that context-speciﬁc processing
of socially relevant information is critical for social interactions.
For example, Georgiou et al. (2007) showed that the kinematic
patterns for the same block stacking actions are modulated by
the nature of the social context (cooperative vs. competitive
context). Likewise, Streuber and colleagues (2011) demonstrated
that sources of visual information about an interaction partner that
allow better performance in a table-tennis task depend on the
nature of the interactive context (cooperative vs. competitive
play). In cooperative play, participants beneﬁted from seeing
the other person’s racket, while in competitive play, participants
showed performance improvements when seeing the other
person’s body. These and other studies (e.g., Hommel et al.
2009) demonstrate that processing of information relevant for
social cognition is inﬂuenced by social context. Since there is
abundant evidence for the involvement of motor-visual units in
processing of socially relevant information (Iacoboni et al. 2005;
Kaplan & Iacoboni 2006), motor-visual units should exhibit
some sensitivity to social context. Here, the associative learning
hypothesis has the potential to provide a convenient and convin-
cing way of explaining context-sensitive processing of socially rel-
evant information by motor-visual units.
In a similar vein, contingency-based learning of motor-visual
associations could be beneﬁcial for processing of socially relevant
information in physical social interactions. Physical social inter-
actions often consist of socially agreed (and therefore probable)
action sequences, which have been learned during development
(e.g., the kissing of cheeks in a certain order as a greeting in
some countries). Actions are learned, therefore, not as isolated
physical events but as part of an action sequence (action
context). Recent observations in our lab demonstrate that proces-
sing of socially relevant visual information depends on the preced-
ing temporal action context (de la Rosa et al. 2014), which makes
one action occurring more probable than another one. In particu-
lar, we used an adaptation paradigm to examine the sensitivity of
action recognition processes to temporally precursory action con-
texts. Previous research has shown that adaptation to one of two
actions biases the perception of a subsequently presented action
towards the non-adapted action (Barraclough & Jellema 2011;
Barraclough et al. 2009). We investigated whether adaptation to
action images is modulated by the presentation of an action
context shown prior to one of the adaptors. We, therefore,
created two experimental conditions that consisted of identical
adaptors and test stimuli but differed in terms of a movie that
was shown prior to one of the adaptors. The movies in the two
conditions showed different action sequences and caused partici-
pants to differently interpret the action displayed by the adaptor.
If action recognition is only based on the immediately available
sensory information about the adaptors, then one would not
expect any modulation of the action adaptation effect across the
two conditions because the two conditions consisted of physically
identical adaptor and test images. On the other hand, if action rec-
ognition is sensitive to the action context that preceded the
adaptors, then the adaptation aftereffects between the two con-
ditions should differ because both conditions were associated
with different social contexts that induced a different action
interpretation of the adaptor. Indeed, we found action adaptation
effects to be different between the two conditions (de la Rosa
et al. 2014). A control experiment showed that the presentation
of the movie alone was not able to modulate the action adaptation
effect between the two conditions. The results, therefore, demon-
strate that action recognition does not only depend on the
immediate sensory information, but also on the action context pre-
ceding an action.
We agree with the suggestion that a dissociation of function and
origin of motor-visual associations is important for a better under-
standing of the involvement of these associations in social func-
tioning. We think that the associative learning account provides
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a novel view that is able to stimulate research that improves our
understanding about the ability of humans to interact, communi-
cate, and socialize with others.
A mass assembly of associative mechanisms:
A dynamical systems account of natural social
interaction
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Abstract: The target article offers a negative, eliminativist thesis,
dissolving the specialness of mirroring processes into a solution of
associative mechanisms. We support the authors’ project enthusiastically.
What they are currently missing, we argue, is a positive, generative
thesis about associative learning mechanisms and how they might give
way to the complex, multimodal coordination that naturally arises in
social interaction.
A central challenge to social cognition is in understanding how
the divide between individual minds becomes bridged during
social interaction. It is not surprising then that the mirror
neuron system (MNS) engenders the sort of fascination it
does, as it provides cortical evidence that the way we relate to
others is inextricably linked to the actions of our own bodies.
Importantly, as Cook et al.’s associative learning hypothesis
posits, these interpersonal connections are highly attuned to
changes in our social environment that mitigate (or abolish
altogether) appeals to innate processes. Given the domain-
general characteristics of associative learning, such a mechanism
is thus well situated to account for a wide range of sensorimotor
possibilities in a variety of interactional contexts. Yet, in most of
the studies reviewed in the target article, movements are con-
ﬁned to relatively simple interactions involving repetitive and
overlearned behaviors such as grasping, clasping, lifting, or
ﬂexing movements of the hands, ﬁngers, and feet. When more
naturalistic interactions are considered, such as those of pro-
fessional dancers and musicians, coordination of movement is
extensively structured around explicit training. These phenomena
do provide valuable cases to test the associative hypotheses. But
they do not yet resemble the complex, coordinated behavior of
social interaction.
When two people interact, complex patterns of behavior
emerge quite spontaneously. These patterns are organized
across multiple types of movement that simultaneously co-
occur with little to no conscious awareness. Nevertheless, they
form a stable network of associations that guide how people con-
verge on meaning and respond to higher-level communicative
goals. The mechanisms proposed by Cook and colleagues
surely hold great promise in better understanding how social
cognition is distributed and grounded in interpersonal motor be-
havior. But these associative mechanisms must ﬁgure into the
complex array of overt and covert processes that are present
when two people interact. At present, there is no good theory
of how this interleaving takes place. We have recently termed
this problem the “centipede’s dilemma” of interaction research
(Dale et al. 2013).
One approach that seems to have promise comes from the
methodological and theoretical toolbox of dynamical systems
theory. Like the target article, this approach sees even human
interaction as emergent from domain-general processes acting
in concert – viewing human interaction as a self-organizing
system. At the core of this approach is a focus on how the com-
ponents of a system interact over time. Components are drawn
in part from processes underlying social cognition, such as visual
attention, executive control, motor priming, and many others
(see Dale et al. [2013] for a more comprehensive list). These pro-
cesses span a range of complexity, too, from basic biomechanical
constraints of conversants, to higher-level ones such as inferences
regarding knowledge and beliefs. Based on these many potential
interactions, it is unlikely that any single component alone will
explain the collective behavior that emerges. Instead, interaction
gains its structure through a process of self-organization in
which the various components mutually inﬂuence and constrain
each other.
There is growing evidence that this interdependence holds
across diverse processes during interaction. For example, individ-
ual frequencies of oscillatory movements, such as those gener-
ated in the way people naturally sway their bodies,
spontaneously converge as stable in-phase and anti-phase
rhythms (Schmidt et al. 1990), and even hold across more irregu-
lar ﬂuctuations of movement (Shockley et al. 2003). Similar
forms of coordination, albeit expressed as more subtle, global
patterns of recurrence, are also evident in how people gesture,
laugh and smile, touch their faces, nod their heads, and even
scan a visual scene (Louwerse et al. 2012; D. C. Richardson
et al. 2008). Moreover, for each behavior being coordinated,
people respond to one other across unique timescales, where
the near overlap of postural synchrony stands in contrast to the
longer delays between head nods.
The ﬁndings just described involve interdependence, between
two people, of one behavior, sometimes called “synchrony” or
“alignment” (Pickering & Garrod 2004). Yet there is also intercon-
nectivity cutting across different behaviors. Each behavior
mutually constrains the other within and across conversational
partners. Even more remarkable is that this multimodal coordi-
nation is also simultaneously modulated by social and task
demands that arise in conversation. The strength of coordination
increases, for example, when there is a greater possibility for mis-
understanding (Louwerse et al. 2012), when people believe that
they might not share common ground (D. C. Richardson et al.
2007), when two people develop a shared vocabulary (Dale
et al. 2011), and even when one person is deceiving another
(Duran et al., in preparation). Thus, the communicative context
itself integrates those involved into a more coherent and stable
two-person unit. Put differently, the associations are doing more
than just bridging their respective behaviors. They are supporting
the integration of each individual’s cognitive processes and behav-
ioral patterns into a coupled system.
We have argued that the associative approach must be sup-
plemented with an understanding of the naturalistic dynamics of
social interaction. Whatever core capacities human beings have
to engage in rich social interaction, they must act together in
order to bring it about. This is a positive explanatory thesis
about domain-general processes and how they function to
support human joint performance. Our ambitious hypothesis is
that movement coordination – a mass assembly of associative
mechanisms – performs the function of facilitating information
transmission. Such hypotheses cannot be tested if single sparse
behaviors are studied in isolation. We can’t reach these phenom-
ena by studying ﬁnger lifts and grasping. Instead, we need to
measure complex spontaneous interactions between people, and
capture the coordination using new integrative frameworks,
such as dynamical systems theory (see M. J. Richardson et al.
2014). The methods and concepts in this framework permit the
study of language, social cognition, and social interaction – the
phenomena that excite supporters of the mirror neuron system –
yet might also explain them with the simple mechanisms laid out
in this target article.
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Mirror mechanism and dedicated circuits are
the scaffold for mirroring processes
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Abstract: In the past decade many studies have demonstrated the
existence of a mirror mechanism that matches the sensory
representation of a biological stimulus with its somatomotor and
visceromotor representation. This mechanism, likely phylogenetically
very old, explains several types of mirroring behaviours, at different
levels of complexity. The presence in primates of dedicated
neuroanatomical pathways for speciﬁc sensorimotor integrations
processes implies, at least in the primate lineage, a hard-wired mirror
mechanism for social cognitive functions.
The core issue of the target article is whether mirror neurons
(MNs) arise by associative learning. My comments, based on neu-
roanatomical and electrophysiological expertise, focus on this and
other related issues (mirror mechanism and action understanding)
addressed by the article.
The mirror neuron mechanism. The most important aspect of
MNs is their capacity to match the visual/acoustic cortical rep-
resentation of a biological stimulus with its corresponding somato-
motor or visceromotor representation. Thus, MNs constitute a
mechanism that not only explains the automatic decoding of the
motor acts of others, but also many other types of processes
involved in social cognitive functions (e.g., emotion recognition,
imitation, oro-facial communication). Recent studies have shown
the existence of MNs active during both listening and production
of species-typical song in singing birds (Prather et al. 2008),
suggesting that mirror mechanisms are probably very primitive
solutions evolved in different vertebrate classes to elaborate
sensory information for social cognition. Furthermore, behaviour-
al evidence suggests that other vertebrates such as rats or dogs
(Range et al. 2007; Zentall & Levine 1972) or even invertebrates
such as the octopus (Fiorito & Scotto 1992), could be endowed
with some form of mirror mechanism.
By using the same matching mechanism, mirroring may occur,
even within the same species, at different levels: in the compre-
hension of goals (Cattaneo et al. 2009; Fogassi et al. 2005; Rizzo-
latti et al 2004) or of meaningful communicative or symbolic
gestures (Ferrari et al. 2003; Lui et al. 2008) (high level), and in
the decoding of observed movements rather than of motor acts
(Catmur et al. 2007; Fadiga et al. 1995) (low level).
Mirror neurons and sensorimotor associative learning. Cook
et al. claim that MNs are the result of associative learning rather
than an adaptation selected by evolution for action understanding
genetically coded in humans and ancestors. Following the authors’
reasoning, if we knew the experience of every monkey since birth,
we could predict the formation, in monkeys living in different
developmental environments, of different types of MNs. Further-
more, many of the typical primate behavioural functions of daily
life would be the result of associative learning, and therefore we
should observe a large inter-individual behavioural variability.
However, it is well known that, for example, object- or space-
related sensorimotor transformations for reaching-grasping
actions are grounded on dorsal cortical circuits (Rizzolatti &
Matelli 2003) that are phylogenetically very old and, in the pri-
mates’ lineage, very similar among different species. Just as
there are these dedicated circuits, linking speciﬁc parietal and pre-
motor areas (Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001), so there is also a dedi-
cated mirror circuit for hand actions observation, linking
anterior superior temporal sulcus (aSTS)↔inferior parietal
cortex (PFG)↔ventral premotor cortex (area F5c) (Nelissen
et al. 2011, p. 3754). It is evident that such selected circuits
cannot re-build every time. They provide, rather, the
neuroanatomical scaffold for both hard-wired and newly-learned
sensorimotor transformations. In these circuits, pre-existing and
new motor representations are matched with their corresponding
sensory representations.
As an example of an anatomo-functional circuit in which the
mirror matching mechanism operates, a series of recent works
(Bonini et al. 2010; Fogassi et al. 2005) has shown that the dis-
charge of purely motor and MNs of monkey premotor (area
F5c) and parietal (area PFG) cortex is modulated, during grasping
observation/execution, depending on the behavioural goals of
speciﬁc executed or observed action sequences (grasp-to-eat or
grasp-to-place). Furthermore, the percentage of MNs tuned for
the hard-wired action (grasp-to-eat) is much higher than that of
MNs tuned for the learned action (grasp-to-place). Overall,
these and other data suggest that the mirror mechanism, deeply
rooted in primate evolution, also plays a strong role in the exten-
sion of action understanding capacity to new actions, in motor skill
consolidation (Cross et al. 2006) and in observation-based rehabi-
litation (Ertelt et al. 2007). These processes could also beneﬁt
from associative learning.
Action recognition and action understanding.Cook et al. claim
that there is no consensus on the concept of action understanding
and on its distinction from action perception and recognition. If
the objective of the nervous system were to simply ensure
action recognition, probably the visual system would be enough:
some sectors of aSTS would be the best candidate for recognizing
the actions of others. However, if we assume that the motor
system is crucial for cognition because it provides information
about motor goals, aSTS areas alone are not able to support
action understanding because they do not show motor responses
(Perrett et al. 1989). Thus, we can hypothesize that the reciprocal
neuroanatomical links between high-order visual areas and motor
areas endow individuals with two main abilities: (1) to interpret
the vision of a hand approaching an object in terms of goal; (2)
to better perceive the details of the observed actions.
Two recent studies support these two functions. The ﬁrst (Cag-
giano et al. 2009) shows that in half of recorded MNs the intensity
of the visual response is different depending on whether the
observed grasping is performed within or outside the peri-
personal space of the monkey, and this effect can be further
modulated by the possibility for the monkey to act or not in its
peri-personal space. The second (Caggiano et al. 2011) shows
that 75% of the recorded MNs discharge more strongly when
the monkey sees the action either from an egocentric or a third-
person perspective. These results can be interpreted as the dem-
onstration that MNs, although always encoding, in their output,
the goal of a motor act (they are basically motor neurons), can,
at the very same time, in conjunction (through feedback projec-
tions) with high-order visual areas sensitive to biological stimuli,
provide information on speciﬁc details of the observed action,
by enhancing the activity of the sensory neurons that are more
selective for those details.
Understanding action with the motor system
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Abstract: We challenge Cook et al.’s claim about the vagueness of the
notion of action understanding in relation with mirror neurons. We
show the multidimensional nature of action understanding and provide a
deﬁnition of motor-based action understanding, shedding new light on
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the various components of action understanding and on their relationship.
Finally, we propose an alternative perspective on the origin of mirror
neurons, stressing the necessity to abandon the dichotomy between
genetic and associative hypotheses.
The role of the mirror mechanism (MM) in social cognition is still
a matter of debate. Much disagreement is primarily due to differ-
ent notions of action and of action understanding. On the standard
view, an action is directed to a goal in virtue of the action’s being
appropriately related to some high-order mental states (e.g.,
beliefs, desires, and intentions) representing this goal. The
relation between actions and their goals is traditionally assumed
to be largely independent of the motor processes and represen-
tations underpinning action execution. These processes and rep-
resentations allegedly concern motor features such as joint
displacements or muscle contractions only. However, two
decades of cognitive and neuroscientiﬁc research on the cortical
motor system has repeatedly challenged this view. Neurophysiolo-
gical and behavioral evidence (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010) has
demonstrated that motor processes may involve motor represen-
tations of action goals (e.g., to grasp, to place, etc.), and not only
kinematic or dynamic components of actions. This suggests that
beliefs, desires, and intentions are neither primitive, nor the
only bearers of intentionality in action. Indeed, motor represen-
tation is enough to ground the directedness of an action to its
goal (Gallese 2000; Butterﬁll & Sinigaglia 2014).
The MM indicates that this holds not only for action execution,
but also for action observation. The activation of the MM can be
selectively related to the observed action goal regardless of its kin-
ematics, dynamics, and the body effector involved (Gallese & Sini-
gaglia 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). This supports the claim
that the MM may play a role in action understanding. By recruit-
ing her own motor representation of the goal to which the
observed action is directed, the observer may understand what
the agent is doing without needing any high-order processing.
Claiming that the MM plays a role in action understanding of
course does not imply that action understanding is overall solely
explained by the MM. Understanding an action is a complex
process. It involves at least representing to which (proximal
and distal) goals the action is directed; identifying which
beliefs, desires, and intentions specify reasons explaining why
the action happened; and realizing how those reasons are
linked to the agent and to her action. The MM enables the rep-
resentation of the goals of others’ actions by taking advantage of
one’s own motor cognition. The richer a person’s own motor
cognition is, the greater her sensitivity to another’s action and
the better her ability to grasp the goal to which that action is
directed. Consistently, action understanding deﬁcits occur fol-
lowing speciﬁc impairments in the recruitment of the motor
representation of action goals (for a review, see Gallese & Sini-
gaglia 2011).
The fact that a motor-based action understanding doesn’t
match any “established category of psychological functioning”
(target article, sect. 9.1) is not per se a good reason to reject it.
On the contrary, it provides a new empirically and theoretically
sound framework to investigate basic aspects of social cognition.
Furthermore, differently from what Cook et al. maintain, it
enables us to shed new light on the various components (e.g., per-
ceptual, motor, and mentalizing) of action understanding, as well
as on their relationship. To this extent, it is worth noting that even
high-order purely sensory mechanisms, like those characterizing
extrastriate cortices such as the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS)
region, are insufﬁcient to represent the goal of a given action at
the same general level as the MM does. In addition, there is no
evidence to date that the STS responds both to proximal goals
(e.g., grasping a piece of food) and to distal action goals (for
eating or for throwing away), as the MM does (Gallese & Siniga-
glia 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010).
Pertaining to the relationship between the motor components
of action understanding and mentalizing, many studies have
demonstrated that the MM kicks in when people have to under-
stand to which goal an observed action is directed (de Lange
et al. 2008; Liepelt et al. 2008a). When people must determine
the reasons why an agent performed a given action, additional
activations of cortical regions such as the mesial anterior frontal
cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the temporo-parietal
junction – typically considered to belong to the so-called mentaliz-
ing network – are detected (de Lange et al. 2008; Liepelt et al.
2008a; Van Overwalle 2009). In spite of many theoretical attempts
to integrate these different components of action understanding,
so far there is neither convincing evidence about the mentalizing
speciﬁcity of these activations, nor a theoretically coherent and
empirically motivated explanation of how the “mentalizing
network” might work. Ironically, such controversial aspects of
the neurobiological bases of mentalizing have not attracted so
much debate, certainly not as much as the role of the MM in
social cognition.
Finally, the functional properties of the MM and its involve-
ment in action understanding are not captured by either a strictly
genetic or a purely associative account about its origin. We
hypothesize (Gallese et al. 2009) that an innate rudimentary
MM is already present at birth, which can then be ﬂexibly modu-
lated by motor experience and gradually enriched by visuomotor
learning. Indeed, such a system could be an ideal candidate for
the neural underpinning of neonatal facial imitation in humans
and nonhuman primates. Recent neurophysiological evidence
also suggests there is an inborn rudimentary form of action mir-
roring in neonate rhesus macaques (Vanderwert et al. 2013). Dif-
ferently from the associative account proposed by Cook et al., our
hypothesis entails a primacy of motor experience in the develop-
ment of the MM and its contribution to understanding others’
actions. This primacy is supported by several studies showing a
causal link between the ability to produce an action and the
ability to understand it (see, among others: Cannon & Woodward
2012; Kanakogi & Itakura 2011).
Evolution after mirror neurons: Tapping the
shared manifold through secondary
adaptation
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Abstract: Cook et al. laudably call for careful comparative research into
the development of mirror neurons. However, they do so within an
impoverished evolutionary framework that does not clearly distinguish
ultimate and proximate causes and their reciprocal relations. As a result,
they overlook evidence for the reliable develop of mirror neurons in
biological and cultural traits evolved to work through them.
Cook et al. have done a great service by marshaling the mounting
evidence that experience inﬂuences the operation of mirror
neurons (MNs). This work reinforces other recent calls (e.g.,
Henrich et al. 2010) to study the effects of variable environments,
both in humans (across cultures) and in nonhuman primates
(across rearing and ﬁeld settings), on the development of neural
and psychological systems. Cook et al. advance this issue with
the hypothesis that speciﬁc aspects of developmental environ-
ments inﬂuence the ontogeny and functions of MN systems.
Encouragingly, anthropologists have documented relevant popu-
lation variation, including in adult interactions with infants (e.g.,
Ochs & Schieffelin 1984), and in interactive practices across
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cultural domains (Fiske 1992). Primatologists and comparative
psychologists have also increasingly catalogued variation in social
behaviors across natural populations (Whiten et al. 2001) and
captive environments (Call & Tomasello 1996; Russell et al.
2011). While the painstaking comparative groundwork is just
beginning, it is hard to dispute Cook et al. on the value of the
enterprise.
However, Cook et al. rely on a curiously impoverished evol-
utionary framework that likely hinders the empirical project
they advocate. The authors do not clearly distinguish and relate
types of biological causation (Laland et al. 2011). To be sure,
they do clearly propose both a proximate/ontogenetic and an ulti-
mate/functional explanation of MNs –MN development is driven
by action-perception contingency learning, and is a by-product of
associative learning mechanisms that bear no evidence of adaptive
specialization for MNs. However, Cook et al. develop alternative
approaches to this “associative” account that are arbitrary conjunc-
tions of ultimate and proximate explanations. Their “genetic”
account weds a nativist ontogenetic explanation to a speciﬁc ulti-
mate function, “action understanding.” That this account is said to
“combine” questions of origin and function, while the associative
account “dissociates” them, is an artiﬁcial consequence of the
“genetic” hypothesis as presented. The authors are mistaken
when they state that, “If MNs were a genetic adaptation, it is
likely that their properties would be relatively invariant across
developmental environments” (sect. 9.1.1). Natural selection
operates on developmental systems through the phenotypes
they produce, and MN development could be largely experi-
ence-dependent while having a speciﬁc evolved function (see
Barrett 2012). Likewise, MNs could be highly canalized and
reliably developing, yet could have evolved for functions other
than “action understanding,” including empathy (Gallese 2003;
Preston & de Waal 2002) – a widely discussed and investigated
ultimate hypothesis that the target article relegates to a footnote.
The “genetic” hypothesis is at best an arbitrary hypothesis, and at
worst a straw man.
In addition, contrasting “canalization” and “exaptation” as Cook
et al. do has the unfortunate effect of obscuring interesting phylo-
genetic questions. While the authors argue that “the motivation
for invoking exaptation is not compelling” (sect. 8.2, para. 1),
they advocate the purest possible exaptation hypothesis – an
ancient adaptation was coopted for producing MNs without any
“secondary adaptation” (Gould & Vrba 1982). The authors go
on to argue that any species capable of associative learning
should be capable of developing MNs, and they predict controlled
training regiments will produce MNs in lab rats. Intriguing, but
this raises a question: Why do humans and macaques (and likely
other species: Mancini et al. 2013; Mui et al. 2008; Range et al.
2011) “naturally” develop mirror neurons, while rats apparently
do not? Is this a happy accident of variation in early developmental
environments? Or has there been varying selection pressures
across species for secondary adaptations that facilitate MN devel-
opment (such as mother–infant face-to-face interaction; Ferrari
et al. 2009b)?
In general, the target article is overly restrictive in discussing
such canalizing mechanisms. Cook et al. discuss only one attention
bias, infant self-observation of reaching. They overlook other
biases, both in infants and in adults, that could facilitate MN
development. For example, in humans the properties of infant-
directed speech (Bryant & Barrett 2007) and adult encourage-
ment and imitation (Bornstein et al. 1992) show evidence of invar-
iance across cultures, while infants show perceptual preferences
for faces (Valenza et al. 1996) and infant-directed motion
(Brand & Shallcross 2008). In addition, no mention is made of
mounting evidence that associative learning mechanisms often
evince domain-speciﬁc design features, such as preparedness to
learn particular ﬁtness-relevant contingencies (Barrett &
Broesch 2012; Garcia & Koelling 1966).
Cook et al. also fail to appreciate the likely evolutionary conse-
quences of MNs reliably developing in a species. Although
ultimate and proximate explanations are classically considered
orthogonal, they can be reciprocally related, such as when proxi-
mate mechanisms become part of the selective environment
(Laland et al. 2011). Selection for behaviors and capacities that
exploit MNs would be a clear case of this. Expressions of
emotion may be a case in point. There is strong evidence that
emotional contagion and mimicry of expressions are mediated
by MNs (Carr et al. 2003; Kircher et al. 2013; Wicker et al.
2003) and have signiﬁcant consequences for social competencies
(Pfeifer et al. 2008) and relationships (Lakin et al. 2003). Given
both mirror neurons and selection for empathy and/or emotional
coordination, evolution could well craft emotional expressions for
facilitating shared emotion. For example, we have argued that
laughter evolved as a medium for playful emotional contagion
that taps MNs to facilitate mutually beneﬁcial social play
(Gervais & Wilson 2005; see also Davila-Ross et al. 2011). To
the extent that human expressions of emotion are elaborated hom-
ologues of ancestral ape expressions (Parr et al. 2007), one might
implicate uniquely human selection pressures that attended ratch-
eting interdependence (Tomasello et al. 2012). Further, the
emergence of cultural evolutionary processes in humans (Boyd
et al. 2011) may have created an additional consequence of
MNs – selection for cultural practices (e.g., religious rituals; Atkin-
son & Whitehouse 2011; Fiske 1992) that facilitate MN develop-
ment and build social bonds through them.
Even if mirror neurons develop through associative learning,
they may be reliably developing adaptations. Evidence of second-
ary adaptation, including biological and cultural traits designed to
exploit MNs, would be evidence of a history of such reliable devel-
opment. The investigation of such derived traits should thus be
integral to the mirror neuron enterprise.
Mirror representations innate versus
determined by experience: A viewpoint from
learning theory
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Abstract: From the viewpoint of pattern recognition and computational
learning, mirror neurons form an interesting multimodal representation
that links action perception and planning. While it seems unlikely that
all details of such representations are speciﬁed by the genetic code,
robust learning of such complex representations likely requires an
appropriate interplay between plasticity, generalization, and anatomical
constraints of the underlying neural architecture.
Mirror neurons (MNs) have stimulated extensive discussions in
cognitive neuroscience and related disciplines, often based on
relatively limited empirical data. The article by Cook et al. pro-
vides an excellent overview of an ongoing discussion concerning
the possible origins of MNs, and, especially, about the question
whether their properties are innate or learned.
Mirror neurons, originally found in premotor and parietal
cortex, represent an interesting representation that links the per-
ceptual processing of actions with motor planning (Rizzolatti et al.
2001; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008). Meanwhile, MN-like sensory-
motor representations have been found in a large variety of
systems, for example, at different sites in the primate brain
(Mukamel et al. 2010; Shepherd et al. 2009; Tkach et al. 2007),
and even in non-primates such as birds (Prather et al. 2008),
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that is, substrates that are not homologous to the primate mirror
neuron system (MNS). Following the arguments of Cook et al.,
this suggests that MN-like properties might emerge from mech-
anisms that apply to brains in general, instead of being pre-pro-
grammed in detail by the genetic code or evolutionary processes
that changed a particular subsystem in the brain.
From the viewpoint of pattern recognition, MNs seem jointly to
encode equivalent classes of perceived actions, and fragments or
primitives of motor programs relevant for the control of action
execution. Also, MNs have also been associated with the encoding
of “semantic properties” of actions (Arbib 2008; Kemmerer &
Gonzalez-Castillo 2010; Pulvermüller 2005), where the precise
mathematical deﬁnition of action semantics or the critical under-
lying features remains an open problem. Although it seems likely
that MNs represent certain aspects of actions that are invariant,
and speciﬁcally useful for motor planning, the principles of the
neural encoding of such properties within populations of MNs
are completely unknown. For example, a recent experiment
shows that many mirror neurons are view-dependent, contradict-
ing the interpretation that MNs encode abstract semantic proper-
ties, invariant with respect to visual stimulus parameters such as
the view (Caggiano et al. 2011). Even less is known about
neural mechanisms supporting the efﬁcient learning of such rep-
resentations and their critical invariance properties.
In the domain of sensory pattern recognition, substantial pro-
gress has been made with respect to the understanding of compu-
tational and neural principles of the learning of complex sensory
patterns, e.g., in vision (Poggio & Edelman 1990; Tarr & Bülthoff
1998; Ullman 1996). Sensory pattern recognition is based on learn-
ing, and the efﬁciency of such learned representations is essentially
dependent on maintaining a balance between their selectivity (the
accuracy with which individual complex features are encoded) and
the invariance against unimportant, semantically irrelevant details
of encoded patterns (Vapnik 1998). For object as well as action rec-
ognition, it has been shown that this problem can be solved by hier-
archical architectures of learned detectors, or classiﬁers, that
increase feature complexity and invariance along the hierarchy,
and such architectures have been used to account for visual prop-
erties of mirror neurons (Fleischer et al. 2013). The same
problem of balancing selectivity versus invariance applies equally
for the encoding and recognition of motor behavior (Poggio &
Bizzi 2004), and thus also for the encoding of sensorimotor patterns
in the MNS. However, it is much less clear how selectivity and gen-
eralization in spaces of complex and goal-directed motor patterns
can be appropriately deﬁned. Recent work has started to explore
which learned structures might enable generalization between
different motor tasks, and how expected reward might interact
with the control of motor behavior (Wolpert et al. 2011). The inﬂu-
ence of expected reward is likely important for the understanding of
the function of MNs, since many of them are encoding the
expected amount of reward (Caggiano et al. 2012).
Extensive research in visual pattern recognition has investigated
how hierarchical representations with good generalization proper-
ties can be learned. Whereas initial approaches optimized inter-
mediate feature detectors by learning, often using large
amounts of training data (Olshausen & Field 1996; Serre et al.
2007; Ullman 2007), more recent approaches, often referred to
as “deep learning,” try to learn whole hierarchical recognition
architectures in an unsupervised manner, enabling generalization
even from very limited datasets (Bengio & Le Cun 2007; Hinton
2007). To make such architectures work, it is essential to constrain
the local learning processes, the overall learning strategy, as well
as to choose general network architectures with bottom-up and
top-down connections that ensure an efﬁcient information trans-
fer through the network during learning. Recent work suggests
that similar hierarchical architectures might be suitable also for
the encoding and recognition motor patterns (Taylor et al. 2011;
Yildiz & Kiebel 2011), and it has been postulated that hierarchical
predictive architectures might be essential in the MN system
(Grafton & Hamilton 2007; Kilner et al. 2007a).
Although we are still quite far from an understanding of the
principles of the robust learning of ﬂexible representations for
action encoding, the lessons learned from sensory pattern recog-
nition suggest a slightly different view of the debate as to whether
MNs are learned or innate. Efﬁcient learning in mirror represen-
tations likely will depend on an interplay between anatomical con-
straints (e.g., basic connectivity patterns between specialized
areas, speciﬁc local circuitry principles, or “canonical microcir-
cuits”; Bastos et al. 2012; Douglas & Martin 2004) that ensure
sparse encoding and dynamic network stability, and potentially
suitable forms of bottom-up top-down connectivity (e.g., Bastos
et al. 2012). These principles might in fact be genetically
encoded. In addition, an appropriate control and scheduling of
relevant plasticity processes (e.g., ensuring local and layer-wise
learning vs. closed-loop optimization of larger parts of the rep-
resentation exploiting top-down predictions) might be critical.
This factor might also depend additionally on ontogenetic
factors, for example, how sensorimotor patterns are acquired
and trained during human development. Beyond these factors,
as stressed by Cook et al., the efﬁcient context- and attention-
dependent control of the activity of MNs and related plasticity
processes is critical to avoid spurious learning, and such control
seems compatible with recent electrophysiological results from
mirror neurons (Caggiano et al. 2009; 2012).
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Higher-level processes in the formation and
application of associations during action
understanding
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Abstract: The associative account described in the target article provides a
viable explanation for the origin of mirror neurons. We argue here that if
mirror neurons develop purely by associative learning, then they cannot by
themselves explain intentional action understanding. Higher-level
processes seem to be involved in the formation of associations as well as
in their application during action understanding.
Cook et al. present an elucidative perspective on how mirror
neurons (MNs) could emerge in the human brain. By clarifying
the conceptual distinction between questions about the function
of MNs and questions about the origin of the matching properties
of these neurons, their article makes an important contribution to
the ﬁeld of MN research. With respect to the origin of MNs, we
think that the associative account put forward by Cook et al. pro-
vides a strong theoretical framework by which experimental ﬁndings
can be assessed. In this commentary, we would like to elaborate on
the potential function of MNs in action understanding, assuming
that the associative account put forward by Cook et al. is correct.
Cook et al. note that if MN activity can be understood as arising
from associative learning, then its function, if any, in action under-
standing remains an open question. We would like to take their
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proposal one step further and argue that if MN activity indeed is a
purely associative phenomenon, then there are strong theoretical
reasons to believe that MN activity itself cannot be constitutive of
genuine action understanding, in the sense of understanding the
“why” of actions (e.g., the goals and intentions underlying
actions). Our argument consists of two parts. First, we argue
that, at least in humans, higher-level cognitive processes can
guide the formation of appropriate associations, and that such gui-
dance seems necessary for forming associations that code for the
“why” of actions. Second, we argue that even if such appropriate
associations have been formed successfully, higher-cognitive pro-
cesses seem required for selecting which of many possible associ-
ations codes the “why” in a particular situation.
Cook et al. review evidence showing that in order to build an
associative connection between two events, it is sufﬁcient that
the two events occur around the same time and that one reliably
predicts the other. This suggests that associative learning is a low-
level process where no reasoning is involved. The fact that even
basic organisms that are unlikely to have higher-order reasoning
ability (e.g., invertebrate sea slugs; Walters et al. 1979) are sensi-
tive to classical conditioning suggests that cognitive processing is
indeed not necessary for the formation of associations.
However, there is evidence that suggests that the degree to
which any two events are associated can be guided by beliefs
about the causal structure of the world and other prior knowledge.
For instance, in a trace conditioning paradigm, Clark and Squire
(1998) found that participants could be conditioned to blink
their eyes when hearing a tone, but only if they were aware of
the relation between that tone and a puff of air to the eye that
caused them to blink. A similar inﬂuence of causal beliefs on
association seems operational in the well-known “blocking”
effect in conditioning. This is the effect that the association of
an event A with event Y is prevented if A is presented together
with another event B that has previously been associated with
event Y. Notably, Waldmann (2000) found that this effect is
modulated by whether the participants were led to believe that
A and B were either possible causes or possible effects of
Y. Findings such as these provide strong evidence that, at least
in humans, which types and degrees of associations are formed
is partly shaped by higher-level cognitive processes. If MNs
indeed code for associations, as Cook et al. suggest, then the
degree to which they can be supposed to support action under-
standing, if at all, will depend on the degree to which the associ-
ative processes that guide the MNmatching properties are in turn
guided by relevant higher-level processes involving beliefs about
the causal structure of actions. In other words, if associations
are formed without consideration of the causes of actions, includ-
ing mental causes such as goals and intentions, then they cannot
come to code for the “why” of actions.
Admittedly, it is conceivable that the associations coded by the
MN system are shaped in part by higher-level processes and
thereby could form associations in a way that is sensitive to the
causal structure of actions. But even then, for the interpretation
of newly observed actions, the MN system can probably not inter-
pret these actions without the involvement of higher-level cogni-
tive processes. This leads us to our second point. There are many
possible intentions that may explain an observed action, as well as
many possible actions that result from an intention. This many-to-
many mapping implies that any given observed action can acti-
vate – for example, in the MN system –many possible intentions
that have been previously associated with that action. To select
which of these associations applies to the current situation, we
need some other, context-sensitive process. For reasons that
have been detailed elsewhere (Uithol et al. 2011), this process
most plausibly involves some form of (possibly implicit, uncon-
scious) reasoning that takes into account some form of knowledge
of the world and how actions interact with intentions and contexts.
This idea is supported by studies showing that when people
consider why an action was performed, for example, when
they observe novel actions (Brass et al. 2007) or when they are
instructed to attend to the intentionality of an action (de Lange
et al. 2008), areas other than MN areas are recruited. Hence, it
seems that, if MN associations play a functional role in action
understanding at all, these associations need to be integrated
with prior knowledge and beliefs in areas outside the MN
system for a full appreciation of the intentionality of actions.
In summary, we agree with Cook et al. that the associative
account of MN activity is viable. The properties of MNs seem
indeed explainable by associative learning. We go one step
further than Cook et al. by proposing that a purely associative
account implies that MNs cannot explain genuine action under-
standing, including understanding of the “why” of actions.
Higher-level processes are important in the formation of appro-
priate associations that may code the intentions of actions, as
well as in the application of learned associations during intentional
action understanding.
Associative and sensorimotor learning for
parenting involves mirror neurons under the
inﬂuence of oxytocin
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Abstract: Mirror neuron–based associative learning may be understood
according to associative learning theories, in addition to sensorimotor
learning theories. This is important for a comprehensive understanding
of the role of mirror neurons and related hormone modulators, such as
oxytocin, in complex social interactions such as among parent–infant
dyads and in examples of mirror neuron function that involve abnormal
motor systems such as depression.
We agree with Cook et al. that sensorimotor associative learning
takes place pervasively in the brain, as well as among mirror
neurons (MNs) in particular. However, many associative learning
theories stress the importance of cognitive representations in Pav-
lovian and instrumental conditioning (Balleine & Dickinson 1998;
Berridge & Robinson 2003). Without consideration of the roles of
cognitive representations, MNs end up being the action-executing
motor neurons (the primary motor cortex), as opposed to the
neurons responsible for action-planning (Schubotz & Von
Cramon 2003) an issue recognized by Cook et al.
We recommend that the “cardinal feature” of MNs – sensori-
motor matching properties – should be best understood in a way
no different from that to understand how the unity of conscious
perception is brought about by integrating distributed activities
in the brain, known as the “binding problem” (Revonsuo &
Newman 1999). This issue applies to a range of brain functions
including perception (Treisman & Gelade 1980), volitional
emotion regulation (Phan & Sripada 2013; Swain et al. 2012),
and social cognitive emotional interaction (Ho et al. 2012). For
example, the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) by Hommel et al.
(2001) suggested that a domain-general binding process can gen-
erate “event ﬁles,” that is, cognitive representations (memory) of
events, which can be any to-be-perceived or to-be-generated inci-
dent in the environment. Interestingly, there is evidence that such
“event ﬁles” can be formed after a single sensory-motor encounter
and represented by a network of loosely linked nodes rather than a
Commentary/Cook et al.: Mirror neurons: From origin to function
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2014) 37:2 203
master ﬁle (Hommel 1998). Because TEC has been linked to
MNs (Hommel 2004), a direct comparison and contrast of TEC
and the account presented in the target article should be
performed.
One speciﬁc example of MN activity is in the parent–infant
dyad. Neuroimaging studies are beginning to explore this in
mothers (Mayes et al. 2005; Swain 2011). Recent ﬁndings (Atzil
et al. 2011; 2012) have demonstrated brain activations in response
to baby-videos that constitute a social network involved in menta-
lization, action representation, simulation, mirroring, and atten-
tion functions (Dodell-Feder et al. 2011; Iacoboni & Dapretto
2006; Keysers & Fadiga 2008). These neuro-hormonal networks
underpin social interactions among kin and non-kin members of
society (Decety 2011; Swain et al. 2004; 2011; 2012), as they
have been demonstrated to respond according to minute-by-
minute interactive synchrony between mother and infant (Atzil
et al. 2011). Such social brain responses involve the integration
of higher-order cognitive functions implicated in mentalization
and empathy, as well as more basic functions of perception
(lingual gyrus) and action representation (motor areas). Possibly,
when perception–action regions are co-activated with mentaliza-
tion regions, they have a social-attentive function that enhances
the salience of the social context and the planning of adequate
action – such as in parent’s ability to understand the intentions
and desires of her infant and to respond with a synchronized
conduct (Atzil et al. 2011).
These parental social-brain functions have been shown to be
under close regulation of oxytocin (OT) (Gordon et al. 2010).
The brain–OT correlations may provide additional support to
the notion that mothering is guided by greater motivational–
emotional focus. Recent pharmaco-imaging study suggests that
plasma OT levels signiﬁcantly correlated with limbic–emotional
brain areas among mothers and fathers (Atzil et al. 2012). Oxyto-
cin is central for the formation of social bonds in general and par-
enting in particular, and is critical for maternal behavior
(Shahrokh et al. 2010) in animal models. In human studies, oxyto-
cin has been established as important for many social competen-
cies, including trust, “mind-reading,” and empathy (Bartz et al.
2011). In parenting, oxytocin was differentially related to limbic
and cortical activations in mothers and fathers for whom arginine
vasopressin may play a related role in modulating social brain cir-
cuits (Atzil et al. 2011) through motivation enhancement or cogni-
tive modulation.
Perhaps, then, the “laboratory” of the parent–infant dyad will
be useful in exploring the importance of MNs for parents, as
well as the development of related systems. One example that
has received no attention so far is the development of MNs in
humans who either have no experience of motion or have the
experience of impaired motion. For example, for babies where
motor function is impaired, would MNs not develop? In this
case, their leg-related sensorimotor cortex would neither be
capable of action “understanding,” and so forth, nor signiﬁcant
neural activity in areas commonly accepted as MNs when witnes-
sing leg movements, because they would have never been able to
associate the visual experience with the motor experience and
thereby never have developed MNs. A less extreme example
may be to study MN development in children of parents with
depression – in which psychomotor retardation may be a signiﬁ-
cant mediating factor in the detrimental effects of postpartum
depression on infant development (Tronick & Reck 2009).
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Abstract: Speech is commonly claimed to relate to mirror neurons
because of the alluring surface analogy of mirror neurons to the Motor
Theory of speech perception, which posits that perception and
production draw upon common motor-articulatory representations. We
argue that the analogy fails and highlight examples of systems-level
developmental approaches that have been more fruitful in revealing
perception–production associations.
Cook et al. make the case that sensorimotor learning plays an impor-
tant role in the origin of mirror neurons (MNs) and that it is there-
fore essential to pay careful attention to an organism’s
developmental history and to couple this understanding with rigor-
ous systems-level theory and experimentation. The putative role of
MNs in speech perception offers both a cautionary tale of making
too much of a surface analogy and a demonstration of the fertility
of a systems-level developmental approach to human behavior.
Speech perception is one of the many phenomena claimed to be
related to MNs. This link is most commonly made through the
Motor Theory (MT) of speech perception, an inﬂuential theory
that posits that humans perceive speech not as sounds, per se, but
as the intended phonetic gestures of the speaker. The central
claim is that speech production and perception share common pro-
cesses and representation, drawn from a linguistic module evolved
speciﬁcally for communication (Liberman et al. 1967; Liberman &
Mattingly 1985). One virtue of MT is that it provides an explanation
for how listeners bridge the gap between the variable, continuous
acoustic speech signal and discrete, relatively invariant linguistic rep-
resentations. Another virtue is that it explicitly provides a common
representation for production and perception – phonetic gestures
(or articulations). Empirical tests of MT’s predictions have provided
mixed support, at best (e.g., Kluender et al. 2005; Lotto & Holt
2006; Massaro & Chen 2008), but the discovery of MNs has led
to a rebirth of MT, inﬂuencing research in the neuroscience of
speech and language processing, speech development, and language
evolution (Fogassi & Ferrari 2007; Galantucci et al. 2006).
Mirror neurons have been taken as evidence for MT because
they provide neural conﬁrmation of a perception–production
link, leading to proposals that “mirror neurons represent the
link between sender and receiver that Liberman postulated” (Riz-
zolatti & Arbib 1998, p.189), and that the MN “system mediates
… speech perception” (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004, p. 186).
Given the importance of common representations for perception
and production in a communication system –what Liberman and
Mattingly (1985) called “parity” – the temptation to attribute MNs
with a central role in speech is understandable. However, as cau-
tioned against more generally in the target article, the link
between MNs and MT has been based largely on analogy and
on the similarity of rather coarse descriptions of MNs and MT.
This alluring analogy fails for several reasons. We have pre-
viously argued (Lotto et al. 2009) that it is critical to be clear
that MT is much more than just the proposal that there is a link
between speech perception and production, or that processes of
speech perception and production interact in some manner.
There is no debate about these tenets. Auditory cortical regions
are activated during speech production (e.g., Price et al. 2011),
and motor regions are activated during speech perception (e.g.,
Wilson et al. 2004). However, the nature of the production–per-
ception link and its signiﬁcance for either production or
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perception are not well established. In particular, it is not clear
how these links or MNs would solve the problems of mapping
variable acoustics to linguistic representations, which ﬁrst motiv-
ated MT. Like the authors of the target article, we argue that
the analogy between MN and MT is counterproductive in that
it directs research endeavors away from systems-level research
that might provide explanations for these mappings.
Nonetheless, there are examples of empirical research and com-
putational modeling in speech perception that provide excellent
illustrations of the kinds of systems-level approach taking into
account developmental history that can move theories away from
analogy and toward explanatory power. Imada et al. (2006), for
example, used magnetoencephalography to examine passive listen-
ing among newborns, 6-month-olds and 12-month-olds. Across all
ages, they observed activation localized to the left superior temporal
cortex, responsible for auditory analysis. However, whereas regions
localized to left inferior frontal cortex (Broca’s area) consistent with
speech motor analysis were active among 6- and 12-month-olds
passively listening to speech, no inferior frontal activation was
observed among newborns. This suggests that cortical regions
associated with speech perception and production are not intrinsi-
cally linked. Rather, links may emerge with experience. Intrigu-
ingly, the developmental timeline of this emergence ﬁts with the
onset of imitation and canonical babbling, consistent with a sensor-
imotor association interpretation.
The target article makes the case that the associative hypothesis
suggests that correlated sensorimotor experience drives the devel-
opment of MN through contiguous, but also contingent, associ-
ation. Speech is an especially rich stimulus for developing such
relationships; by and large, the sounds we utter, we also hear and
so there are meaningful correlations among auditory, motor, and
somatosensory signals with which to learn perception-action
relationships. In the ﬁelds of speech perception and production,
computational models have been constructive in delineating
systems-level theories for how such relationships may be learned.
The DIVA (Directions Into Velocities of Articulators) model
(Guenther & Vladusich 2012) includes an articulatory control
system that is trainable by feedback from auditory and somatosen-
sory control systems. Predictions of the model concerning effects of
auditory input on speech motor acquisition and control have been
extensively tested, and many of the aspects of the model have been
related to plausible neural structures. This is exactly the kind of
explanatory developmental model called for by Cook et al. in the
target article. Whereas the “neurons” in DIVA are active both
during perception and production, this is a consequence of the
model’s architecture and the nature of the feedback. Nothing is
gained in the theory by referring to these neurons as MNs. Like-
wise, a more recent computational-neural model of sensorimotor
integration in speech by Hickok et al. (2011) provides a theoretical
foundation for understanding perception–production interactions
arising from a feedback-feedforward system with no explicit need
for neurons genetically speciﬁed to respond to action and percep-
tion. These types of models provide strong theoretical bases for
the development of neurons with “mirror”-like properties as a
result of correlations in perceptual-production experience and the
demands of communication.
Hebbian Learning is about contingency, not
contiguity, and explains the emergence of
predictive mirror neurons
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Abstract: Hebbian Learning should not be reduced to contiguity, as it
detects contingency and causality. Hebbian Learning accounts of mirror
neurons make predictions that differ from associative learning: Through
Hebbian Learning, mirror neurons become dynamic networks that
calculate predictions and prediction errors and relate to ideomotor
theories. The social force of imitation is important for mirror neuron
emergence and suggests canalization.
There is much to like about Cook et al.’s article. Asking how
mirror neurons (MNs) emerge is indeed different from asking
what MNs are good for. The authors’ richness of stimuli argument
is well made. Their experimental evidence shows that experience
can have an effect on sensorimotor associations. Unfortunately, it
also presents the Hebbian Learning account of MNs (Keysers
2011; Keysers & Perrett 2004) as an inferior alternative to Associ-
ative Sequence Learning (ASL) based on contiguity alone. Here,
we argue instead that Hebbian Learning and ASL represent
different levels of description – neural and cognitive, respect-
ively – by showing that (a) Hebbian Learning is sensitive to contin-
gency and causality, and (b) Hebbian Learning generates valuable
predictions about the neural properties of mirror neurons.
Psychology and physiology. ASL was proposed from a psycho-
logical perspective to explain the “causes and consequences of
imitation” (Heyes 2001). In contrast, the Hebbian Learning
account was independently developed from a neurophysiological
perspective to explain the emergence of mirror neurons. Single
cell physiologists, Keysers and Perrett (2004), unaware of ASL,
recorded neurons in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the
premotor (PM) cortex. The unexpected similarity in the sensori-
motor properties encountered in these two regions begged for a
mechanistic explanation of how neurons acquire such action sen-
sitive responses, and they harnessed a modern understanding of
Hebbian Learning, based on the known physiology of Spike
Timing Dependent Plasticity, to explain how such neuron sensi-
tivities could be wired up, because, when you hear/see your
actions or others imitate you, STS and PM neurons have the
ﬁring statistics to become interconnected (Keysers & Perrett
2004).
Hebbian Learning is not simply contiguity. Cook et al. depict
the Hebbian account of MN development as one of “contiguity,”
that is, when neurons “ﬁre together” (see target article, sect. 3.2,
para. 3, point 3). However, this is not accurate. The Hebbian
Learning account of mirror neurons draws on our contemporary
understanding of Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity (Caporale
& Dan 2008). Hebb (1949) stated that synapses become stronger
“when one cell repeatedly assists in ﬁring another” (p. 63), empha-
sizing causality, and neuroscience shows synapses are potentiated
if the presynaptic input precedes but not follows postsynaptic
activity (Fig. 1a). Additionally, intermixing trials in which postsyn-
aptic spiking occurs without presynaptic input prevents synaptic
potentiation (Bauer et al. 2001). In summary, physiologists
and neuromodellers (http://lcn.epﬂ.ch/~gerstner/SPNM/node70.
html) understand Hebbian Learning to depend on contingency/
causality, not simple contiguity. Cook et al.’s critique of
Hebbian Learning in this and other articles is a misunderstanding
of what physiologists and modellers understand it to mean. Ironi-
cally, the authors’ new attempt to deﬁne ASL in neural terms – “
The kind of learning that produces MNs occurs when there is cor-
related […] excitation of sensory neurons and motor neurons […
that] increases the strength of the connection between them […]
when we observe our own actions” (sect. 3.2, para. 2) – is thus
actually an adoption of a Hebbian Learning account of mirror
neurons.
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Hebbian Learning and ASL are not “synonyms.” According to
Cook et al., the “canalization” hypothesis posits “Hebbing Learn-
ing” and “associative learning” as synonymous terms (sect. 8.1,
para. 1). Again, this isn’t accurate. ASL takes a holistic, systems
perspective. When I reach for a peanut, grasp it, and bring it to
my mouth, I have three separate episodes of correlated sensori-
motor experiences. ASL predicts associations within action
phases (Fig. 1b and their Fig. 1c and vertical connections in
Heyes 2001). In contrast, Hebbian Learning takes the micro-
scopic perspective of individual neurons and their spiking
(Fig. 1c). STS neurons start ﬁring ∼100 msec after their favorite
stimulus (Keysers et al. 2001), and hundreds of milliseconds
lapse between PM spiking and overt movement (and even more
before imitation by others); the assumption that sensory and
motor representations are simultaneous is therefore an approxi-
mation (Keysers 2011) – STS activity occurs ∼250 msec after
PM activity for the same action (gray arrows in Fig. 1c). With
synaptic plasticity temporally asymmetric (Fig. 1a and 1c),
Hebbian Learning, unlike ASL, predicts that synaptic plasticity
will also occur between action phases, connecting reach-STS to
grasp-PM neurons, and grasp-STS to bring-to-mouth-PM
neurons. Viewing reaching should then activate grasp-PM
neurons. Predictive coding (Keysers 2011; Keysers & Perrett
2004) and active inference (Friston et al. 2011) are fascinating out-
comes of Hebbian Learning. Indeed, predictive coding is appar-
ent: Still images of reaching increase the excitability of muscles
involved in grasping (Urgesi et al. 2010) and grasping mirror
neurons respond to the sight of reaching behind an opaque
screen (Umilta et al. 2001).
Connections from PM to STS also exist and have a net inhibitory
inﬂuence. The Hebbian Learning account suggests the information
ﬂow from PM back to STS may cancel predicted sensory conse-
quences and thereby compute action prediction errors (Fig. 1d)
(Keysers & Perrett 2004). Indeed, we showed that as people increas-
ingly predict the gestures of others, the ﬂow of activation indeed
shifts from STS -> PM to PM -> STS (Schippers & Keysers 2011).
Hence, unlike ASL, Hebbian Learning predicts the dynamic
details of the neural circuitry that emerge during self-observation
and imitation. The Hebbian Learning account matches modern
theories of predictive coding or active inference (Fig. 1e). While
ASL refers to sensory or motor representations, Hebbian Learn-
ing describes a ﬂow of information between STS and PM with
both coming to contain hybrid sensorimotor representations.
This opens intriguing parallels with ideomotor theories
(Hommel et al. 2001) (see also the commentary by Brass &
Muhle-Karbe in this BBS issue).
ASL and Hebbian Learning are descriptions at different levels,
and arguing that ASL accounts for mirror neurons better than
Hebbian Learning seems as idle as arguing that psychology is
better than neuroscience. Instead, asking how the circuitry-level
predictions of contemporary Hebbian Learning relate to,
implement, and inform the systems-level predictions of ASL are
more fruitful approaches.
Finally, Cook et al. argue that MNs are not a social adaptation
because domain-general mechanisms sufﬁce to explain them –
yet, parents’ peculiar motivation to imitate their child’s facial
expressions, a domain-speciﬁc social behavior, is argued to be
essential for, hence to canalize (Del Giudice et al. 2009) mirror
neurons. This social force merits more analysis before accepting
the argument against hybrid models.
Deciphering mirror neurons: Rational decision
versus associative learning
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Abstract: The rational-decision approach is superior to the associative-
learning approach of Cook et al. at explaining why mirror neurons ﬁre
or do not ﬁre – even when the stimulus is the same. The rational-
decision approach is superior because it starts with the analysis of the
intention of the organism, that is, with the identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc
objective or goal that the organism is trying to maximize.
Cook et al. argue that the proper entry-point to decipher mirror
neurons (MNs) is the associative-learning hypothesis. They
argue that the standard “genetic” hypothesis implicitly suggests
that MNs are adaptive, that is, favored by natural selection.
Instead, they argue that MNs exist as a by-product of associative
learning –where the genetic component is rather learning as
domain-general capability. Put differently, there are no genetic
Figure 1 (Keyers). (a) Temporal asymmetry in Hebbian Learning. (b) ASL predicts associations between corresponding phases of an
action sequence. Hebbian Learning predicts associations between subsequent phases, that is, predictions (c), and utilizes inhibitory
feedback (d) for prediction errors (e).
Commentary/Cook et al.: Mirror neurons: From origin to function
206 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2014) 37:2
blueprints speciﬁc for the MNs phenotype. MNs are simply the
by-product of the broader learning mechanism: When the specta-
tor’s sensory and motor neurons are excited as the spectator
watches another organism doing action X, it is because the same
neurons got excited when the spectator, in the past, has under-
taken a similar action, say X+. That is, MNs ﬁre as a result of learn-
ing, when X+ is judged to be close enough to X. So, to put it
plainly, the spectator’s MNs ﬁre mainly because of “remem-
brance”: One can relate to the observed action because it
reminds one of one’s own experience, whether it is joy or suffer-
ing. So, MNs are ultimately the outcome of a self-centered mech-
anism, where one can reach out to others only if one has
undergone the same situation.
Despite itsmany insightfulpayoffs, theassociative-learninghypoth-
esis leaves two blind spots. First, it cannot, at ﬁrst approximation,
explain how the spectator could understand the action of another,
where the spectator has never been in a similar situation. That is,
how could there be “action understanding” in cases where X and X+
are far apart? For instance, men can normally understand the pain
of women in labor, although they could not have entered such an
experience. Adam Smith (1976b, p.317) mentions this example to
repudiate Hobbes’ “selﬁsh” theory of sympathy. For Smith, when
one sympathizes with another person, it is not because of “remem-
brance” of his or her joy or suffering – but rather because of the
ability to view matters from the station of the other.
Second, if MNs are about learned response, how could MNs
ﬁre in some cases and fail to ﬁre in other cases – in cases where
the observed actions, X and X+, are very close? For instance,
while a spectator’s MNs ﬁre when the spectator sees a hand reach-
ing for a cup, they do not ﬁre if the spectator witnesses the same
motion, but no cup in sight. The reason for this is MNs usually ﬁre
when the action has meaning, that is, there is a goal to reach. As
also noted by the Cook et al., the spectator’s MNs do not ﬁre
when the spectator watches object-absent or pantomimed
motion of the hand, even when the motion is very similar to the
motion of trying to grasp a cup (see Gallese et al. 1996).
Actually, these two cases raise the same question: What is the
link between MNs and “meaning” or “action understanding”?
To see the link, we have to move beyond the associative-learning
approach. To introduce the issue of context, á la Cook et al., is
merely ad hoc. A more promising way to decipher MNs is
through the anatomy of decision making (Khalil 2011). It seems
that MNs ﬁre when the spectator intends to “understand” the
intention of the observed actor and, in fact, does understand it.
As such, the spectator places himself or herself in the station of
the observed actor and imagines what it would be like. Such
switching of stations, emphasized long ago by Smith (1976a),
amounts to the spectator looking at the matter not from his or
her own self-centered station, but rather from the station of the
observed. In such case, the objective of the spectator is knowledge
or understanding. If the spectator cannot make sense of the
observed action, MNs would not ﬁre. However, if the organism
can make sense of the observed action, MNs would ﬁre.
The situation is different if the organism’s objective is not
knowledge but rather self-enjoyment (utility). In this case, the
neurons would ﬁre or not ﬁre irrespective of understanding. Actu-
ally, in this case, the neurons in question differ from what is tech-
nically called MNs (Khalil 2011). The spectator here uses the
observed action as a stimulus – similar to what Cook et al.
argue – to remember his or her own experience. In this case,
the organism here simply wants to indulge itself in the observed
sensation. It does not care to ﬁnd out “why” or “how come” the
observed sensation has risen. It simply takes the observed reac-
tion, without any regards to the observed reaction in relation to
its cause, as a way to indulge in self-enjoyment. In this case, the
organism does not place itself in the station of the observed, but
rather stays in its own station.
To decipher this minute, but intricate difference between the
two objectives – understanding as opposed to utility –we need to
identify at the entry point what is the objective of the organism
(see Khalil 2013). But such a set-up is the hallmark of rational-
decision hypothesis. Namely, to understand the function of any
trait, we must ﬁrst identify the actor and the actor’s objective.
Relating the “mirrorness” of mirror neurons to
their origins
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Abstract: Ever since their discovery, mirror neurons have generated
much interest and debate. A commonly held view of mirror neuron
function is that they transform “visual information into knowledge,” thus
enabling action understanding and non-verbal social communication
between con-speciﬁcs (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). This functionality
is thought to be so important that it has been argued that mirror
neurons must be a result of selective pressure.
The central hypothesis put forward by Cook et al. is that mirror
neurons (MNs) are not the direct result of a genetic adaptation
per se, but rather, they are a result of associative learning
between visual and motor modalities. Within this framework, it
is the mechanism underlying associative learning that has been
selected for – not MNs. One of the crucial differences between
the genetic adaptation account and the associative account is
that the adaptation account assumes that the origin and function
of MNs are co-dependent, whereas the associative account dis-
sociates the questions about origin and function, such that they
can be treated as independent processes. Any discussion
about the ontogeny of MNs, therefore, depends inextricably
upon their proposed functional role. Cook et al. adopt the view
that the function of MNs is to encode the goal of an observed
action. They then go on to argue that the neurophysiological
data do not clearly support this functional role and should be con-
sidered as evidence against the genetic adaptation account.
Another possibility though, is simply that the mirror neurons do
not encode the “goal” of the observed action – rather than encod-
ing the goal of an action, MNs may be part of a distributed
network that predicts the sensory (exteroceptive and propriocep-
tive) consequences of an action (Clark 2013; Kilner et al. 2007b).
Within this framework, MNs discharge during action observation
not because they are driven by the visual input, but because they
are part of a generative model that is predicting that input. In this
predictive coding account, the motor system is active when
observing an action because it is the best model of the observed
action. The generative model entails a representation of – or prob-
abilistic belief about – the goal or intention of an observed action.
Given this belief, MNs, in concert with other brain areas, generate
a prediction of the sensory consequences of the most likely action
that would achieve the goal or intention: for example, the kin-
ematics of the action. By comparing the predicted sensory infor-
mation with the actual sensory information, the system can infer
the goal of the observed action by minimising prediction error.
Crucially, in this framework MNs play the same role during
both action execution (active inference) and action observation
(predictive coding) (Friston et al. 2011). In predictive coding,
neuronal representations are used to make predictions, which
are optimised during perception by minimizing prediction error.
In active inference, action tries to fulﬁll these predictions by mini-
mizing sensory (e.g., proprioceptive) prediction error. This
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enables intended movements (goal-directed acts) to be prescribed
by predictions, which action is enslaved to fulﬁll. In this frame-
work, the “mirrorness” of MNs simply reﬂects the fact that the
content of the representations, the action, remains the same in
action execution and observation. What changes is the context,
or agency –whether the action was produced by the self or
another. Therefore, whatever account, genetic or associative,
best explains the ontogeny of mirror neurons, it must hold for
both action observation and action execution. Within the active
inference framework, any selective pressure must operate at the
level of agency (self or other) and not at the level of the mirror
neurons.
Cook et al.’s article highlights the important point that it is
incredibly hard to disambiguate the genetic and associative contri-
butions to the ontogeny of a speciﬁc neuronal population. This is
because all neurons show associative plasticity, and their response
proﬁles can be modiﬁed through interactions with the environ-
ment –where these modiﬁcations depend upon heritable
(genetic) synaptic (associative) plasticity. For example, orien-
tation-tuned responses in neurons in primary visual cortex can
be elicited in kittens as soon as they open their eyes – suggesting
that the orientation maps are innate. However, depending on
the environment, the orientation-tuning can be optimised
during development to reﬂect the observed world (Blakemore
& Mitchell 1973). If a kitten is raised in an environment with
only vertical stripes, the response properties of the kitten’s
neurons in the primary visual cortex will reﬂect this and responses
to horizontal stimuli will be lost. In addition to this, many
responses of neuronal populations that we think of as being a
result of evolutionary adaptations – for example, binocular dis-
parity responses and direct cortico-motoneuronal cells – are not
present at birth but develop postnatally. This is in distinction to
the formal phenotypes that contextualise the function of these
neurons; for example, having two eyes and opposable thumbs.
Indeed, for visual responses, the consensus view is that the
primary repertoire of connections that underlie vision are
present at birth and are fundamentally reﬁned by early postnatal
experience. In other words, it is not the neurons that are the
genetic adaptation, but rather, how they form connections. In
this light, it is tempting to propose the same for the visuomotor
responses of MNs. In other words, mirror neurons arise as a
result of domain-general mechanisms of associative learning, as
proposed by Cook et al., but in the context of cortical connections
between visual and motor systems selected by genetic adaptation.
From this point of view, with respect to the ontogeny of MNs,
perhaps we should consider that no neuron is an island?
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Abstract: The target article argues that developmental processes are key
to understanding the mirror neuron system, yet neglects several bodies of
developmental research that are informative for doing so. Infants’ actions
and action understanding are structured by goals, and the former lends
structure to the latter. Evaluating the origins and functions of mirror
neurons depends on integrating investigations of neural, social-cognitive
and motor development.
Cook et al. articulate two conclusions with which we wholeheart-
edly agree: (1) The functions of mirror neurons (MNs) cannot be
determined based only on patterns of neural activation during
action observation. Independent measures of the putative social-
cognitive functions of MNs are needed and have, so far, not
been sufﬁciently integrated with neural measures; and (2) under-
standing the developmental origins of MNs and the broader
systems in which they are situated is essential for understanding
their functional signiﬁcance.
Given the centrality of developmental processes to Cook et al.’s
arguments, we ﬁnd it surprising that they do not engage the devel-
opmental literature more fully. They propose a relatively simple
learning process – the formation of contingency-based associ-
ations between visual and motor experience – to account for the
existence of MNs. For example, they propose that MNs reﬂect
repeated experiences with reaching for objects and seeing the
resulting hand movements. This kind of learning seems very
likely to occur, but without a fuller consideration of motor and
social-cognitive development, it is difﬁcult to see how any impor-
tant social-cognitive functions could arise from motor experience.
In fact, several bodies of experimental work with human infants
indicate that much richer connections exist betweenmotor experi-
ence and social cognition.
Developmental research shows that infants’ actions are pro-
spectively goal-directed from very early in infancy (von Hofsten
1980; 2004), and during the ﬁrst year, manual skills become
increasingly well-organized (Thelen et al. 1996; von Hofsten &
Ronnqvist 1988). For example, Claxton et al. (2003) demonstrated
that infants reach for objects differently depending on what they
intend on doing next: They are faster to reach for a ball if they are
going to throw it versus place it into a container. Further, over the
course of the ﬁrst year of life, infants begin to systematically antici-
pate the shape, size, and orientation of the objects that they grasp
(von Hofsten & Ronnqvist 1988). This body of work shows that
motor competence even in young infants involves abstract
action plans, as it does in adults (Rosenbaum 1991). This fact
about infants’ actions has implications for the role that action
experience might play in infants’ perception of others’ actions as
organized by goals.
In fact, converging research has shown that infants also view
others’ actions as structured by goals. Infants encode others’
actions in terms of the relation between agent and goal (e.g., Bran-
done &Wellman 2009; Luo & Johnson 2009; Sodian & Thoermer
2004; Sommerville & Woodward 2005; Woodward 1998), selec-
tively imitate the goals of others’ actions (Gerson & Woodward
2012; Hamlin et al. 2008; Meltzoff 1995), and anticipate the out-
comes of others’ actions based on their goals (Cannon & Wood-
ward 2012; Gredebäck et al. 2009; Kanakogi & Itakura 2010;
Krogh-Jespersen & Woodward, under review). Moreover, across
these ﬁndings, matched comparison conditions and ﬁne-grained
analyses of infants’ attention during the tasks have shown that
infants’ responses reﬂect more than simply attention to physical
movements or low-level associations between hands and objects.
Instead, this body of evidence shows that infants analyze others’
behavior in terms of the abstract relational structure that
organizes goal-directed actions.
Importantly, infants’ action understanding is related to and
shaped by their action experience. The emergence of goal-
directed actions in infants’ own motor repertoires correlates
with their analysis of these actions in others (e.g., Brune & Wood-
ward 2007; Cannon et al. 2012; Kanakogi & Itakura 2011; Loucks
& Sommerville 2012; Sommerville & Woodward 2005). Critically,
interventions that change infants’ own actions render changes in
their analysis of others’ action goals. For example, 3-month-old
infants are not yet efﬁcient at reaching, but, given training to
use Velcro “sticky” mittens to apprehend objects, they sub-
sequently demonstrate an understanding of others’ reaches as
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goal-directed (Sommerville et al. 2005). Matched training that
involves passively observing others’ reaches does not have this
effect (Gerson & Woodward 2014; for related ﬁndings, see Liber-
tus & Needham 2010; Sommerville et al. 2008). Thus, this body of
work shows that infants’ own experience producing goal-directed
actions informs their understanding of the goals that structure
others’ actions.
Nevertheless, studies of infants have made only preliminary
progress in the domain in which the MN hypothesis originated –
neural processes. We agree with Cook and colleagues that a
systems approach is needed to evaluate the functional relations
that may be signaled by the ﬁring properties of MNs. In human
infant research, we have neither the precision of single-cell
recordings nor (yet) an analysis of connectivity among potential
components of the mirror neuron system (MNS). Even so,
infants evidence neural activity in the motor system during obser-
vation of others’ actions (Marshall et al. 2011; Nyström et al. 2011;
Southgate et al. 2009). Critically, changes in infants’motor experi-
ence modulate this neural response to others’ actions. Develop-
ments in infants’ motor skill affect the motor system’s response
to others’ actions (Cannon et al., under review; van Elk et al.
2008), and short-term manipulations of motor experience in
infants generate similar effects (Marshall et al. 2013; Paulus
et al. 2012). Yet, as Cook et al. point out with regard to the
adult work, the critical connection between the MNS and social
understanding has not been made for infants. Establishing this
connection requires integrating neural techniques with behavioral
methods for investigating social cognition in infants.
Cook et al. use a developmental framework to argue against
over-interpretation of MN ﬁndings. While we see merit in their
argument that many open questions still exist concerning the
MNS, we also advise against throwing out the baby with the bath-
water. Rather than using developmental arguments to minimize
the potential signiﬁcance of MNs for social cognition, the ﬁeld
should be pushing forward to understand the links between
neural systems, social cognition, and motor skill. Because each
of these systems undergoes rapid and dramatic change during
early ontogeny, a developmental approach is likely to shed the
most light on the links between them.
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Abstract: We argue, by analogy to the neural organization of the object
recognition system, that demonstration of modulation of mirror neurons
by associative learning does not imply absence of genetic adaptation.
Innate connectivity deﬁnes the types of processes mirror neurons can
participate in while allowing for extensive local plasticity. However, the
proper function of these neurons remains to be worked out.
The article by Cook et al. addresses the question whether mirror
neurons (MNs) are a genetic adaptation for action understanding.
The authors argue that if this were the case, one might predict that
their functioning would be protected against “environmental per-
turbations” (sect. 7.1, para. 1). They make the further claim that if
it could be demonstrated that the functioning of MNs can be
modulated by associative learning, such an outcome could be
taken as evidence against the genetic adaptation hypothesis.
One may question the prediction that if mirror neurons were
“designed by evolution” for action understanding, their response
properties should likely be protected against experience-based
modulations. There are numerous examples in the literature
demonstrating innate neuronal machinery that is modulated by
experience (e.g., experience-based modulations of ocular domi-
nance columns in V1: Wiesel & Hubel 1965; activation of
primary visual cortex during Braille reading in early blind partici-
pants: Buechel et al. 1998; enlargement of the cortical represen-
tation of neighboring digits after deafferentation of single digits:
Merzenich et al. 1983). Such plasticity, while constrained by the
innate connectivity pattern of cortical and subcortical areas,
enables the brain to ﬂexibly adjust to a dynamic environment and
to both permanent and temporary changes of the input. It is far
from obvious why one should assume that a function that is
innate would be protected from such plasticity. Thus, although
Cook et al. convincingly demonstrate that the properties of MNs
can be modulated by experience, the studies discussed in their
article are inconclusive regarding the question whether the capa-
bility to match visual and motor representations of actions is innate.
We have argued, in another context, that the observed object cat-
egory-speciﬁc organization in the visual ventral stream is driven pri-
marily by distinct long-range connections to downstream processes
(Mahon & Caramazza 2011). Different domains of objects are
associated with different types of processes. For example, animate
but not inanimate objects involve computing affective/social
responses. The different processes that characterize different
object domains involve distinct, even distant, areas of the brain
that must be connected to function effectively as domain-speciﬁc
networks. On this view, then, visual cortical organization is deter-
mined in part by the need to satisfy innate connectivity constraints.
The innateness of these constraints is revealed by the fact that the
large-scale, domain-speciﬁc organization of visual cortex remains
invariant in congenitally blind subjects, that is, in the absence of
visual input (e.g., Mahon et al. 2009). However, in these subjects
the properties of the neurons in “visual” areas have undergone
extensive modiﬁcation: they now respond to completely different
sensory inputs even as they retain their domain-speciﬁcity. This
shows that plasticity does not imply absence of innate neural organ-
ization. Likewise, it seems reasonable to assume that the capacity of
MNs to match visual and motor representations is made possible by
the innate connectivity between ventral premotor cortex/macaque
F5 and parietal cortex (AIP [anterior intraparietal], PFG [parietal]
areas), which receives visual input from areas IT (inferotemporal
cortex), STS (superior temporal sulcus), andMTG (middle temporal
gyrus) (Borra et al. 2008; Luppino et al. 1999; Matelli et al. 1986;
Muakkassa & Strick 1979; Petrides & Pandya 1984; Webster et al.
1994). This innate connectivity deﬁnes the types of processes
MNs can participate in while allowing for extensive local plasticity.
In our view, the fundamental question that needs asking is not
whether speciﬁc associations between visual and motor represen-
tations of actions are present at birth –which we take as a given –
but whether the link between visual and motor representations
takes the form proposed by mirror neuron theorists. A mechanism
specialized for connecting visual and motor functions is funda-
mental for any cognitive function, or otherwise we would lack
the ability to react appropriately to sensory input. It seems reason-
able to assume that such a basic mechanism should be genetically
determined. What remain to be worked out are the anatomical
and functional structure of the innate connections between
visual to motor representations and the precise nature of the rep-
resentations involved in this process. In the context of the latter
issue, ﬁguring out the role played by MNs in action understanding
is key, but as Cook et al. note, the role of these neurons remains
poorly understood.
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One source of difﬁculty is the fact that even granting that MNs
are involved in matching visual and motor aspects of actions, this
does not imply that they are required for action understanding. It
is typically argued that (mirror) neurons that code the abstract
“goal” of an action (e.g., “grasping food,” irrespective of the type
of grip and the effector involved) should be involved in action
understanding. It is less clear, however, what is “motor” about
such abstract representations, and how these differ from concep-
tual representations outside the macaque mirror neuron system.
What is needed is evidence thatMNs are necessary for comprehen-
sion as opposed to being activated as a consequence of action
understanding, for example, to react appropriately to the observed
action, or to coordinate our actions with those of other people.
Unequivocal evidence demonstrating a causal link between the
functioning of MNs and the ability to understand actions has not
been presented thus far. We believe that the answer to this ques-
tion is unlikely to come from investigation of modulation of MNs
by associative learning alone, important as this might be for a full
characterization of these neurons, but through the investigation
of the impact of temporary and permanent lesions to areas contain-
ing mirror neurons and their connections.
Reconciling genetic evolution and the
associative learning account of mirror neurons
through data-acquisition mechanisms
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Abstract: An associative learning account of mirror neurons should not
preclude genetic evolution of its underlying mechanisms. On the
contrary, an associative learning framework for cognitive development
should seek heritable variation in the learning rules and in the data-
acquisition mechanisms that construct associative networks,
demonstrating how small genetic modiﬁcations of associative elements
can give rise to the evolution of complex cognition.
In promoting the associative learning account of mirror neurons
(MNs), Cook et al. have chosen to adopt an extreme version.
Not only have they argued that the matching properties of MNs
(the coupling of perception and action) are learned, but they
also claim that this learning process did not evolve beyond a
domain-general, all-purpose associative learning mechanism.
Although we are strongly in favor of the ﬁrst, more general associ-
ative argument (which is also clearly supported by Cook et al.’s
review of the scientiﬁc evidence), we ﬁnd their second claim
less convincing, theoretically problematic (in terms of evolution-
ary theory), and somewhat counterproductive. Instead, we shall
argue that a more realistic and productive associative account of
MNs (and of similar advanced cognitive traits) should be based
on identifying the genetically variable mechanistic details on
which the associative process is based, and on which selection
can operate in the course of evolution.
Cook et al.’s second claim that precludes genetic evolution is
not as parsimonious as it may ﬁrst appear. It implies that associat-
ive learning mechanisms acting in the construction of MNs for
thousands of generations were not affected by selection in any
way that was related to their role in producing MNs. This argu-
ment is difﬁcult to test and is also evolutionarily unlikely. Unless
it is clear that a trait is fairly recent (such as reading, typing,
driving a car, etc.), a possible effect of natural selection on this
trait cannot be precluded and is even to be expected. For
example, although it is possible that our ability to use our hands
for handling tools is merely a by-product of their adaptive
design for climbing trees, we cannot preclude the possibility
that our hands were also modiﬁed by natural selection as a
result of their tool-making activity during the past ∼3 million
years. Moreover, the functionality and the conserved nature of
associative learning mechanisms (highlighted by Cook et al.),
suggest that they are under strong stabilizing selection. This stabi-
lizing selection, however, is unlikely to be identical across multiple
species and populations. It is both plausible and supported empiri-
cally that despite general similarity, associative learning mechan-
isms may differ in their parameters or mechanistic details as a
result of different selection pressures. Many forms of learning,
from imprinting to taste aversion, are increasingly recognized as
different forms of associative learning that have adapted to differ-
ent tasks (e.g., Bateson 1990; Shettleworth 2010). There is also
evidence for ﬁne-tuning of associative learning mechanisms by
different selection pressures imposed by alternative behavioral
strategies (Mery et al. 2007). Why, then, should associative learn-
ing mechanisms acting in the construction of MNs be different?
Paradoxically, the extreme version of the associative learning
accountweakens our ability touse associative learning toexplain cog-
nitive phenomena. If indeed all it takes to constructMNs (or similar
associative networks) is to have the same basic domain-general
associative learning ability, then all animals and all individuals
should construct such networks equally well. Ignoring for the
momentwhether this is the case, adopting this view implies that heri-
table variation or species-speciﬁc differences in cognitive abilities
cannot be explained by the associative account. Thus, the extreme
version of the associative learning account may still explain MNs
but cannot explain heritable variation in intelligence or social skills
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2003; Gray & Thompson 2004), cannot
address genetically based cognitive disorders (e.g., Crespi et al.
2010), nor can it be used as a framework for cognitive evolution.
Alternatively, allowing associative learning mechanisms to vary
genetically may offer a much more powerful account. We have
recently proposed such a framework (Lotem & Halpern 2012)
based on earlier work (Goldstein et al. 2010; Lotem & Halpern
2008) and their recent implementation (Kolodny et al. in press;
2014). In our framework, MNs may be viewed as no more than
a speciﬁc instance of a much wider set of associative networks
that represent contingencies or contiguities in time and space,
which is consistent with Cook et al.’s general view. However, con-
trary to Cook et al., we predict that different species or individuals
may construct different associative networks as a result of genetic
differences in (a) their data-acquisition mechanisms (the atten-
tional and motivational mechanisms directing them to process
the relevant data) and in (b) the memory parameters (weight
increase and decrease) of their associative learning rules. Most
importantly, our model emphasizes the coevolved coordination
between these two genetically variable components, coordination
that determines learning dynamics and therefore the content and
the structure of the network. Our data-acquisition mechanism is in
fact similar to Heyes’s idea of “input mechanisms” by which
associative learning may be tuned to acquire data about the
actions of others in order to facilitate social learning (Heyes
2012c). But we also go a step further by proposing that acquiring
the relevant data is not sufﬁcient. Memory parameters possessed
by the learner must also ﬁt the distribution of acquired data, as
they presumably evolved to test the statistical signiﬁcance of pat-
terns and associations, given the natural distribution of the data.
We used these principles to explain a range of phenomena in
language acquisition and cognitive development (Lotem &
Halpern 2008; Goldstein et al. 2010; Kolodny et al. in press)
and to propose an associative framework for cognitive evolution
(Lotem & Halpern 2012; Kolodny et al. 2014). Although our
model may eventually turn out to be inaccurate or even incorrect,
it certainly suggests that allowing associative principles to evolve is
a much more useful exercise than dismissing their genetic evol-
ution. We thus call the readers to adopt Cook et al.’s general
endorsement of associative accounts (see also Heyes 2012b;
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2012c), but not to the point of neglecting the genetic evolution of
their underlying mechanisms.
Understanding the role of mirror neurons in
action understanding will require more than a
domain-general account
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Abstract:Cook et al. propose thatmirror neurons emerge developmentally
through a domain-general associative mechanism. We argue that
experience-sensitivity does not rule out an adaptive or genetic argument
for mirror neuron function, and that current evidence suggests that
mirror neurons are more specialized than the authors’ account would
predict. We propose that future work integrate behavioral and
neurophysiological techniques used with primates to examine the
proposed functions of mirror neurons in action understanding.
In their target article, Cook et al. argue that mirror neurons (MNs)
did not evolve to support action understanding. Instead, they
argue that MNs emerge through a domain-general associative
mechanism: Neurons that are contingently activated by observing
and performing a particular action ultimately become selectively
activated by either observing or performing that action. We
agree with the authors that it is premature to conclude that
MNs have the speciﬁc adaptive function of subserving action
understanding (and that the term “action understanding” itself is
typically ill-deﬁned). Nevertheless, while we think Cook et al.
are right that we know little about the function and origin of
MNs, we think they may be right for the wrong reasons.
The ﬁrst problem concerns the fact that Cook et al. use evidence
that MN responses can change with experience to support their
domain-general association account. Unfortunately, the ﬁnding
that MNs are tuned by experience does not in principle mean
that MNs are not innate and do not have an adaptive function.
Instead, MNs may be responsive to goal- or object-directed
actions more abstractly, perhaps starting out prepared to represent
a ﬁxed set of canonical actions that are phylogenetically ancient and
then through experience becoming more ﬁnely tuned such that
non-canonical actions can be represented as goal-directed (e.g.,
using a grasping tool to reach an object). For these reasons, we
don’t see the fact that MNs respond to a broader set of stimuli to
which the “evolutionary ancestors of contemporary monkeys
could not possibly have been exposed” (sect. 4.1, para. 3) to be dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile with an innateness account. The idea that mirror
neurons may start with a ﬁxed set of prepared representations that
gradually expand through experience seems to ﬁt well with how
many domain-speciﬁc cognitive mechanisms work.
Indeed, the science of the mind has several examples of abstract
innate biases that are tuned by speciﬁc experiences. To take a
classic example, rats have an innate bias to connect nausea with
what they have eaten, but they must also use associative learning
to identify which speciﬁc foods are to be avoided after different
experiences (Garcia & Koelling 1966). As this case illustrates,
showing that MNs change with experience does not necessarily
mean that they result in domain-general learning mechanisms
that can take in any sort of inputs. Instead, MN representations
could still emerge from domain-speciﬁc processes, ones that
allow only certain kinds of experiences to act as inputs but
become tuned to new inputs across experience.
A second set of reasons to doubt the target article’s claim that
MN learning is domain-general concern (1) the rarity of these
neurons (according to one study, only about 17% of neurons
sampled from a common monkey F5 region; Gallese et al.
1996), and (2) their seeming speciﬁcity to only particular types
of visual-motor contingencies (e.g., grasping). If MNs develop
through domain-general processes whenever there is contingent
stimulation, Cook et al. should expect any and all neurons to
develop “mirror” properties, and thus should expect to observe
MNs for a variety of contingencies all over the brain. A domain-
general account of MN learning should predict that species
would develop mirror-like neurons that respond to Pavlovian con-
tingencies, such as a neuron that ﬁres both when a bell rings and
when the subject salivates. If neurons are truly domain-general
associative learners as the authors contend, then it is hard to
explain why only some kinds of associations are represented by
MNs to the exclusion of others and why only a small subset of
neurons turn into MNs over the course of development. Even if
MNs do acquire mirror properties through experience with con-
tingent activation, this only pushes the question of specialization
back to why these neurons change in response to contingencies
while the majority of neurons in the brain do not.
Finally, the target article attempts tomarshal evidence that human
learners receive enough of the necessary types of inputs to create
MNs through associative learning, stating that “much of the sensori-
motor experience required for MN development comes from being
imitated, synchronous action, and exposure to action words” (sect.
3.2., para.3). Unfortunately, this account of MN formation would
likely not predict the existence of MNs in nonhuman primates,
who rarely imitate (see Lyons et al. 2006) and do not have language
at all (eliminating two of the proposed routes to MN formation).
Thus, the experiential account proposed by Cook et al. to account
for their proposed origin of MNs seems incomplete given the data.
For all these reasons, we believe that the target article’s approach
of searching for MNs’ developmental origin before their function
may not be the best way to examine or falsify an adaptive argument
for these neurons. In order to falsify the hypothesis that MNs are
involved in action understanding, we recommend thatMN research-
ers instead directly test the role that MNs play in action understand-
ing empirically – through experiments investigating the level atwhich
actions are represented by these neurons. Since most of what we
know about MNs comes from single-cell recording in monkeys, we
propose to integrate neurophysiological recording techniques with
behavioral methods that allow us better insight into the types of
actions that monkeys understand (e.g., Umiltà et al. 2001). Primate
cognition researchers have recently developed a number of new be-
havioral methods in which monkeys appear to represent others’
object-directed actions (Rochat et al. 2008), perceptions (Flombaum
&Santos 2005; Santos et al. 2006), and knowledge (Marticorena et al.
2011). We argue that recording monkey MN activity while subjects
perform these action understanding tasks could provide unique
insight into the speciﬁc ways that action is represented in these
neurons. Cook et al.’s article points us in the right direction by ques-
tioning the current accounts of the role MNs play in “action under-
standing,” but we believe that careful empirical work will be
needed to test these accounts going forward. A domain-general
association account is an inadequate replacement.
Vocal coordination and vocal imitation: A role
for mirror neurons?1
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Abstract: Some birds and mammals have vocal communication systems in
which coordination between individuals is important. Examples would
include duetting or antiphonal calling in some birds and mammals, rapid
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exchanges of the same vocalization, and vocal exchanges between paired
individuals and other nearby pairs. Mirror neurons may play a role in
such systems but become functional only after experience.
A possible role for mirror neurons in human speech has been
raised by others (e.g., Hickok 2010). Here, I propose that
mirror neurons (MNs) may play a role in other forms of vocal
communication, speciﬁcally wherever imitative or responsive
vocalization is found. In humans, examples would include conta-
gious laughing or crying, and synchronized singing in duets or
choral groups. In more general terms, I wish to raise the possi-
bility that mirror-like neurons exist to foster vocal communication
between individuals, where rapid exchange of information is
required. Communication of this type exists in nature in duetting
birds and mammals, and in rapid vocal exchanges between two
individuals, where the appropriate response to a particular vocali-
zation is a vocal response given after a brief interval. I further
propose that neurons that serve this function are part of inherited
neural circuitry that mediates a communication system, but
become active only through experience.
There are numerous species of birds and mammals that engage
in rapid and frequent vocal exchanges. These may be referred to
as “duetting,” “antiphonal calling,” or simply vocal exchanges. In
birds and some primates, duetting seems to serve to maintain or
strengthen the pair-bond. In some cases, the duetting pair call
in such rapid synchrony that it is often difﬁcult to determine
which partner is performing which part (e.g., Geissmann 2002;
Müller & Anzenberger 2002).
Such synchronization obviously requires a neural system that
can manage this behavior, and, presumably, also mediate the
learning processes that lead up to the performance of this behav-
ior (Brenowitz et al. 1985. I propose that a “mirror-neuron–like”
system may be central to the performance of this behavior.
Such an ensemble of neurons would, in each partner, monitor
both the immediately ensuing component and trigger the
expected output. How such an ensemble becomes activated in
an individual may depend on associative learning, but there also
must be a genetically derived program that puts together the com-
ponents of the ensemble in the ﬁrst place.
While Cook et al. propose that experimentation in the lab is
needed to demonstrate the essential role of associative learning in
MN formation, most of the behaviors I am addressing are probably
not likely to occur in lab settings. However, some primates widely
used in laboratory settings engage in vocal exchanges that can be
observed while they are in captivity, and for which an established
history in behavioral neuroscience exists. In squirrel monkeys
(Saimiri), females who are afﬁliative partners (as determined by
their close association during foraging and rest periods) produce
“chuck” vocalizations in rapid exchanges of no more than a few
hundred msec (Newman & Bernhards 1997). Each afﬁliative part-
nership exchanges chucks with each other, and each individual
makes chucks that are sufﬁciently distinct acoustically so that
their partner can recognize them on the basis of their vocalizations
alone. Experimentation has shown that one particular part of the
chuck (referred to as the “ﬂag”) is essential for accurate recognition
and response (Soltis et al. 2002). This behavior starts out during
development as a more general “contact call,” in which young
females respond indiscriminately to the chucks of other females.
Gradually, over a year or two, a female learns to distinguish, and dif-
ferentially respond to, the chucks of its mother and other afﬁliating
females (McCowan & Newman 2000). The genetic component of
this behavior is in the tendency to make chucks in the ﬁrst place.
The associative learning component comes from a young female
gradually learning to restrict her chuck responses to the chucks of
afﬁliative partners. While MN-like populations of neurons need
not be necessary for this behavior, I propose that ensembles that
regulate the production, monitoring, and subsequent response
(and hence “MN-like”) would be more efﬁcient (and likely favor-
ably selected for) over populations of neurons that might be
engaged in a variety of behavioral activities.
Another primate vocal communication system that might be
mediated by a MN-like system is antiphonal calling in the
common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus). Here, members of a
mated pair exchange loud “phee” calls with other mated pairs
within an interval of 5 sec or less (Miller & Wang 2006). This be-
havioral system requires that a vocalizer recognizes when its
partner calls, and when a member of another pair calls, and
responds only to the latter with less than a 5-sec delay. No one
knows how the brain mediates this behavior, but a study (Miller
et al. 2010) using immunocytochemistry of c-fos gene expression
has identiﬁed areas of the cortex that show neural activity to
hearing a phee, to producing a phee, and to the production and
hearing of a respondent’s phee. No one, as yet, has recorded
from single units in the identiﬁed frontal cortical areas in the mar-
moset, so it would be interesting to learn if MN-like activity was
found there. Such specialized activity would likely occur both
when the vocalizer called and when there were responses.
To summarize, ensembles of neurons that possess mirror-
neuron–like properties are likely to exist in a wide range of birds
and mammals, so that a correspondingly broad approach to identi-
fying and learning more about these systems is needed. Cook et al.
suggest that experiments in the lab would be needed to reveal the
MNs emerging during associative learning. My suggestion that
MN-like systems exist widely in nature implies that behavioral
tests performed in a lab setting would be insufﬁcient to explore
the full extent of their role in communication. Some species
are too vulnerable in nature or otherwise protected from invasive
experimentation, but, with the improving technology to record
neural activity in freely moving animals, it might be possible to
study these systems. Some work being done on European Starlings
(Sturnus vulgaris) has potential here (George et al. 2010).
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Associative learning alone is insufﬁcient for
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Abstract: Cook et al. argue that mirror neurons originate from associative
learning processes, without evolutionary inﬂuence from social-cognitive
mechanisms. We disagree with this claim and present arguments based
upon cross-species comparisons, EEG ﬁndings, and developmental
neuroscience that the evolution of mirror neurons is most likely driven
simultaneously and interactively by evolutionarily adaptive psychological
mechanisms and lower-level biological mechanisms that support them.
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In the target article, Cook et al. suggest that the evolutionary origins
and maintenance of the mirror neuron system (MNS) lie in
“domain-general processes of associative learning in the course of
individual development, and, although they may have psychological
functions, their psychological functions do not necessarily have a
speciﬁc evolutionary purpose or adaptive function” (target article,
Abstract). We agree that the excitement surrounding the discovery
of mirror neurons (MNs) has led to an inordinate focus on their role
in social-cognitive functions and how these functions might play a
role in the evolution of the MNS. However, we strongly disagree
with the authors’ claims that the known social-cognitive roles the
MNS plays in primate cognitive and behavioral functioning have
not and do not affect the MNS in an evolutionary context and
that the associative account “separates questions about their
origin and function” (sect. 1, para. 4).
The target article describes a lower-level biological mechanism
(associative learning) that, as Cook et al. argue, fully accounts for
the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of mirror neurons.
We assert that the initial evolution, further evolution, and evol-
utionary maintenance of the MNS is likely jointly inﬂuenced by
such lower-level biological mechanisms and by the well-documen-
ted role that the MNS plays in social-cognitive functions. One
example of this joint inﬂuence can be observed in individuals
with an intact versus an impaired MNS who are more able to
attract reproductive partners, reproduce, and protect and
provide for their offspring within the complex social structures
of primate societies (e.g., Howlin & Moss 2012).
We agree that associative learning is likely a critical mechanism
for both the development and the evolution of mirror neurons.
However, given that associative learning mechanisms exist in
species that do not have a MNS, some alternative mechanism
must interact with associative learning in order to produce the
evolutionary pressure required for the origin and maintenance
of the MNS in humans. To avoid directly addressing the evol-
utionary advantages the social-cognitive functions of the MNS
confer, Cook et al. use a “straw man” argument. They attack the
most extreme proposal of the role of social-cognitive functions
in the evolution of the MNS – evolutionary selection via action
understanding. The “associative learning in vivo” and “evolution-
ary selection based upon action understanding” accounts rep-
resent polar extremes, both of which are unlikely to reﬂect
reality. Simultaneously, however, the adaptive advantages of the
social-cognitive capacities (e.g., action perception, processing,
and prediction) ascribed to the MNS enhance individuals’ repro-
ductive ﬁtness, creating precisely the evolutionary pressure that
the authors propose has not, and does not, exist.
Cook et al.’s depiction of the role of developmental research in
elucidating biological/genetic versus environmental/learning inﬂu-
ences on the MNS is concerning. We agree that evidence for neo-
natal imitation is limited and, even if it is present, is unlikely to be
driven by MNS mechanisms since cortical regions that contain
MNs are not fully developed at birth. However, the postnatal
developmental timeline of the MNS neither rules out genetic/bio-
logical and evolutionary processes nor demonstrates the role of
associative learning. It is well known that frontal and association
cortices that house MNs undergo striking synaptic development
and myelination between 8-months and 3-years of age (Huttenlo-
cher 2002; Imada et al. 2006; Locke et al. 1995). Developmental
EEG evidence similarly indicates protracted cortical development
in these regions (Hagne 1968; Southgate et al. 2009), with conti-
nuing maturation until late childhood or adolescence (Martineau
& Cochin 2003). Therefore, biological factors may explain pro-
tracted MNS development.
Cook et al. also dismiss EEGmu suppression as an index ofMNS
functioning too quickly. The strong relationship between the mu
rhythm and action observation/execution can be traced back to
1954, whenGastaut and Bert reported that themu rhythmwas con-
sistently reduced when stationary subjects “identiﬁed themselves
with an active person represented on a screen” (see also Pineda
2005). We also recently published a re-analysis of pooled data
from four published studies, including a total of 66 individuals
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), demonstrating that, across
the age-span from 6–17 years, there was signiﬁcantly less mu sup-
pression in individuals with ASD compared with matched controls
during action observation, but not during self-movement
(Oberman et al. 2013). Although source estimation indicates that
the generator of the mu rhythm is in the postcentral gyrus rather
than premotor or primary motor cortex (Hari & Salmelin 1997),
the possible downstream modulation of motor cortex by the MNS
is tangential to their mirror properties. Cook et al. also ignore
recent studies showing that the same stimuli that elicit mu suppres-
sion also activate MN regions (as indicated by BOLD response;
Perry & Bentin 2009) and modulate a TMS-induced motor
evoked potential (Lepage et al. 2008), suggesting that all three
indices are likely capturing the sameunderlying corticalmechanism.
In summary, we argue, contrary to Cook et al., that the origins
and evolution of mirror neurons are unlikely to be driven by
associative learning alone, but, rather, to be a consequence of a
combination of evolutionary, biological, developmental, social-
cognitive, and experience-based inﬂuences. Indeed, we speculate
that the MNS is not functionally ﬁxed, but rather a currently evol-
ving, ﬂexible, semi-modular neural network that interacts with
multiple other neural systems, including the motor and social-
motivation systems (Oberman et al. 2008). The functioning of
such a system at any point in development should be viewed as
a snapshot of a dynamic system that is constantly modulated by
these inﬂuences and interactions with other systems (Johnson
2011; Johnson et al. 2002). Environmental and biological inﬂu-
ences unfold simultaneously and interactively, not separately
and sequentially, and their relative roles can only be disentangled
with careful measurement and calculation (Dobkins et al. 2009;
Smit et al. 2012). Cook and colleagues attack theories that argue
for the evolution of the MNS based upon its proposed role in
action understanding (Rizzolatti & Fadiga 1998; Rizzolatti et al.
1996), but we believe that the theory proposed by Cook et al.
arguing that associative learning mechanisms alone can account
for the origins and development of the MNS is equally as unlikely.
Both models ignore the reciprocal relationships between evolutio-
narily adaptive psychological mechanisms and the lower-level bio-
logical mechanisms that are required for their existence.
Testing key predictions of the associative
account of mirror neurons in humans using
multivariate pattern analysis
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Abstract: Cook et al. overstate the evidence supporting their associative
account of mirror neurons in humans: most studies do not address a key
property, action-speciﬁcity that generalizes across the visual and motor
domains. Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of neuroimaging data
can address this concern, and we illustrate how MVPA can be used to
test key predictions of their account.
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The discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in macaques has undoubt-
edly had a major impact on the ﬁeld of social neuroscience by pro-
viding a potential mechanism for associating visual and motor
aspects of actions, which could be a core component in action
understanding. The timely article by Cook et al. addresses one
of the fundamental questions on this topic, namely, how such
visuomotor associations emerge in the ﬁrst place.
While we agree with much in Cook et al.’s article, our concern is
that some of the interpretations and conclusions the authors draw
about mirror neurons in humans generally, and in favour of the
associative account speciﬁcally, risk being overstated based on
the evidence reviewed. Speciﬁcally, most inferences (but see
Mukamel et al. 2010) about MNs in humans are based on a com-
bination of proposed homologies between macaques and humans,
and on studies employing less invasive methods to study the brain,
including transcranial magnetic stimulation, magneto- and elec-
troencephalography, and most notably, functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI). The former approach assumes a
mapping between brain regions across monkey and human
species, but this homology is imperfect (Sereno & Tootell
2005). The latter ostensibly provides a wealth of evidence for
human MNs; for example, numerous fMRI studies have shown
common areas demonstrating an increased response during
observation and execution of actions (compared to a baseline con-
dition), but such effects could be explained by task engagement or
attention processes (Oosterhof et al. 2013).
In contrast, we would argue that stricter requirements are
needed to infer that a brain region may contain mirror neurons.
In macaques, MNs have been shown to code speciﬁc, individual
manual actions that generalize across the visual and motor
domains. In contrast, most fMRI studies with humans do not
test for this key property: action-speciﬁcity. To demonstrate
action-speciﬁcity in the human brain, the same action, whether
observed or executed, should elicit more similar neural responses
than dissimilar actions (Oosterhof et al. 2013).
In our view, the most promising approach addressing this limit-
ation is the application of multivariate pattern analysis (Edelman
et al. 1998; Haxby et al. 2001; Haynes & Rees 2005; Norman
et al. 2006), which considers neural responses across a group of
voxels. The logic behind this method is that the spatially distribu-
ted pattern, across voxels, of a speciﬁc observed (or executed)
action should be more similar to the pattern associated with
executing (or observing, respectively) the same action than a
different action. Although fMRI cannot be used to measure indi-
vidual neurons, MVPA complements single-cell recording
approaches by considering spatially distributed responses at a
system level. Importantly, this sensitive approach allows for disso-
ciating responses of spatially overlapping neural populations
(Peelen & Downing 2007).
Relevant to the topic of the present article, the human mirror
system, recent MVPA studies have provided evidence for cross-
modal action-speciﬁc representations of manual actions in
anterior parietal and lateral occipito-temporal cortex (Oosterhof
et al. 2010; 2012). These ﬁndings, together with evidence from
single-cell recordings in humans (Mukamel et al. 2010), indicate
that regions consistent with MN properties can also be found
Figure 1 (Oosterhof). Hypothetical example illustrating neural effects of visuomotor “counter-mirror” training. (a) Neural responses are
measured in a region of interest using fMRI while participants observe (red boxes) or are instructed to perform (green boxes) two actions
(lifting or tilting a cup-shaped object). Each trial is associated with a spatially distributed pattern of responses over voxels. (b) Before
training, congruent actions across the visual and motor domain are represented more similarly, as illustrated by a similarity matrix
(higher pattern similarity indicated in dark orange; left), multi-dimensional scaling in two dimensions (more similar patterns depicted
nearer in space; centre), and a dendrogram (“leaves” representing patterns are connected by shorter paths if patterns are more
similar; right). (c) After counter-mirror training, where participants learn to lift (or tilt) the object after observing a tilt (or lift,
respectively) action, the neural similarity structure might have changed, where non-matching actions are represented similarly across
the visual and motor domain. (d) When visualized using multi-dimensional scaling, here in three dimensions, the similarity
“trajectories” (dark purple arrows) during learning and unlearning of the associations can be visualized, allowing for assessment of the
temporal dynamics of changes in visuomotor associations. A color version of this image is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0140525X13002434.
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outside the canonical fronto-parietal network, consistent with
Cook et al.’s associative account.
Particularly relevant for the target article is that MVPA – in par-
ticular, representational similarity analysis (RSA; Kriegeskorte
2009; Kriegeskorte et al. 2008) – can be used to test key predic-
tions, at a neural population level, of the associative account of
the human mirror system. Cook et al. write “the properties of
MNs can be changed in radical ways by relatively brief periods
of sensorimotor experience” (sect. 3.4, para. 4), based on evidence
from several behavioural studies showing that priming effects
(e.g., automatic imitation effects) can be reduced or even reversed
after counter-mirror training. Although we agree that these
ﬁndings are interesting and consistent with an associative learning
account, we do not believe that results from such studies
alone provide strong evidence to support the authors’ claim, as
the neural correlates of these effects were not measured in ﬁne
detail. We believe that MVPA enables such detailed measurement
and can be used to characterize where and when such changes
occur at a neural population level.
To illustrate this, we provide a hypothetical example based on
associative account predictions brought forward by Cook et al.
of how counter-mirror learning can be adapted to study the
changes in neural representations using MVPA (cf. Catmur
et al. 2007; Press et al. 2007). Patterns of responses can be
measured in the brain when participants observe or execute two
different manual actions (Fig. 1a). Before training, observing
and executing actions congruent across the visual and motor
domain are represented similarly (Fig. 1b). After counter-mirror
training, where actions incongruent across the visual and motor
domain are associated with each other, this situation is reversed:
manual movements incongruent across the visual and motor
domain might now be represented similarly (Fig. 1c).
The application of MVPA provides other advantages. First,
unlike TMS studies, MVPA does not require deﬁning regions of
interest a priori through the use of “searchlight” analyses (Krieges-
korte et al. 2006; Oosterhof et al. 2010; 2011). Second, MVPA
enables the study of temporal dynamics of learning and unlearn-
ing new visuomotor associations of speciﬁc actions across the
brain (Fig. 1d). Third, MVPA can be used to test generalization
to other experimental factors such as viewpoint and different
grasps. Fourth, MVPA allows for comparisons of neural represen-
tations across species (macaques and humans) and brain measure-
ment methods (fMRI and neurophysiology), allowing for more
detailed comparisons of (dis)similarities across species (Krieges-
korte 2009).
In conclusion, we agree that the existing evidence of a human
mirror system is compatible with an associative learning
account. However, we argue that the current evidence is not
strong enough to fully support all the claims made by Cook
et al. in the target article. We believe that the application of
MVPA, in particular RSA and information mapping techniques,
offers a promising avenue to more fully characterize the human
mirror system, and thus provide evidence to support or falsify
the associative learning hypothesis. We predict that these
methods will be crucial for future fMRI studies if they are to
advance our understanding of the human mirror system.
The mirror system in human and nonhuman
primates
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Abstract: The description of the mirror neuron system provided by Cook
et al. is incomplete for the macaque, and incorrect for humans. This is
relevant to exaptation versus associative learning as the underlying
mechanism generating mirror neurons, and to the sensorimotor learning
as evidence for the authors’ viewpoint. The proposed additional
testing of the mirror system in rodents is unrealistic.
Cook et al., in the section on mirror neuron basics (sect. 2),
provide an incomplete description of the mirror system in the
macaque, ignoring some recent developments. Using monkey
fMRI, Nelissen et al. (2005) visualized the frontal regions involved
in action observation. This study is extremely important as it
makes a point which has escaped most researchers in the
human imaging ﬁeld: In order to activate F5c, where mirror
neurons (MNs) are housed, in fMRI, the actor has to be in view
in the videos. Simply showing an isolated hand preforming an
action is insufﬁcient. Cook et al. also ignore the subsequent
study (Nelissen et al. 2011), combining fMRI experiments with
anatomical tracer studies. This later study revealed that the
visual signals conveying action observation travel from the
superior temporal sulcus (STS) to F5c over two parietal way
stations: cytoarchitectonic PFG and the anterior intraparietal
(AIP) area. Thus, this report indicates that, contrary to the asser-
tion in section 3.2 (para. 2), STS neurons need not be linked to
premotor neurons for the MNs to be generated, but rather, that
visual and motor signals have to be associated in only a few parietal
areas: PFG and AIP. This latter area, while not a classical mirror
area, also houses MNs, according to fMRI (Nelissen et al. 2011)
and unpublished single-cell results from studies conducted in
Parma and Japan. Although this restricted association in parietal
cortex is compatible with a genetic/evolutionary as well as an
associative learning origin, it suggests that a domain-general
mechanism such as associative learning may not be needed and
that a more specialized hybrid mechanism, such as exaptation
(sect. 8.2), might be more relevant than Cook et al. indicate.
The sentence “there is no evidence that the sensorimotor learning
involved in MN development is modiﬁed or constrained relative
to the associative learning that occurs in standard conditioning
experiments” (sect. 8.2, para. 1) may thus require serious revision.
The other development regarding monkeys concern two recent
studies from the Lemon group showing how the mirror signal is
“extinguished” by the addition of suppressed MNs among
cortico-spinal neurons in F5 or M1 (Kraskov et al. 2009; Vignes-
waran et al. 2013). Any account of how mirror neurons acquire
their intriguing properties should take into account this transform-
ation from purely excitatory to mixed excitatory/suppressed popu-
lations of MNs along the motor hierarchy. This point is again
unaddressed, and it may well be that a genetic or hybrid mechan-
ism can account for this range of responses more easily than an
associative learning process. The data from monkeys concerning
suppressed MNs also bear upon the interpretation of the
Mukamel et al. (2010) data, suggesting that these human record-
ings may have been made in areas situated at a level of the motor
hierarchy other than the planning level of the classical mirror
areas (PFG/AIP and F5c).
In the section discussing mirror neuron basics, the authors also
claim that the human mirror system is known. Ironically, the only
mirror area for which the homology is known is the least docu-
mented in monkeys: AIP. There is indeed excellent evidence for
the existence of this homologue, a combination of dorsal intrapar-
ietal sulcus anterior (DIPSA) and the so-called putative human
AIP (phAIP) in anterior IPS (Durand et al. 2009). In contrast,
most evidence for human areas cited by Cook et al. is weak or
inexistent. Overlapping activations for action observation and
execution are by no means proof for the existence of MNs, as
the voxels contain thousands of neurons (Dinstein et al. 2008).
Similarly, the repetition suppression studies have yielded contra-
dictory results, unsurprisingly so, given that repetition suppression
overestimates selectivity (Sawamura et al. 2006) and visual
responses of premotor neurons do not adapt (Caggiano et al.
2013). That imitation constitutes an argument supporting the
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existence of a mirror system in humans is debatable, and that the
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) comprises a classical mirror area is
unlikely, since it is not activated by action observation in well-con-
trolled studies (Abdollahi et al. 2013; Jastorff et al. 2010). Finally,
the direct evidence of Mukamel et al. (2010) is also very disputa-
ble, because for technical reasons the so-called mirror neurons
were, unlike the monkey MNs, recorded outside the areas
involved in the planning of grasping. Indeed, so far it has been
possible to record single neurons only in the medial regions of
the hemispheres of epileptic patients undergoing pre-surgical
physiological evaluation, preventing any exploration of anterior
IPS or ventral premotor cortex. Given the recent evidence that
medial fronto-parietal areas are involved in the observation of
climbing and locomotion (Abdollahi et al. 2013), it is likely that
Mukamel et al. (2010) tested neurons with far from optimal
actions. The absence of clear evidence for human MNs and
areas reduces the value of all the sensorimotor learning exper-
iments that are cited in support of the authors’ viewpoint (sects.
7.1 & 7.2), as they have been performed only in humans.
Finally, Cook et al. appear relatively uninformed about the
value of rodent experiments, which they propose as an alternative
to monkey studies (sect. 9.1, experimentation, para. 3). Even if
rats do grasp with their forepaws, this behavior differs markedly
from human grasping, reducing the relevance of proposed exper-
iments for understanding the origin of human MNs. In general,
given the immense difference in cortical surface area between
the two species (for mice, the ratio is 1/1,000 [Rakic 2009], com-
pared to 1/9.2 for macaque [Van Essen et al. 2012]), the value of
rodents as a model for the human brain may be overrated. Given
the importance of the the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) for an
extended mirror system, suggested by recent studies (Abdollahi
et al. 2013; Filimon et al. 2007), its limited development in
rodents might further devaluate the rodent model in the
present context. In fact, it may be the case that the most dorsal
parts of the human superior parietal lobule (SPL) are evolutiona-
rily the oldest parts of PPC (which we may share with rodents),
whereas the more ventral regions of the inferior parietal lobule
(IPL) are the most evolutionarily novel (Mantini et al. 2013).
Given the limitations of the rodent model, lesion or reversible
inactivation experiments in monkeys would be more relevant
than asserted by Cook et al.
Contagious behavior: An alternative approach
to mirror-like phenomena
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Abstract: Contagious behaviors such as yawning and itching/scratching
have mirror-like properties and clearly deﬁned stimulus and motor
parameters; they are also relatively easy to study and should be part of
the debate about mirror neurons and the neurological mechanisms of
social behavior. The broadly tuned, multimodal stimuli of contagious
behavior challenge present accounts of mirror mechanisms that focus on
speciﬁc, mirrored acts.
The range of mirror-like processes under investigation should be
broadened to include contagious behavior, a class of social behav-
ior that is largely neglected by mirror neuron (MN) researchers.
The study of contagious behavior offers the highly desirable prop-
erties of identiﬁable stimuli and motor responses. In contrast,
mirror neurons (MNs) seem lost in thought, like disembodied
computers not hooked up to printers – full of potential, but
short on demonstrated function. Once the relation between the
brain’s inputs and outputs are deﬁned, we will be well on the
way to understanding the mechanism of mirror-like behavior.
The study of contagious behavior also offers an economic incen-
tive; it can be a low-budget affair that requires only behavioral
observation, not the pricey technology of neurophysiology labs
or fMRI machines.
Upon ﬁrst hearing about MNs, students often ask about their
involvement in contagious yawning, laughter, and the like. They
are surprised to learn that what seems obvious to amateurs is
often ignored by professionals, including the authors of the
target article. My present comments focus on yawning and
itching/scratching, representative contagious behaviors. These
and other contagious acts – laughing, coughing, nausea/vomiting,
and vocal crying – are reviewed and contrasted in my recent
book, Curious Behavior: Yawning, Laughing, Hiccupping, and
Beyond (Provine 2012).
Yawns are propagated, being passed from one person to another,
in a behavioral chain reaction. This mindless connectedness
involves social behavior of the most primal sort. When you yawn
contagiously, you do not consciously decide to imitate the observed
yawn – it happens automatically. The rippling of yawns through a
group is heritable, neurologically programmed social behavior
that synchronizes the physiological and behavioral state of the
group. Details about the mechanism of this contagion, its evolution,
and its development are still being worked out. However, it is clear
that the motor act of yawning is phylogenetically ancient, character-
istic of most vertebrates, and develops early in prenatal life. Conta-
gious yawning, in contrast, is phylogenetically more modern,
conﬁned in various degrees to great apes and, perhaps, dogs and
other highly social mammals, and develops several years after
birth (see reviews in Provine 2005; 2012; Walusinski 2010).
One of the most striking features of adult human yawning is its
extreme contagiousness. Almost anything associated with yawning
can be a vector for the contagious response, including viewing
yawning faces, hearing yawn-related sighs, thinking about
yawning, or even reading about yawning, as you are now doing.
Given the broad, multimodal spectrum of yawn stimuli, the invol-
vement of a single, narrowly tuned detector or MN sensitive to a
speciﬁc aspect of a yawning person seems unlikely. Instead, con-
tagion is probably mediated by a variety of detectors of yawn-
related stimuli, each capable of producing a yawn. In the pre-
MN research era, I proposed that an ethological releasing stimu-
lus was responsible for triggering the stereotyped motor act of
contagious yawning (Provine 1986; 1996). Although the stereo-
typy of yawning is unchallenged, the detector activated by the
releasing stimulus is much more broadly tuned than I had
anticipated.
Itch and associated scratching, like yawning, are highly infec-
tious, and the stimulus vector for their contagion is broadly
tuned and multimodal (Provine 2012). Although eczema,
contact dermatitis, and other skin irritation can trigger itch, so
can such abstract stimuli as hearing a lecture about itch,
viewing itch-causing parasites, or seeing someone else scratching,
especially among individuals with pre-existing dermatological
conditions (Holle et al. 2012). The itch/scratch complex provides
intriguing research opportunities because it has more potential
response variability than stereotyped behaviors such as
yawning. For example, Ward et al. (2013) investigated how the
behavior of a model inﬂuences the speciﬁc site of itchiness and
scratching of an observer. When participants in their study
viewed a movie depicting scratching, they were more likely to
scratch themselves, but the hand that they used to scratch (left
or right) and the site of scratching did not necessarily match
the model. Although the model scratched only the arms and
chest, the majority of participants viewing the video directed
their scratching upward toward their face and hair. The
authors concluded, “contagious itchiness may be more driven
by vicarious perception of the feeling state (itchiness/unpleasant-
ness) than contagion of the motor act or bodily target” (Ward
et al. 2013, p. 2).
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Many questions about contagious behavior and MNs remain.
Building on the above results for contagious yawning and
itching/scratching, should we conclude that the sufﬁciency of a
variety of multimodal stimulus triggers is evidence against the be-
havioral involvement of MNs, instances of broadly tuned or mul-
tiple MNs, or examples of a different class of mirror-like acts that
do not involve MNs? Do environmental contingencies inﬂuence
the tuning of stimulus triggers or MNs, possibly contributing to
the acquisition of multimodality? And what about other conta-
gious behaviors? To what extent does the contagiousness of
nausea/vomiting, coughing (but not sneezing), vocal crying, laugh-
ing, and yawning involve shared feeling states or another, more
speciﬁc trigger (Provine 2012)? The answers to these questions
may come from developmental, comparative, and perceptual
studies that are now underway. Whatever the outcome, such
research will broaden our understanding of the neurological
basis of sociality.
Experiential effects on mirror systems and
social learning: Implications for social
intelligence
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Abstract: Investigations of biases and experiential effects on social
learning, social information use, and mirror systems can usefully inform
one another. Unconstrained learning is predicted to shape mirror
systems when the optimal response to an observed act varies, but
constraints may emerge when immediate error-free responses are
required and evolutionary or developmental history reliably predicts the
optimal response. Given the power of associative learning, such
constraints may be rare.
Cook et al. present a compelling case that mirror neurons (MNs)
have a developmental origin in associative learning. Moreover,
they legitimately argue that empirical testing is required to deter-
mine whether MNs and mirror systems have evolutionary origins
as adaptive specializations, echoing criticism of adaptationist “just-
so” stories in other ﬁelds (Pigliucci & Kaplan 2000). Here, I
discuss whether work on mirror systems can be informed by,
and inform, the ﬁelds of social information use and social learning.
I leave aside discussion of communicative signals, by deﬁnition
adaptive specializations.
Many animals use social information (information provided by
other individuals) and social learning (learning from this infor-
mation; Reader & Biro 2010). Debate over mirror system origin
and function can be viewed as part of a broader debate over the
origins of a reliance on social cues and of the mechanisms under-
lying social information use, a debate Heyes (1994; 2012a; 2012c)
has also championed. Besides the fact that mirror systems utilize
social information, there are numerous points of intersection
between the two research ﬁelds. Mirror systems have been pro-
posed to underlie various forms of social learning, including stimu-
lus enhancement, emulation, and imitation learning (Byrne 2002;
Keysers & Perrett 2004), and such systems could potentially
associate personal and conspeciﬁc location and thus also underlie
local enhancement. Social learning propensities, biases, and pro-
cesses have been proposed to be products of general learning pro-
cesses, in a similar fashion to the Cook et al. proposal (Church
1957; Heyes 1994; 2012c; Keysers & Perrett 2004; Laland &
Bateson 2001; Leadbeater & Chittka 2007; Miller & Dollard
1941). Furthermore, like mirror systems, the assumption that
social learning is an adaptive specialization has been questioned,
as has whether any such adaptive specialization would involve
input systems rather than the learning mechanisms themselves
(Caldwell & Whiten 2002; Heyes 2012c; Lefebvre & Giraldeau
1996; Reader et al. 2011). These points of intersection suggest
the two ﬁelds may usefully inform each other.
Experiential effects on the propensity to use and learn from
social information have been demonstrated in several species
(Kendal et al. 2009), supporting the idea that responses to social
cues can be learned. However, ﬂexibility alone is insufﬁcient to
demonstrate that the value and meaning of social cues are acquired
by learning, since ﬂexibility could be genetically encoded. For
example, individuals could follow evolved unlearned rules-of-
thumb of when, where, and how to employ social information
(Rendell et al. 2011). Direct manipulation of the beneﬁts of
social information provides superior evidence for learned biases
in social information use. For example, sparrows raised with an arti-
ﬁcial parent that had reliably indicated food were more likely to
approach feeding conspeciﬁcs than if the parent had not reliably
indicated food (Katsnelson et al. 2008). Similarly, in ﬁnches
manipulation of the net beneﬁts of attending to others resulted in
changes in individual tendencies to use social information, with
lags that suggested the birds were learning the optimal response
on the basis of received rewards (Mottley & Giraldeau 2000).
Perhaps the most compelling current evidence for associative learn-
ing shaping social information use involves the acquisition of match-
ing and nonmatching responses during social learning. Dawson
et al. (2013) trained bumblebees in a feeding array where conspe-
ciﬁc “demonstrators” indicated either the presence of sweet sucrose
or bitter quinine. Bees thus readily learned to approach or avoid
conspeciﬁcs. Later, the bees observed demonstrators at one color
of ﬂower in a two-color array. Bees previously rewarded for
approaching conspeciﬁcs were more likely to choose the same
color as demonstrators, whereas the reverse was true in the
quinine-trained bees. Such data strikingly parallel mirror and
counter-mirror effects observed in budgerigars and dogs (Mui
et al. 2008; Range et al. 2011).
Although these examples provide evidence that experience can
shape reliance on social cues, interpreting all individual and
between-species variation in social information use as the result
of prior learning would risk telling associationist “just-so” stories.
Studies of the evolution of learning provide useful insights into
when an evolutionary account may explain variation in social infor-
mation use (e.g., Boyd & Richerson 1985; Dunlap & Stephens
2009; Johnston 1982). When opportunities for learning are
limited, learning or errors are costly, or the optimal response to a
social cue is highly predictable, natural selection could shape
genetically encoded predispositions to respond in a certain
manner to particular social cues. Similarly, if experiences in early
life predict later payoffs of social information, and there are costs
to learning, early life experience may result in ﬁxed social learning
tendencies during adulthood (Lindeyer et al. 2013).
There are several instances where responses to social cues
appear ﬁxed. Cases such as humans copying the most successful
individual even when this is suboptimal (Offerman & Schotter
2009), birds ignoring reliable asocial information to copy conspe-
ciﬁcs (Rieucau & Giraldeau 2009), and the aforementioned
counter-mirror effects taking longer to develop than mirror
effects could all be the result of the extensive social experience
individuals have prior to testing. However, other examples are
more difﬁcult to explain in terms of experiential effects. For
example, several avian species use conspeciﬁc and heterospeciﬁc
nesting or breeding success during their own habitat selection
without clear opportunities to learn to use these cues (although
experience can shape later choices; Morand-Ferron et al. 2010).
Restrictions on the stimuli monkeys and warblers socially learn
about are also consistent with an adaptive specialization account
(Davies & Welbergen 2009; Mineka & Cook 1988, but see
Heyes 1994). Such predispositions would reduce errors during
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social learning, rather like predispositions to attend to conspeciﬁcs
protect young birds from errors during ﬁlial imprinting (Horn
2004).
Given that predispositions are expected for certain forms of
social information use, the unconstrained ﬂexibility of mirror
systems that Cook et al. note raises two possibilities, assuming
that mirror system efﬁciency is a determinant of ﬁtness. Either
(1) mirror system ﬂexibility is vital to their adaptive function,
suggesting that social cues have variable meanings that must be
learned, or (2) evolved alternatives to associatively acquired
mirror systems are constrained, perhaps by their cost. The
broad affordances of associative learning may mean that beneﬁcial
mirror systems come virtually “for free,” reducing the likelihood of
alternate evolved solutions.
If mirror systems and social learning tendencies are the pro-
ducts of general learning processes, the evolution of social and
general intelligence may be closely entwined (Brown & Brüne
2012; Dunbar & Shultz 2007; Reader et al. 2011). Furthermore,
because associative learning and social information use are phylo-
genetically widespread, mirror systems could be studied in species
such as insects, where evolutionary studies could examine the
related but separate questions of adaptiveness and adaptive
specialization. Particularly informative would be studies of
species where deviating from group behavior carries strong
costs, such as certain ﬁsh (Bates & Chappell 2002). Studies of
links between mirror system efﬁcacy and behavioral competence
are essential, ideally by measuring costs and beneﬁts for ﬁtness
in “real-world” group situations to establish when individuals
out-compete or interact more effectively with others. Cook
et al. present a parsimonious model that inspires broad application
and testing of mirror system concepts.
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Abstract: Cook et al. argue that mirror neurons originate in sensorimotor
associative learning and that their function is determined by their origin.
Both these claims are hard to accept. It is here suggested that a major
role in the origin of the mirror mechanism is played by top-down
connections rather than by associative learning.
The characterizing feature of the primary visual cortex of primates
is the presence of neurons sensitive to stimulus orientation.
Regardless of whether the orientation-sensitive neurons are deter-
mined genetically or acquired by experience, or both, they are at
the basis of the functional organization of primates’ visual system
(Hubel & Wiesel 1998; Marr 1982). The same is true for mirror
neurons (MNs). Regardless of whether their properties are deter-
mined genetically, acquired by experience, or both, they represent
the neural substrate of a fundamental mechanism that transforms
sensory information into a motor format (the mirror mechanism).
The functions of the mirror mechanism vary from action under-
standing, to imitation, to empathy, and even, in birds, to song rec-
ognition (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). Their function depends on
their anatomical location. Thus, contrary to the view advanced in
the present target article, the problem of how MNs originate is
utterly irrelevant as far as their function is concerned. It is an
interesting problem, but it has little to do with the function of
the mirror mechanism.
The claim that mirror neurons are just “another type” of associ-
ation neurons misses their characterizing, unique property, which
is that of giving a motor format to sensory stimuli. This misunder-
standing can be also found in an interesting paper on mirror
neurons by Damasio and Meyer (2008). They claimed that the
parieto-frontal mirror neurons are neural ensembles included in
higher-order association areas called “non-local convergence-
divergence zones” that collect information from lower-order
visual, auditory, and somatosensory association areas, and signal
back to those areas. Action understanding depends on the acti-
vation of this network. This proposal had the merit of highlighting
the role of top-down connections in action understanding. It over-
looked, however, as done in the present target article, the fact that
parieto-frontal mirror neurons are motor neurons. When MNs
discharge, they “ignite”motor schemata similar to those endogen-
ously activated during motor imagery and, within limits, during
actual motor act execution. In other words, my motor schemata
are activated during the observation of similar motor schemata
of others. This provides a neurophysiological account of the mech-
anism underlying action understanding “from inside” (Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia 2010): “a ﬁrst person process, where the self feels like an
actor, rather than a spectator” (Jeannerod 1997, p. 95; emphasis
added). This appears to be a function that only the mirror mech-
anism is able to mediate.
Mirror neurons have top-down effects (Damasio & Meyer
2008, see also Kilner et al. 2007b). In other words, following
MN activation, signals go not only toward other motor areas,
but also backwards to lower-order visual, auditory, and somato-
sensory areas. This top-down activation binds the understanding
of what a person is doing (e.g., grasping), encoded in the motor
cortex, with the visual details of that action. An interesting
possibility is that the top-down mechanism also has another
function, which is: to be the neural substrate of a learning
mechanism that starts from motor centers rather than from
the environment. An elegant experiment by Van Elk et al.
(2008) illustrates this point well. EEG was recorded during
observation of action videos in 14- to 16-month old infants.
Desynchronization of the movements-related rhythms (e.g.,
mu rhythms) was found for the observation of crawling, but
not for the observation of walking. Furthermore, the size of
the effect was strongly related to the infant’s own crawling
experience. The authors concluded that experience of one’s
own actions is closely related to how actions of others are
perceived.
Cook et al. dismiss the experiments showing that human neo-
nates are able to copy actions done by others (Meltzoff &
Moore 1977). Their argument is the following. The best-docu-
mented imitative action is tongue protrusion, but even this act
“lacks the speciﬁcity … of imitation” (target article, sect. 6.1,
para. 1). In addition, this behavior can also be elicited when
infants observe a mechanical “tongue” or disembodied mouth.
It is hard for me to conceive how the mirror mechanism of a
neonate might have a neurological maturity such as to provide a
precise copy of tongue protrusion. Occasionally this could
happen, but the potential act encoded in a newborn must be,
for maturational reasons, just “protruding.” Note also that grasp-
ing MNs generalize across the observed actions having the same
goal. For example, in both monkeys and humans the observation
of a grasping robot arm is effective in triggering mirror neurons
(Gazzola et al. 2007, Peeters et al. 2009; Rochat et al. 2010),
exactly as does the “mechanical tongue” in the example men-
tioned above. My hypothesis is that tongue protrusion in new-
borns is an effect mediated by a mirror mechanism similar to
that described for crawling by Van Elk et al. (2008). Action
comes ﬁrst and links motor centers with sensory centers. Once
these connections are established (or reinforced), the external
information can ﬂow in a forward direction, from stimuli to
actions. Hence the imitation.
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Abstract: Like Cook et al., we suggest that mirror neurons are a
fascinating product of cross-modal learning. As predicted by an
associative account, responses in motor regions are observed for novel
and/or abstract visual stimuli such as point-light and android
movements. Domain-speciﬁc mirror responses also emerge as a function
of audiomotor expertise that is slowly acquired over years of intensive
training.
The discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) proffered a tempting
solution for the difﬁcult theoretical and neurocomputational
problem of linking self and other (Barresi & Moore 1996).
MNs were regarded in some quarters as a neuroscientiﬁc
silver bullet, one providing the evolutionary and neural basis
of social cognition, empathy, theory of mind, language, and civi-
lization. After this period of MN-Mania, inevitably there has
been a ﬁerce counter-MN-reformation, with some acolytes
vociferously denying the mere existence of MNs. By pleasant
contrast to either extreme, the target article offers a sober
and reasoned framework for thinking about the origins and
emergence of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS). Here, we
offer additional evidence that may be explained with an associ-
ative MN account, but are problematic to account for via
speciﬁc innate mechanisms. First, the human MNS seems
capable of abstraction and generalization, as evidenced by its
involvement in processing novel visual stimuli that have not
existed through evolution and are thus hard to square with
built-in, genetically coded MNs. Second, a straightforward
associative model of early speech production accurately predicts
the existence of MN-like responses for speech; and domain-
speciﬁc mirror-like responses emerge in response to intensive
training in producing and perceiving instrumental sounds.
Abstraction and selective tuning for conspeciﬁcs (lack
thereof). In both correlational and causal studies, human MNS
has been linked to the processing of point-light biological
motion stimuli, which depict actions through motion cues
(Gilaie-Dotan et al. 2013; Saygin et al. 2004; van Kemenade
et al. 2012). In contrast, macaque MNs do not even respond to
videos of actions (Ferrari et al. 2003), except possibly after exten-
sive training (Caggiano et al. 2011). Although differences between
humans and nonhuman primates could also have cross-method-
ology sources (e.g., ﬁring rates, vs. LFPs, vs. BOLD fMRI), con-
trasting the ease with which human observers process point-light
stimuli, with the daunting undertaking of getting nonhuman pri-
mates to perform even the simplest tasks with them (Vangeneug-
den et al. 2009), it appears there may be cross-species differences.
The ability of the human MNS to extrapolate to such abstract rep-
resentations is difﬁcult to explain with a speciﬁc genetic adap-
tation, but ﬁts rather well as a natural by-product of the human
ability to effectively use abstractions in associative learning (cf.
language, see next), itself an emergent outcome of domain-
general aspects of primate evolution.
Consider also whether the MNS is adapted speciﬁcally for con-
speciﬁcs. Although one study has claimed the human MNS is
“mirror only for other humans,” further studies have reported
that human MNS also responds to robot actions (e.g., Cross
et al. 2012; Gazzola et al. 2007; Oberman et al. 2007), as do sub-
divisions of F5 in the macaque (Nelissen et al. 2005). EEG and
fMRI studies involving highly human-like androids indicate that
the human MNS is not straightforwardly tuned to human
motion or human appearance (Saygin et al. 2012; Urgen et al.
2013). Overall, in terms of response properties, it appears that
MNS is not highly selective to conspeciﬁcs, or even living
things. Such data, and more generally, the oft-noted insensitivity
of MNs to perceptual factors, are much more consistent with an
adaptationist account than a genetic account of MNs. For why
should the brain have a specially evolved system for understanding
the actions of others that is also responsive to stimuli that did not
exist in the natural environment until very recently, such as twen-
tieth century point-light displays and twenty-ﬁrst century Japanese
androids?
Notes from speech and language. Language has been one of
the most paradigmatic areas in which nature versus nurture and
domain-speciﬁc versus domain-general debates took place
(Elman et al. 1996). We have long held that language is best
viewed as a complex skill that emerges from adaptations of
domain-general sensorimotor neural systems (Dick et al. 2004;
2007; Saygin et al. 2003), nicely summarized by the late Elizabeth
Bates as “language is a new machine built out of old parts” (Bates
et al. 1988).
The ﬁeld of speech and language has lived through decades of
the “poverty of the stimulus” argument regarding the purported
necessity for innately speciﬁed, special mechanisms and represen-
tations (see commentary by Holt & Lotto, this BBS issue). But if
anything, the emerging consensus is that language has parasitized
a remarkably plastic yet determinedly primate brain that is orga-
nized along sensorimotor and not domain-speciﬁc lines. We
suggest that the continuing saga of mirror neurons may follow a
similar dramatic arc.
The domain of speech provides a compelling example of how
MNs might develop in a simple “ﬁre together wire together” learn-
ing mechanism with simple (yet realistic) anatomical constraints. In
a computational model of infant babbling, Westermann and
Miranda (2002; 2004) showed that a network that produces
babble (permutations ofmuscle movement combinations), and sim-
ultaneously “hears” its acoustical output, will spontaneously form
MNs for speech. Once the computational baby has babbled sufﬁ-
ciently, when it then hears a vowel, the auditory representation
map of this vowel will activate the motor representation that has
been linked up to it via Hebbian learning.
A strong prediction of this early associative model of the emer-
gence of MNs for speech was found in an fMRI study: Enhanced
activation for passively heard syllables was observed in a premotor
region that was strongly activated during production of the same
syllables (Wilson et al. 2004). Although this ﬁnding was taken by
some as conﬁrmation of the motor theory of speech perception,
subsequent studies have shown that mirror-like responses can
emerge in motor regions as a product of more general audiomotor
expertise, as would be predicted by associative accounts. When lis-
tening to dramatic speech and solo violin playing, professional
actors show considerably more activation for speech in premotor
areas, including that reported in Wilson et al. (2004). Conversely,
violinists listening to the same stimuli show the opposite pattern –
much greater activation for listening to violin excerpts than for
speech (Dick et al. 2011).
Overall, mirror-like responses, rather than being speciﬁc
genetic adaptations, are more likely to be evidence for the remark-
able functional plasticity that allows primates – especially
humans – to learn and master complex contingencies via
domain-general mechanisms.
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Abstract: Neonatal imitation should not exclusively be considered at the
population-level; instead, we propose that inconsistent ﬁndings
regarding its occurrence result from important individual differences in
imitative responses. We also highlight what we consider to be a false
dichotomy of genetic versus learning accounts of the development of
mirror neurons, and instead suggest a more parsimonious epigenetic
perspective.
A number of lines of evidence support the notion that neonatal
imitation is a real phenomenon. Although we realize our commen-
tary is unlikely to settle this debate, we believe that Cook et al. fail
to consider the importance of individual differences in neonatal
imitation. Neonatal imitation has been demonstrated using
more than one gesture (which is critical because it shows speci-
ﬁcity in matching) in more than two-dozen studies. In fact,
recent work – not reported by Cook et al. – refutes the notion
that neonatal imitation is simply an arousal effect (Nagy et al.
2013). Similarly, neonatal imitation is not a reﬂex-like behavior,
as newborns appear to remember, after a delay, both the particu-
lar gesture (Paukner et al. 2011) and person (Simpson et al. 2013)
with whom they interacted and initiate interactions. Moreover,
nursery infant monkeys, who have no exposure to contingent
behaviors from caregivers, and therefore have no opportunities
to learn to imitate, still show neonatal imitation (Ferrari et al.
2006). Given that neonatal imitation occurs in a variety of pri-
mates, it may be a shared behavioral adaptation (Paukner et al.
2013a).
Critically, neonatal imitation may reﬂect activity of the nascent
mirror neuron system (MNS), as it is associated with suppression
of speciﬁc electroencephalogram (EEG) frequency band activity
(Ferrari et al. 2012). This work is consistent with a recent study
based on simultaneous EEG and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) in human adults showing activity of the parietal
and premotor/motor cortex (i.e., mirror neuron areas) linked
to EEG suppression within the alpha band (i.e., mu rhythm)
(Arnstein et al. 2011). And, there is EEG evidence of a function-
ing MNS from birth in neonate macaques that lack any early
face-to-face contingent experience with social partners (Ferrari
et al. 2012).
Inconsistent neonatal imitation ﬁndings (e.g., Cook et al.’s
Fig. 2) may be the result of variation among infants in imita-
tion, indicating signiﬁcant individual differences in infants’ abil-
ities to learn contingent behavior, upon which critical cognitive
and social skills are based (Reeb-Sutherland et al. 2012). In
support of this idea, recent ﬁndings reveal that individual
differences in neonatal imitation in monkeys are correlated
with visual attention to social partners (Simpson et al. 2014;
similar ﬁndings in humans: Heimann 1989), person recognition
(Simpson et al. 2013), face viewing patterns (Paukner et al.
2013b; under review), deferred imitation (Paukner et al. 2011),
and goal-directed movement (Ferrari et al. 2009c). Therefore,
rather than dismissing neonatal imitation – as Cook et al.
appear to do –we argue that one should focus on the causes
and consequences of individual differences in neonatal imitation
through longitudinal (Suddendorf et al. 2012) and comparative
(de Waal & Ferrari 2010) studies of newborns. We suggest
that it would be insightful to examine neonatal imitation in
infants who have siblings with autism spectrum disorder, a
high-risk population (e.g., Chawarska et al. 2013), or examine
effects of early experiences on neonatal imitation, including be-
havioral (e.g., Sanefuji & Ohgami 2013) and pharmacological
(e.g., Tachibana et al. 2013) interventions.
In addition to questioning their view of neonatal imitation,
we, like others (e.g., Casile et al. 2011; Del Giudice et al.
2009), believe that Cook et al. are mistaken in opposing
genetic and learning views on MNS development. Instead, as
with any developmental phenomenon, it is important to con-
sider gene expression in different environments, and in differ-
ent species, in order to understand how evolution produced
predictable, functional, and species-speciﬁc phenotypes. Using
this approach, we can examine how mechanisms of learning
evolved to produce adaptive specializations through epigenetic
mechanisms (Domjan & Galef 1983). Epigenetics is the study
of changes in gene expression as a consequence of an organ-
ism’s response to different environmental stimuli; genes can
be temporally and spatially regulated, and epigenetics is the
study of these reactions and the environmental factors – includ-
ing the prenatal environment – that inﬂuence them. Countless
examples emerging from the ﬁeld of epigenetics demonstrate
that genetic and epigenetic inheritance is not indicative of
innateness, nor are phylogenetically inherited traits insensitive
to experience (e.g., Jensen 2013; Roth 2012). Indeed, epige-
netic models now focus on the origins of complex behaviors;
we propose that such models should be considered along
with associate learning mechanisms in predicting developmen-
tal trajectories, within and between species. We agree that it is
misleading to think that natural selection selects only speciﬁc
“good” genes. Instead, natural selection acts on phenotypes,
which are the result of complex interactions, including environ-
mental effects on gene expression. Therefore, it is more fruit-
ful to identify epigenetic regulatory factors responsible for the
emergence of predictable developmental brain/behavior trajec-
tories, than to search for genes that produce speciﬁc pheno-
types. For example, in macaque infants, we are now
beginning to understand the epigenetic mechanisms that can
explain how early social adversity increases the risk of disease
and disorder (e.g., Provençal et al. 2012).
We also agree with Cook et al. that learning likely shapes the
development of the mirror neuron (MN) network in the brain,
but learning occurs differently as a function of individual
characteristics and context. Selection pressures operate not
only on the ﬁnal phenotype, but also on the interactions
between genes and the environment and the interactions
between molecular factors and the environment (Blekhman
et al. 2008). It is possible that MNs evolved to support learning
of basic functions of sensorimotor recognition of others’ behav-
ior, essential, though not speciﬁcally an adaptation for, higher-
order cognitive functions, as well as sensorimotor learning
(Bonini & Ferrari 2011). The interaction of genes and experi-
ence through learning can only occur if the basic neural circui-
try is there to support such learning. We contend that MNs may
provide the scaffolding for these interactions early in life, having
themselves been remodeled by epigenetic processes across
evolution.
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Abstract: Commentators have tended to focus on the conceptual
framework of our article, the contrast between genetic and
associative accounts of mirror neurons, and to challenge it with
additional possibilities rather than empirical data. This makes
the empirically focused comments especially valuable. The
mirror neuron debate is replete with ideas; what it needs now
are system-level theories and careful experiments – tests and
testability.
R1. Introduction: Types of challenge
The target article (“Mirror neurons: From origin to func-
tion” – henceforth “O2F”) called for a new approach to
research on mirror neurons (MNs): a shift in priorities
from “ideas” to rigorous, theory-based experimentation.
Reﬂecting current priorities, the commentators have
offered many more conceptual than empirical challenges;
more in principle possibilities than testable hypotheses.
In some respects this is disappointing, but it makes the
empirically grounded commentaries especially precious;
and, since many of the possibilities are very interesting, it
does not detract from the liveliness of the discussion.
We will respond to all substantive comments in roughly the
order in which the relevant issues arose in O2F. The major
exception is section R2, which deals with comments relat-
ing to sections 3 and 8 of the target article. Section R3
relates to section 4, R4 to section 5, and R5 to section
6. Breaking the rhythm, section R6 focuses on commen-
taries that offered convergent evidence in support of the
associative account or extensions of our approach, and R7
relates to section 9 of O2F. Those who are quick on their
feet will notice that there is no partner for section 7 of
O2F, in which we presented experimental evidence in
support of the associative account. That is because this evi-
dence has not been challenged. Some commentaries, dis-
cussed in section R2, say that it does not show all that we
think it shows, but no one has denied that the properties
of MNs can be changed radically by sensorimotor
experience.
R2. Nature and nurture: Five false claims
Perhaps it is human nature to dichotomize nature and
nurture (Linquist et al. 2011)! Maybe we humans have
such a powerful tendency to split nature and nurture – to
think of biological form as a product of internal or external
factors, genes or environment, evolution or learning – that
we imagine others are doing it even when they are not.
Such a cognitive bias would help to explain why many com-
mentators mistook our genetic-associative distinction for a
nature-nurture dichotomy. To put the record straight,
here are ﬁve claims that we did not make in O2F
because, like the commentators cited in this list, we think
these claims are false:
1. Associative learning is sufﬁcient for the development
of MNs (Bertenthal; Bonaiuto; Giese; Oberman,
Hubbard, & McCleery [Oberman et al.]).
2. The genetic account assumes that learning does
not contribute to the development of MNs (Behme;
Bertenthal).
3. Genetically inherited traits are insensitive to experi-
ence (Bertenthal; Kilner & Friston; Lingnau & Cara-
mazza; Martin & Santos).
4. Genetically inherited traits are insensitive to associat-
ive learning (Bertenthal; Bonaiuto; Kilner & Friston;
Lingnau & Caramazza; Newman).
5. Associative learning cannot be adaptively specialized
(Behme; Bertenthal; Gervais; Martin & Santos;
Simpson, Fox, Tramacere, & Ferrari [Simpson et al.]).
R2.1. Associative learning is sufﬁcient for the
development of MNs
Taken at face value, this claim is so obviously false that no
one could imagine it was the thrust of our article. Even
when one takes “the development of MNs” to be shorthand
for “the development of the matching properties, or mir-
rorness, of MNs” – as we did throughout O2F – it is clear
that the developmental system draws on a multitude of
resources in addition to associative learning, starting with
basic nutrients and the genetically inherited potential to
develop neurons at all. The useful version of the “associat-
ive learning is sufﬁcient” claim is laid out byBonaiuto, who
suggests that the associative account assumes “every
neuron is either directly or indirectly connected with
every other neuron in the brain.” This is useful because it
gives us a new and clearer way of saying: “The associative
hypothesis assumes that gene-based natural selection has
played a signiﬁcant background role with respect to the
development of MNs; for example, in shaping the
anatomy of visual and motor cortex for visual guidance of
action” (O2F, sect. 3.2, para. 1). With Bonaiuto’s help,
we can now rephrase this: The associative hypothesis
does not assume complete or random connectivity
between visual and motor cortex. Rather, it assumes that
gene-based natural selection has produced partial connec-
tivity as an adaptation for the development of visual
control of actions, not for mirroring. For example, visual
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areas detecting highly action-relevant properties of objects
may have the potential to be more richly or readily con-
nected with premotor cortex than visual areas processing
less action-relevant properties of objects. It is also possible
that genetic evolution has produced some preferential con-
nectivity between visual areas processing observed action
and motor areas. However, the associative account suggests
that, if this is the case, these predispositions do not favor
mirror over non-mirror or counter-mirror connections.
Therefore, the issue that separates the associative account
and Bonaiuto’s view from the genetic account (e.g.,
Fogassi) is whether the pattern of partial connectivity, or
“primary repertoire” (Kilner & Friston), was favored by
natural selection because it tends to produce sensorimotor
neurons that are good for guiding instrumental action or
because it produces MNs that are good for action under-
standing or another social cognitive function.
R2.2. The genetic account assumes that learning does
not contribute to the development of MNs
According to Behme (see alsoMartin & Santos), our dis-
cussion of MN responses to unnatural stimuli – such as
plastic crumpling and paper tearing –made clear that,
although we said that “the genetic hypothesis does not
necessarily assume that experience plays a minimal role”
(O2F, sect. 3.1, para. 4), the genetic account is really a
straw man who insists that learning does not contribute
to the development of MNs. By reafﬁrming its basic
tenets, Fogassi’s commentary conﬁrms that the genetic
account is not a straw man. More speciﬁcally, we agree
with Behme that the mere fact that some MNs respond
to unnatural stimuli is problematic only for the starkest
version of the genetic account. However, as we emphasized
(O2F, sect. 4.1), many MNs do not merely respond, they
respond maximally, to unnatural stimuli. This is hard to
reconcile even with versions of the genetic hypothesis
that assign important roles to sensory and/or motor learn-
ing, because these assume that links among sensory
neurons, or among motor neurons, account for responses
to unnatural stimuli. In contrast, maximal responding to
unnatural stimuli implies that the learning that produces
tool-use and audiovisual MNs is sensorimotor; it connects
sensory neurons coding unnatural stimuli directly with
motor neurons coding action (Cook 2012).
R2.3. Genetically inherited traits are insensitive to
experience
We are grateful to Kilner & Friston and Lingnau & Car-
amazza for mentioning some of the classic studies showing
unequivocally that genetically inherited traits are sensitive
to experience.
R2.4. Genetically inherited traits are insensitive to
associative learning
The fourth claim deserves closer scrutiny. Several com-
mentators assumed not only that we are making this
claim, but also that, without it, the evidence that sensorimo-
tor learning can radically change MNs does not support
the associative over the genetic account (Bertenthal;
Bonaiuto; Gervais; Kilner & Friston; Newman).
This misconception is largely our fault. The argument
underlying our tests of the associative account has been
explained previously (Heyes 2010), but was not made expli-
cit in the target article. To rectify this, here is a short,
focused version of the argument: Our training experiments
(reviewed in O2F, sect. 7) indicate that (A) counter-mirror
sensorimotor experience (e.g., moving an index ﬁnger
whenever you see little ﬁnger movement) reverses the
matching properties of MNs, and (B) sensorimotor experi-
ence with inanimate objects (e.g., making a ﬁst whenever
you see a certain shape) induces MNs to respond to inani-
mate objects.1 As predicted by the associative account,
effects A and B show that sensorimotor experience per-
turbs but does not damage MNs: it prevents MNs from
selectively encoding similar observed and executed
actions, but does not stop them from encoding systematic
relations among stimuli and responses. This is hard for
the genetic account to accommodate because (1) if a trait
is a gene-based adaptation, its development tends not to
be perturbed by environmental variations that were
present when the trait evolved, and (2) sensorimotor
experience of the kind that reverses and induces MN
activity is likely to have been present in the period when,
according to the genetic account, MNs evolved. Speciﬁ-
cally, it is likely that the common ancestors of extant
monkeys and humans experienced contingencies between
observation and execution of nonmatching actions (e.g.,
when one individual countered a blow from another) and
between objects and actions (e.g., when distinctive
actions were made on distinctive objects).2 Thus, our key
assumption is not that “genetically inherited traits are
insensitive to associative learning,” but that “if a trait is a
gene-based adaptation, its development tends not to be
perturbed by environmental variations that were present
when the trait evolved.”
R2.5. Associative learning cannot be adaptively
specialized
Several commentators have suggested that we were wrong
to contrast the genetic account with the associative account
because associative learning can be adaptively specialized
(aka “canalized” and “exapted”) (Behme; Bertenthal;
Gervais; Giese; Keysers, Perrett, & Gazzola [Keysers
et al.]; Lotem & Kolodny; Martin & Santos; Simpson
et al.). For example, as indicated by Garcia’s classic exper-
iments on food aversion learning (e.g., Garcia et al. 1955),
genetic evolution can alter input mechanisms or learning
rate parameters so that contingencies between some pairs
of events (e.g., ﬂavor and illness) are learned more
readily than others (e.g., ﬂavor and shock), a phenomenon
known as “selective association” (Gemberling & Domjan
1982; Heyes 2003; Pearce 2008). To be clear: We have
no doubt that associative learning can be adaptively special-
ized. Indeed, if we had any doubts, we would not have put
so much effort into experiments that were explicitly
designed to test for signs of adaptive specialization in the
development of MNs. We have tested for adaptive special-
ization – for example using counter-mirror and induction
training (O2F, sect. 7) – and failed to ﬁnd it. That is why
the associative account is not a hybrid model; why it is
“extreme” (Lotem & Kolodny) in suggesting that MNs
are forged by domain-general processes of learning that
have not been specialized by genetic evolution for the
development of MNs.
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The associative hypothesis would be less plausible if it
had been shown that adaptive specialization of associative
learning is not merely possible, but normal or typical
(Lotem & Kolodny). However, the evidence does not
support typicality. There are quite a few examples of selec-
tive association, but selective association can be due to prior
learning (Mackintosh 1973) rather than genetic processes –
“ontogenetic inﬂection” rather than “phylogenetic inﬂec-
tion” (Heyes 2003) – and in many cases it has merely
been assumed that the source of selective association is
phylogenetic; that it constitutes adaptive specialization.
The commentaries on our article offer a rich array of
hybrid genetic-associative possibilities. For example, com-
mentators point out that MNs could be built by a form of
associative learning that is adaptively specialized for
empathy (Gervais) or self-monitoring (Bonaiuto) rather
than action understanding; via epigenetic as well as
genetic processes (Simpson et al.); by the modiﬁcation
of memory parameters as well as input mechanisms
(Bonaiuto; Keysers et al.; Lotem & Kolodny); and
where the modiﬁed input mechanisms involve mother-
infant face-to-face interaction, infant-directed speech, imi-
tation by adults, and the face preference (Gervais; Keysers
et al.). We agree that these are all logical possibilities and
that there is “no a priori reason” (Behme), such as lack
of parsimony (Lotem & Kolodny), to reject hybrid
models. Indeed, as we said in the target article, we see
hybrid modeling as “a promising direction for future
research” (O2F, sect. 8.2). We just want to see some evi-
dence. It is not enough to generate hypotheses; they also
need to be tested.
Reader’s commentary conﬁrms that it is possible to test
adaptive specialization hypotheses by discussing research
on social learning, rather than MNs, in which this has
been done successfully. In contrast, very few commentators
have identiﬁed empirical research on MNs that, in their
view, supports a hybrid, adaptive specialization model
over the associative and genetic accounts. Oberman
et al. cite a study by Howlin and Moss (2012) which
reported that people with autism spectrum conditions
(ASC) are at a disadvantage, compared with neurotypical
controls, in relation to employment, social relationships,
health, and quality of life. To count this as evidence for a
hybrid model, it would be necessary to make three unjusti-
ﬁed assumptions: that people with ASC have abnormal
MNs; that their disadvantages are due to this abnormality;
and that the disadvantages would not occur if MNs devel-
oped in the manner described by either the genetic or
the associative account.
Similarly, citing Meltzoff (1995), Bertenthal suggests
that infants more readily imitate human than mechanical
movements and that this animacy bias supports a hybrid
model over the associative account. However, a replication
of Meltzoff’s (1995) study found evidence that his results
were due to stimulus enhancement – a phenomenon that
does not implicate MNs – rather than imitation (Huang
et al. 2002). More broadly, animacy bias in imitation –
which has been reported in other studies – is fully compati-
ble with the associative account. Human developmental
environments typically offer many more opportunities to
associate the observation of human action, than the obser-
vation of mechanical action, with action execution (Press
2011). Therefore, one does not need to invoke adaptive
specialization to explain animacy bias. Furthermore, as
predicted by the unadorned associative account, animacy
bias is abolished when action execution is correlated with
observation of mechanical movements (Press et al. 2007).
Taking a broader approach, Gervais (see alsoMartin &
Santos and Oberman et al.) suggests that hybrid models
are better able to explain why monkeys and humans, but
not rats, have MNs. The ﬁrst problem with this argument
is that we do not know whether rats or free-living
monkeys have MNs; they have not been tested. The
second problem is that the associative account predicts
species differences based on the amount and kind of sen-
sorimotor experience received in the course of typical
development, and – borrowing Bonaiuto’s terminology
again – the pattern of partial connectivity between sensory
and motor areas that has been favored by genetic evolution
for visual guidance of action.
We hope our article will encourage those who back hybrid
models to test them against the genetic and associative
accounts in carefully designed experiments. This was, to a
large degree, our purpose in writing O2F. The resulting
experiments may well show that the associative account is
wrong or needs to be augmented (Heyes, in press). For
example, in common withGervais, we have suggested else-
where that cultural evolution, rather than genetic evolution,
may have favored social practices that facilitate the develop-
ment of imitation and MNs through associative learning
(Heyes 2012a; 2013). But even if future experimental
research shows that the associative account is plain wrong,
in our view it would be a good result. It would mean that
research on MNs has moved from exciting speculation to
exciting experimentation: from ideas to tests and testability.
R3. “Goals” and the ﬁeld properties of MNs
In section 3 of O2F, we argue that research on the ﬁeld
properties of MNs does not support the claim that they
selectively encode action “goals,” a central plank of the
case for the genetic account. Several commentators expli-
citly endorse our view that MNs do not selectively
encode goals (Giese; Heil, van Pelt, Kwisthout, van
Rooij, & Bekkering [Heil et al.]; Kilner & Friston).
Others repeat the claim that MNs selectively encode
goals, but do not engage with the evidence we have pre-
sented (Brown & Brüne; Fogassi;Gallese & Sinigaglia;
Khalil; Martin & Santos). They do not explain how the
goal-encoding claim can be reconciled with the evidence
that MNs are responsive to intransitive as well as transitive
actions, and to low-level features of action such as the path
through space, effector used, and observer’s viewpoint.
Orban mentions four studies that we did not discuss in
O2F, two using fMRI and two using single-unit recording
in monkeys. The ﬁrst fMRI study (Nelissen et al. 2005)
reported that area F5c was active during action observation
when the actor’s body was in full view but not when the
monkey could see only parts of the actor’s body. This
ﬁnding does not warrant the general claim that a full view
of the agent is necessary for MN ﬁring in monkeys. For
example, audiovisual MNs discharge when the monkey
hears paper tearing and can see only the experimenter’s
static, disembodied head and arms (see Figure 1b in
Keysers et al. 2003). However, in those cases where MN
activity is sensitive to the visibility of the actor’s body, the
associative account makes the testable prediction that this
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is due to either generalization decrement or contextual
learning of the kind discussed in section 5 of O2F. The
second fMRI study (Nelissen et al. 2011) conﬁrmed that
signals travel from STS to F5c over two parietal way
stations, which is entirely compatible with our statement
that some sensory neurons in STS are “connected, directly
or indirectly, to motor neurons in PMC … and parietal
cortex” (O2F, sect. 3.2, para. 2).
The third and fourth studies reported “suppression
MNs,” neurons that discharge when a focal behavior is exe-
cuted and show below baseline activity when a similar be-
havior is observed (Kraskov et al. 2009; Vigneswaran
et al. 2013). These results are very interesting indeed, but
it is not clear why Orban believes that they support a
genetic or hybrid account over the associative hypothesis.
Indeed, at ﬁrst blush, suppression MNs seem to be trouble-
some for any account suggesting that evolution designed
MNs to promote action understanding. If standard “exci-
tation MNs” were designed to promote action understand-
ing, it looks as if suppression MNs must have been designed
to prevent action understanding. This is implausible, and
therefore supporters of a genetic or hybrid account have
appealed to an untested auxiliary hypothesis – that the
speciﬁc and presumably unique function of suppression
MNs is to allow self-produced and other-produced
actions to be distinguished (Mukamel et al. 2010).
Given that associative learning can be both excitatory and
inhibitory, there is no reason to doubt that suppressionMNs
are compatible with the associative account. However, a
good deal more will need to be discovered about suppres-
sion MNs before the associative account, or any other
hypothesis, can offer a clear and speciﬁc explanation of
their properties. For example, we need to know how sup-
pression MNs are related to MNs that show below baseline
activity during both action execution and observation (di Pel-
legrino et al. 1992), about the source(s) of inhibitory input
(frontal executive regions, parietal cortex, and/or other F5
neurons), and about the developmental history (e.g., the
training received by the animals prior to recording) of the
monkeys in which suppression MNs can be found.
Fogassi suggests that two observations favor the genetic
account, which postulates goal encoding, over the associat-
ive account: The activity of some MNs covaries with the
outcome of the observed movement (grasp-to-eat versus
grasp-to-place), and “the percentage of MNs tuned for
the hard-wired action (grasp-to-eat) is much higher than
that of MNs tuned for the learned action (grasp-to-
place).” We discussed the ﬁrst of these observations in
O2F (sect. 5.2), showing that the pattern of covariation
can be explained by contextual associative learning. We
cannot see how the second observation bears on the dis-
tinction between the genetic and associative accounts as
they were described in the target article or why the com-
mentator identiﬁes grasp-to-eat as “hard-wired” and
grasp-to-place as “learned,” but it should in any case be
clear that the associative account predicts varying pro-
portions of MNs as a function of the differential contextual
sensorimotor experience received by the animal.
R4. Still the right kind of learning
In section 5 of O2F we argued that domain-general prin-
ciples of associative learning, including contingency
sensitivity and contextual modulation, provide a uniﬁed
explanatory framework for the ﬁeld properties of MNs.
While many commentators agree that associative learning
plays a signiﬁcant role, some argue that a special kind of
associative learning is involved in the development of
MNs. In section R2 we have responded to commentaries
which suggest that it is special in being adaptively special-
ized. In this section, we turn to commentaries which
suggest that the development of MNs depends on associat-
ive learning that is more “Hebbian,”more “ideomotor,” and
more “high-level” than that which has been revealed by
research on conditioning in animals.
R4.1. Hebbian and/or associative?
In O2F we offered two interpretations of what Keysers
et al. describe as the Hebbian hypothesis: On one
reading, it is “identical in substance to the associative
hypothesis [and] helpful in providing a more detailed neur-
onal model of how sensorimotor experience makes MNs
out of motor neurons” (sect. 8.1, para. 1), and on the
other reading –which we thought “less likely to represent
the authors’ intentions” – “‘Hebbian learning’ differs from
‘associative learning’ in depending on contiguity alone,
rather than both contiguity and contingency” (sect. 8.1,
para. 2). In their commentary, Keysers et al. seem to
conﬁrm that our ﬁrst interpretation was correct. They cer-
tainly emphasize the neuronal speciﬁcity of their model,
and stress that, however Hebbian learning may have been
understood in the past, Keysers et al. understand it to be
a process that depends on contingency. However, if, as
they suggest, the associative and Hebbian accounts are
merely “descriptions at different levels,” and it is “idle” to
argue that one is better than the other, it is not clear why
Keysers et al. also suggest that the two accounts make
different predictions; that the Hebbian account would,
and the associative account would not, predict the for-
mation of associations between as well as within action
phases – for example, between “reach-STS” (observation
of reaching) and “grasp-PM” (execution of grasping), as
well as between “grasp-STS” (observation of grasping)
and “grasp-PM” (execution of grasping). Two theories are
either equivalent, and it is idle to ask which is correct, or
they make different empirical predictions, and it is the
basic stuff of science to test them against one another.
In this case, we think that Keysers et al. are right about
the equivalence rather than the differential predictions.
Tracking of predictive relationships between events
(rather than event co-occurrence), via prediction error, is
at the heart of the formal models of learning that under-
write the associative account (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner
1972; Schultz & Dickinson 2000). Therefore, the associat-
ive account is wholly compatible with “sensory prediction”
(Keysers et al.), “predictive coding” (Brass & Muhle-
Karbe; Kilner & Friston; Press et al. 2011), and, most
speciﬁcally, with the formation of associations between, as
well as within, action phases. The challenge for both the
associative and the Hebbian views – assuming they are
equivalent in substance – is to deﬁne the conditions in
which learning produces “classical” MNs, which ﬁre
during the observation and execution of the same action
(e.g., grasping), and those in which it yields nonmatching
MNs such as logically related MNs, that may encode
relations between successive components of an action
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sequence. The advantage of the associative/Hebbian
account over the genetic account is that it can readily
accommodate both kinds of MNs because associative learn-
ing is all about prediction rather than matching. However,
because associative learning does prediction on a variety of
timescales, those who support an associative account need
to work on predicting the timescale on which it will operate
for different types of action and of sensorimotor
experience.
R4.2. Ideomotor and/or associative
In their thoughtful commentary, Brass & Muhle-Karbe
suggest that MNs are a neural substrate of ideomotor rep-
resentations, established through the formation of
response-effect associations, and contrast this with our
associative account, which identiﬁes MNs as “sensorimo-
tor” representations and refers to “sensorimotor” learning
(see also Ho, MacDonald, & Swain [Ho et al.]). They
may well be right. There may be a real, empirically testable
difference between their ideomotor account and our
associative model. But, as with Keysers et al., where
Brass & Muhle see conﬂict, we see harmony. We suspect
that the two views seem to be different because what we
call “stimuli” they call “response effects,” but the two
accounts are in fact united in suggesting that the critical
associations – the associations that give MNs their cardinal
properties – link neuronal representations of “R” and “E,”
not “S” and “R,” in their diagram (see Fig. 1 in Brass &
Muhle-Karbe’s commentary). If this is correct, our training
experiments (O2F, sect. 7.1) contain the right ingredients
for the ideomotor account – they expose participants to
contingent relationships between R and E, execution and
observation of action – but not in the order in which
these events are typically experienced in everyday life. In
each trial of our training regimes, participants observe an
action and then execute an action. We have used this
kind of regime because it is easier to control the contingen-
cies experienced by participants when the observed action
comes ﬁrst, and because there is compelling evidence that
associative learning is bidirectional (Ayres et al. 1987;
Elsner & Hommel 2001; 2004; Mahoney & Ayres 1976).
It is important to note that, conﬁrming the bidirectionality
assumption, other groups have replicated and extended our
ﬁndings using training regimes in which response execution
precedes action observation (e.g., Wiggett et al. 2011).
Of course, the proof of the ideomotor/associative
pudding will be in the testing, but the examples mentioned
by Brass & Muhle-Karbe do not yet convince us that it
will be possible to generate differential predictions. They
suggest that two empirical ﬁndings are inconsistent with
the associative account. In the ﬁrst, Kunde (2001) found
that responses were executed faster when followed by
compatible, rather than incompatible, sensory effects – evi-
dence for anticipatory excitation of the sensory conse-
quences of action. However, as discussed in the previous
paragraph, the associative account is compatible with pre-
dictive motor-to-sensory propagation, following exposure
to either S-R or R-E contingencies. In the second study,
Liepelt et al. (2008b) found a larger index/middle auto-
matic imitation effect when fractional ﬁnger movements
were presented inside, rather than alongside, metal
clamps. Applying the associative account, Heyes (2011)
agreed with the view (proposed by Brass previously and
given by Brass & Muhle-Karbe in their present commen-
tary) that this could be described as an effect on mirroring
of “high-level beliefs about the intentionality of the
observed action,” but suggested that the effect was
mediated by enhanced attention to the clamped move-
ments (see also Heil et al. and Brown & Brüne).
R4.3. Reasoning and/or association
The associative account identiﬁes the learning processes
involved in the development of MNs with those that
produce conditioning in a variety of animal species.
However, Heil et al. argue that this type of “low-level”
associative process is ill-suited to producing MNs. Appeal-
ing to evidence that beliefs about causal structure can
modulate human associative learning, Heil et al. raise the
possibility that another type of associative process is
responsible for the development of MNs, one that is
shaped by and integrates higher-level cognitive processes.
This is an interesting but, in its current form, largely specu-
lative hypothesis. To make it testable, Heil et al. would
need to say more about the kind of high-level processes
they take to be involved in the development and online
control of MNs (e.g., the processes that yield contingency
awareness may or may not be reasoning processes) and
about the way in which the high- and low-level processes
are supposed to interact. In humans, language-mediated
high-level processes can certainly inﬂuence associative
learning by modulating input mechanisms – for example,
task instructions can direct participants’ attention towards
or away from the computer screen on which stimuli are
presented – but this kind of interaction is entirely compati-
ble with our associative hypothesis (e.g., Lotem &
Kolodny). To motivate their hypothesis, Heil et al. would
also need to cite ﬁndings from the MN literature that
they regard as consistent with a high-level associative
process, but inconsistent with a low-level mechanism. At
present they suggest only that a high-level process would
be needed if MNs are to mediate action understanding.
This may be so, but it is not a compelling argument in
favor of a high-level process given the ambiguity of the
term “action understanding” (O2F, sect. 3.1), and the cor-
responding lack of clear evidence that MNs mediate action
understanding (O2F, sect. 9.2).
In section R4 we have argued that both the associative
and Hebbian accounts are compatible with predictive
coding; that the associative account is complementary to,
not in conﬂict with, ideomotor theory; and that there are
currently no data from MN research suggesting that their
development or operation is guided by a “higher-level”
associative process. We therefore maintain that phylogen-
etically ancient associative processes are “the right kind of
learning” to yield the ﬁeld properties of MNs.
R5. Poverty of the poverty argument
In section 6 of O2F we argued that human developmental
environments typically contain multiple sources of the kind
of correlated sensorimotor experience necessary to build
MNs; each of these sources is rich; and the mechanisms
of associative learning can make swift and efﬁcient use of
these sources. No commentary queried the evidence in
support of this “wealth of the stimulus” argument. We
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also suggested that imitation and EEG data from human
and monkey neonates do not support a complementary
“poverty of the stimulus” argument; they do not show
that MNs develop too soon to be built by associative learn-
ing. Some commentators have concurred with this view.
For example, Oberman et al. agree that the evidence
for neonatal imitation is limited, and suggest that, even if
the evidence were stronger, it is unlikely that neonatal imi-
tation would reﬂect MN activity because the cortical areas
containing MNs are not fully developed at birth. Similarly,
Rizzolatti ﬁnds it hard to “conceive how the mirror mech-
anism of a neonate might have a neurological maturity such
as to provide a precise copy of tongue protrusion.”
However, two commentaries have opposed our view of
the neonatal imitation literature: Gallese & Sinigaglia
do so implicitly, by simply stating that neonates imitate,
but Simpson et al. cite evidence that, in their view,
shows that neonatal imitation is a “real phenomenon.”
There are, in our view, several problems with Simpson
et al.’s survey of the literature on neonatal imitation.
First, in pointing out that neonatal imitation has been
demonstrated “in over two-dozen studies,” it focuses on
positive effects and disregards the greater number of pub-
lished studies reporting negative effects; failure to ﬁnd evi-
dence of neonatal imitation (see Fig. 2 in O2F). Second,
the vast majority of the positive ﬁndings cited by Simpson
et al. come from studies that incurred a high risk of Type
I error because they did not use the standard, “cross-
target” or “double-dissociation” procedure. This procedure
reduces the risk that nonspeciﬁc effects of a movement
stimulus will be mistaken for imitation (production of a
speciﬁc, matching response) by comparing the frequency
of action A following observation of A and B, and the fre-
quency of B following observation of A and B; that is,
looking for an interaction between stimulus and response.
The only evidence of such an interaction cited by
Simpson et al. (Ferrari et al. 2006) could have occurred
by chance; it appeared to be present on only one of four
test days and across only the lip-smacking–tongue-protru-
sion comparison. Consistent with this possibility, the
effect appears not to have been replicated in a subsequent
study by the same authors (Paukner et al. 2011; see O2F for
discussion). Finally, Simpson et al. do not offer compelling
reasons to believe that the mixture of positive and negative
ﬁndings, illustrated in Figure 2 of O2F, is due to individual
differences in neonatal imitation rather than a general lack
of imitative capacity in newborns. Yes, it is possible that
neonates vary in their ability to imitate, and they are cer-
tainly difﬁcult to test. But in humans the tongue-protrusion
effect has been replicated many times, suggesting that
current procedures are good enough to detect a signal
when a signal is there to be found.
We argued in O2F that the tongue-protrusion signal is
reliable but indicative of an oral exploratory response
rather than imitation (Jones 1996; 2006). Contesting this
view, Simpson et al. cite a new study (Nagy et al. 2013)
indicating that observation of tongue-protrusion does not
induce arm and leg movement. Appendage movements
are unlikely to be part of oral exploration, and therefore
this study does not bear on our point.
Turning from imitation to EEG measures, Simpson
et al. and Oberman et al. argue on two grounds that
alpha suppression during action observation is a valid indi-
cator of MN activity in neonatal monkeys: (1) When human
adults observe action, alpha suppression has been found
alongside BOLD responses in premotor cortex, and (2)
some studies have found that when people with autism
spectrum conditions (ASC) observe action, they show less
alpha suppression than neurotypical controls. The ﬁrst of
these observations does not establish alpha suppression as
a valid index of motor, rather than somatosensory, activity,
because alpha effects correlate with both premotor and
somatosensory BOLD responses (Arnstein et al. 2011);
MEPs during action execution correlate with beta, but
not with alpha, suppression (Lepage et al. 2008); and in
adults the source of alpha suppression during action
execution has been traced to somatosensory cortex (Hari
& Salmelin 1997). It is likely that, because of the high con-
nectivity between somatosensory and motor areas, motor
activity sometimes contributes to alpha suppression.
However, even if a motor contribution could be demon-
strated in studies of action observation in infants, it would
remain an open question whether the motor contribution
represented mirroring – activation of motor programs cor-
responding to the actions observed – or a generalized readi-
ness to act. The force of the second observation – that
people with autism show less alpha suppression than con-
trols – rests on the highly controversial assumption that
people with autism have abnormal MNs (Bird et al. 2007;
Press et al. 2010; Southgate & Hamilton 2008).
Research on mirroring in neonates faces formidable
methodological challenges. Unless or until these are over-
come, it cannot support a compelling poverty of the stimu-
lus argument.
R6. Convergent evidence and extensions of the
associative account
Many commentators have presented convergent evidence
supporting the associative account. Oosterhof, Wiggett,
& Cross (Oosterhof et al.) report multivariate pattern
analyses (MVPA) of fMRI data that indicate mirror – sen-
sorimotor matching – responses in brain areas outside the
classical parietal-frontal mirror circuit. As Oosterhof et al.
note, the ﬁnding that mirror responses are widespread
across the brain is in line with the predictions of the associ-
ative account. It also therefore counters those commenta-
tors who argue that the associative account must be
wrong because MNs are only found in restricted brain
areas (Bonaiuto; Fogassi; Martin & Santos; Orban).
Saygin & Dick discuss evidence indicating that mirror
responses are not solely responsive to biological stimuli,
being present also for point-light displays and robotic or
android movements. As they note, and particularly in the
light of evidence that some MNs respond maximally to
unnatural stimuli (see R2.2 and Cook 2012), such ﬁndings
ﬁt more closely with an associative than with a genetic
account of MN matching properties.
Presenting further convergent evidence for the associat-
ive account, several commentators mention data demon-
strating experiential effects, both on social behavior more
generally and on mirror responses in particular. Reader
outlines studies showing that associative learning allows
both birds and insects to learn from conspeciﬁcs, while
Newman discusses how experience modulates squirrel
monkeys’ vocal responses to other monkeys’ calls. Holt &
Lotto report data demonstrating that in infants, cortical
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responses to perceived speech sounds in motor areas show
a developmental proﬁle consistent with experience-depen-
dent learning; and Saygin & Dick discuss a study showing
effects of sensorimotor experience on responses to per-
ceived sounds in premotor areas (Dick et al. 2011).
A number of commentators suggest ways in which the
associative account could be extended to reward proces-
sing, speech processing, and high-level social interaction.
Brown & Brüne (see also Giese) suggest the associative
account may provide a useful framework for conceptualiz-
ing the role of reward in the development and function of
the mirror mechanism. This line of enquiry is well worth
pursuing, but interpreting the role of reward in the oper-
ation of a mature mirror mechanism is unlikely to be
easy. Whereas Brown & Brüne suggest that putative
examples of contextual modulation may in fact reﬂect
differences in the processing or value of reward, an alterna-
tive interpretation is that instances of putative modulation
by reward reﬂect stimulus-driven contextual control. More-
over, where participants attend closely to actions associated
with reward or punishment, differential mirror responses
may also reﬂect input modulation (Heyes 2011).
In their commentary, de la Rosa & Bülthoff highlight
the value of contingency sensitivity and contextual modu-
lation for understanding how humans behave in social
interactions. We certainly echo this view. Contingency sen-
sitivity offers an elegant account of the emergence of auto-
matic imitation of some actions, but prepotent
complementary responses for others (Tiedens & Fragale
2003). Moreover, interactive behavior is frequently ambig-
uous: The appropriate response to an observed action may
be imitative in one situation, but complementary in
another. Contextual modulation by physical features of
the context (e.g., visual, auditory cues) or internal states
(e.g., level of arousal, presence of hormones) may serve
to resolve this ambiguity and thereby enable ﬂexibly adap-
tive behavior (Cook et al. 2012a).
Another commentary that addresses behavior in social
interactions is that of Duran, Dale, & Richardson
(Duran et al.). These authors endorse the associative
account, but we disagree with their characterization of our
account as “negative eliminativist”: On the contrary, we
believe our proposal for a new approach to investigation of
MN function is a positive message, and it has been viewed
as such by most commentators (see R7.2). However, we
applaud the ambition of Duran et al.’s thesis, which seeks
to use domain-general processes, including associative
learning, to explain social interaction in naturalistic settings.
R7. Looking ahead
The ﬁnal section of O2F called for a new approach to
research on MNs, with a keen eye on participants’ develop-
mental history, and using system-level theory to deﬁne
putative functions of MNs and rigorous experimental
methods to test the system-level hypotheses. In this
section we respond to comments on the theoretical
(R7.1) and empirical (R7.2) components of these proposals.
R7.1. Understanding “action understanding”
In O2F we pointed out that there is “no consensus about
exactly what is meant by ‘action understanding,’ or how it
differs from cognate functions such as ‘action perception,’
‘action recognition,’ and ‘action selection’ ” (sect. 3.1,
para. 2). This is a conceptual problem that has generated
a major empirical problem. When it is not clear what a
mechanism is supposed to be doing, it is all but impossible
to design experiments ﬁnding out whether the supposition
is correct. We also suggested that the best way to solve this
problem would be to focus on the development of system-
level theories (sect. 9.1.2), in which MNs feature as one
component of a system deﬁned by its outcome or typical
effect and in which the role of MNs is clearly distinguished
from, and related to, the roles of other components (Heyes,
in press).
In the commentaries, no one denies that understanding
“action understanding” is a problem, and many endorse the
need for system-level theory, explicitly or by discussing par-
ticular system-level theories with enthusiasm (Behme;
Heil et al.; Holt & Lotto; Kilner & Friston; Lingnau
& Caramazza; Saygin & Dick). (We particularly like
Kilner & Friston’s slogan, “no neuron is an island.”)
However, conﬁrming that we have not constructed a
straw man (cf. the claim by Oberman et al.), members
of the Parma group eschew the system-level approach.
Instead, these commentators seek to elucidate the “action
understanding” function of MNs by (1) repeating the
claim that they encode or interpret action “goals”
(Fogassi; Gallese & Sinigaglia), and are therefore
“bearers of intentionality” (Gallese & Sinigaglia); (2)
noting that MNs transform “sensory information into a
motor format” (Rizzolatti); and (3) describing MN-
mediated action understanding as “action understanding
‘from inside’ (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010): ‘a ﬁrst person
process, where the self feels like an actor, rather than a
spectator’ ” (Rizzolatti).
The ﬁrst of these strategies is not promising because, as
we argued in O2F (sect. 4), the term “goal” is at least as
ambiguous as “action understanding,” and on at least two
natural interpretations of “goal” – as an object of action
and as a high-level intention – the evidence suggests that
goals are not selectively encoded by MNs. The second
strategy is more straightforward, but it is clearly insufﬁcient
because it does not refer to the cardinal, matching proper-
ties of MNs. They can certainly be said to transform sensory
information into a motor format, but that is also true of, for
example, canonical neurons. The third strategy is phenom-
enological; it distinguishes MN-mediated action under-
standing from other sorts of action understanding with
reference to the actor’s conscious experience –whether
he or she “feels” like an actor or a spectator. This suggestion
is coherent and intuitively appealing, but it is unlikely to be
helpful as a guide for experimental research. Without a
return to the methods of introspectionism, researchers in
psychology and neuroscience are “spectators”; we are “on
the outside,” trying to work out the function of MNs, not
by examination of our own conscious experience, but by
studying the brains and behavior of other people. There-
fore, to use the phenomenological strategy we would
need to be told how, from the outside, to distinguish
“inside” and “outside” action understanding; how these
types of action understanding differ in terms of the obser-
vable behavior they produce.
Rizzolatti also explains with helpful clarity that he now
believes that mirror neurons contribute to social cognitive
functions such as imitation, empathy, and song recognition,
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as well as action understanding, and regards “the problem
of how MNs originate [as] utterly irrelevant as far as their
function is concerned.” We have no quarrel whatever
with these views; they are wholly in accord with the “func-
tionally permissive” character of the associative hypothesis
(O2F, sect. 9) and the way in which it splits questions about
the origin of MNs from questions about their function.
However, it is important to note that these views do not
make the genetic hypothesis a straw man –Fogassi’s com-
mentary and the quotations in O2F (sect. 3.1), attest to its
reality – or obviate the need for system-level theory.
Indeed, they increase that need. There are just two
widely recognized methods of deﬁning the function of a
trait in a biological system: one does it with reference to
the trait’s history, typically its evolutionary history, and
the other, “functional analysis,” does it in the context of
what we have described as system-level theory (Cummins
1975; Godfrey-Smith 1994). Given that these are the two
paths available, rejection of the history route – denial that
the function of MNs relates to their origins –makes
pursuit of the alternative, system-level theory, absolutely
essential; and multiplying the putative functions of MNs
means that we need system-level theories deﬁning the
role of MNs, not only in action understanding, but also in
imitation, empathy, and song recognition.
Gallese & Sinigaglia are absolutely right: the mere fact
that “action understanding” is a new term is not a reason to
reject it. All we are saying, here and in O2F, is that those
who use the term need to tell us what it means, and to
do so in the context of system-level theory.
R7.2. Experimental approaches
Few commentators (except perhaps Fogassi) disagree with
our proposal that MN research should report participants’
developmental history: that is, their sensory, motor, and
sensorimotor experience with the actions for which MNs
are being tested. Indeed, Gervais comments on the
“value of the enterprise” of documenting the effects that
variation in developmental environment may have on the
ontogeny and function of MNs. In this vein, the develop-
mental data described by Krogh-Jespersen, Filippi, &
Woodward (Krogh-Jespersen et al.) are a promising
start. These data demonstrate how infants’ motor experi-
ence (speciﬁcally, in this case, their tendency to produce
goal-directed actions) relates to their neural responses to
observation of others’ actions; to their ability to understand
others’ actions; and to their ability to imitate. These ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with the predictions of the associative
account; however, they serve to highlight the importance
of assessing participants’ previous sensorimotor (not just
motor; cf. Gallese & Sinigaglia; Rizzolatti) experience
with speciﬁc actions when investigating neural responses
to, understanding of, or imitation of those actions (see
earlier response to Bertenthal for further explication of
this point).
Several other commentators appear to embrace our sug-
gestion that MN research pay closer attention to develop-
mental history: Simpson et al. propose examining the
effects of early sensorimotor experience on imitation,
whileHo et al. note that it would be informative to consider
the development ofMNs in infantswho have atypical experi-
ence, for example, those who cannot walk themselves or
whose parents suffer from depression. We wholeheartedly
concur that research with these populations could prove
highly informative in dissociating the relative roles played
by sensory, motor, and correlated sensorimotor experience
in the development of MNs, and perhaps also shed some
light on their function.
We are pleased that most commentators have endorsed
our call for a more rigorous, experimental approach to the
investigation of MN function (Behme; Gervais; Holt &
Lotto; Krogh-Jespersen et al.; Lingnau & Caramazza;
Newman; Oosterhof et al.; Reader; de la Rosa &
Bülthoff). Here we address some criticisms of our propo-
sals and discuss the commentators’ additional suggestions
for future research.
Orban’s commentary illustrates the constraints that have
been placed on MN research to date by the genetic
account. It suggests that MNs have only, and will only, be
found for grasping actions; that MNs can only be con-
sidered such when found in classical areas; and that only
a primate model holds any value for understanding the
human brain. Such suggestions are in accord with an
account that considers MNs to be a genetic adaptation
for representing others’ grasping actions in one’s own
motor system (see also Fogassi). They illustrate the risk
that the genetic account will conﬁne future research to
certain actions, brain areas, and species. However, as we
indicated in the target article, the associative account pre-
dicts (and data support these predictions) that mirror
neurons will be found for a range of actions (e.g., Ferrari
et al. 2003), in a range of brain areas (e.g., Dushanova &
Donoghue 2010; Mukamel et al. 2010; Tkach et al.
2007), and across a range of species (e.g., Prather et al.
2008). We therefore see no reason to reject the possibility
that MNs could be induced in other species through sen-
sorimotor training of species-appropriate actions.
We are not aware of any research that has investigated
whether MNs are present in rodents. However, those com-
mentators who deny that MNs are (Gervais), or could be
(Orban), present in rodents (or in other species;
Oberman et al.) seem to have misunderstood our point.
The associative account suggests that whether MNs are
likely to exist in laboratory (or indeed free-living) rats will
depend on their prior learning history; but it makes the
strong prediction that regardless of whether they are
present or not, appropriate experience in which the sight
or sound of an action is paired contingently with execution
of that action should produce visuo- or auditory-motor
MNs for that action, in rodents and indeed in any other
species. This approach is also endorsed by Reader’s com-
mentary, in which he proposes the use of insect or ﬁsh
models to investigate MNs. Building on the previous
point, Newman’s commentary provides an interesting
description of behaviors consistent with the existence of
audio-vocal mirror-like circuits in a variety of species. We
agree with Newman that it would be interesting to test
for MNs in these species – indeed the presence of audio-
vocal MNs in swamp sparrows has already been demon-
strated (Prather et al. 2008).
The preceding commentators have focused on exper-
imentation into MN properties. Other commentators
propose investigation of the possible role of MNs in conta-
gious behavior (Provine) and in higher-level social cogni-
tion tasks: Martin & Santos advocate carrying out single-
unit recording while macaques undergo tests assessing
their awareness of others’ knowledge. We believe that
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such an endeavor would beneﬁt from the kind of system-
level analysis we have outlined in the target article (see
also Holt & Lotto). Such an analysis would specify, for
example, the role that MNs are predicted to play in these
tests and whether or not this role must be carried out by
MNs.
Several commentaries touch on the methodological chal-
lenges facing futureMN research. Lingnau &Caramazza
understood us to be suggesting that research into the
modulation of MN responses by associative learning is suf-
ﬁcient to provide evidence of the role of MNs in social cog-
nition. This is certainly not the case. Instead, the associative
account implies that the function of MNs cannot be discov-
ered solely by research on their ﬁeld properties; tests of the
kind described in O2F (sect. 9.1.3), and promoted by
Lingnau & Caramazza, are also needed. We agree, there-
fore, that temporary and permanent lesion studies are an
important component of research on MN function;
indeed, we presented some evidence from such studies in
the target article. However, such studies are vulnerable to
what we termed the “localization problem”: not all
neurons in “classical” MN areas are mirror neurons and
thus lesion studies may overestimate the involvement of
MNs in the cognitive function of interest.
Oosterhof et al. point out that MVPA, although not a
causal technique, can help to overcome the localization
problem. This method, unlike standard fMRI approaches,
allows measurement of spatially distributed responses to
speciﬁc observed and executed actions. Oosterhof et al.
provide an interesting description of how this technique
could be used to test further the predictions of the associ-
ative account, and we agree that MVPA may also prove a
promising additional tool to investigate the functional prop-
erties of MNs.
Bonaiuto argues that computational models can provide
a convincing demonstration of the concepts underlying the
associative account. We agree and have therefore pre-
viously presented such a model (Cooper et al. 2013a;
2013b). As Bonaiuto suggests, this model requires appro-
priate input representations of actions. It demonstrates
how sensorimotor associative learning can modulate the
development of mirror properties (Cooper et al. 2013b)
and how mirror networks operate, once developed, to
produce imitative behavior (Cooper et al. 2013a). Other
computational models which use domain-general learning
processes and demonstrate the development of MN-like
properties in the domain of speech processing are
described by Holt & Lotto and Saygin & Dick. Giese
also summarizes how insights from visual pattern recog-
nition may be applied to computational modeling of
MNs. Thus, we consider computational modeling to be
important not only for testing accounts of how MNs
develop, but also for providing novel predictions regarding
the functional properties of mature mirror systems.
R8. Conclusion
We are grateful to all of our commentators, combatants and
supporters alike, for studying O2F and contributing their
insights and opinions to the debate. Given our focus on
tests and testability – both in comparing the associative
account with genetic and hybrid models of the origin of
MNs, and in future research on the function of MNs –we
have found the methodological and empirically grounded
commentaries especially valuable, but they are all both
thoughtful and provocative. The contributions from
Rizzolatti and other members of the Parma group were
especially welcome. We disagree with the Parma group
on a number of points, but we have no doubt that their
shining discovery, mirror neurons, will intrigue scientists
and philosophers for many years to come.
NOTES
1. Contrary to what some commentators suggest, we have
demonstrated this not only behaviorally, but also with all of the
neurophysiological measures commonly used to detect MNs in
humans (Bertenthal) and with measures that demonstrate
action-speciﬁcity (Oosterhof et al.).
2. We are very grateful to Nick Shea for suggesting that we lay
out the argument in this way.
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